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PROLOGUE 
This dissertation is polemical, biographical, logical, 
historical, theoretical and practical: 
The treatment of the relationship between sociology 
and social policy does not conform to conventional 
wisdom; and so in order to make its case it is 
perforce polemical. 
The discussion of the relationship between knowledge 
and policy draws upon personal experience; and so it 
cannot avoid being to that extent biographical. 
The argument in favour of a new paradigm for sociology 
is long and complicated; and so to make sense it has 
to be logical. 
The reasoning throughout the whole dissertation, 
however, relies not alone upon logic but also upon a 
sense of history, which combines an appreciation of 
classical philosophy and modern sociology in a single 
outlook. 
This dissertation is theoretical inasmuch as it provides 
a philosophical paradigm within which the science of 
sociology can be understood and its relationship with 
social policy determined. 
The dissertation is also practical inasmuch as evidence 
can be provided of the use of its paradigms for actually 
affecting current social policy. 
Fo r examples of the application of the fundamental principles 
discussed in this dissertation to actual policy formulation, 
please see the fo llowing fo ur wo rks: 
1. 'A Survey of Prog rams Relevant to Youth of the Federal 
Departments and Agencies', by T. 0 Brien . under 
contract with the Citizenship Branch of the Secretary 
of State, Ottawa, Canada, 970. 
2 . 'Planning- Becoming-Oevelopment', by T. 0 Brien , Centre 
for Co ntinuing Education, Australian National 
University, Canberra, 1977. 
i 1 
3. 'Job-Generation ' , by T. 0 Brien, Hill of Content, 
Me 1 bourne, 1981. 
4. Australia, Joint Parliamentary Committee of Public 
Accounts, Report 213, Income Maintenance ?ro grams, 
A.G.P.S., Canberra, 1983. 
The author of this dissertation provided the conceptual 
framework for the above ment ioned report and it is ideas 
arising out of the preparatory r esearch that are 
discussed in this document. 
The author vlishes to extend his thanks to all those who 
helped him to produce this dissertation and i n 
particular to Professor J. Zubrzycki. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The way in which communities organise themselves can be 
observed from three different angles. Initially. one 
may adopt the role of a community development worker 
and walk the streets and talk with individuals. groups . 
committees and organisations in particular localities. 
Alternatively, one may step aside into a university and 
study sociology and review community theory. Else. one 
may join the public service. Here there is a chance of 
working with both administrators and politicians. 
learning how they view the organisation of the national 
community. Thus one may acquire three distinct ways of 
understanding diverse aspects of the same reality. 
Chapter 1 explains how the above three perspectives can 
be complementary to each other. The second chapter sets 
out a theoretical framework for understanding the practice 
of community development. It takes two subsequent chapters 
to draw up a sensible definition of sociology and to show 
the relationship between sociological ideas and programs aimed 
at sponsoring development from the bottom upwards. But 
much community development also takes place from the top 
downwards through the implementation of government social 
poli~y. So. the final four chapters are spent clarifying 
the meaning of social policy. 
Ordinarily, different perspectives on the same reality 
give rise to conflict; and so attempts are often made to keep 
it at a minimum by approach avoidance techniques. In 
other words separate organisations compartmentalise their 
functions and avoid as much as possible any inter:erence 
from others. Nonetheless. just as often, people can 
only bring about significant developments in the functioning 
of democratic institutions when they are prepared to engage 
in organisational interactions and to accept the risk of 
tensions that these may cause. 
So, the following study makes three salient points : 
Community development is interpreted in different ways 
as the viewpoint from which it is seen varies; 
A sociologist can enhance his ability to contrihute to 
social policy when he can clearly define what he means 
by sociology and can articulate its relationship to 
politics and ethics; 
Policy analysts who appreciate the nuances of distributive 
justice can clearly see the need for a more integrated 
philosophy of public administration and a consequent 
improvement in the arrangement and coordination of 
departmental functions. 
PART I 
THINGS, KNOWLEDGE AND CHOICE 
CHAPTER 1 
CHANGING OUTLOOKS 
Sociology derives its origins from philosophy and its effectiveness 
from public administration. So, this study begins by identifying a 
philosophical perspective. In subsequent chapters this leads to an 
original angle on the nature and function of sociology. In turn, this 
fresh outlook on sociology ooens up a sensible way of understanding public 
administration. 
In philosophy I am a moderate realist. Those who are familiar 
with Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy will understand what I mean by 
that. Those who have read Bernard J.F. Lonergan's classic work on 
'Insight' will be able to appreciate even better my basic philosophical 
position. 1 However, here and now my purpose is not to elaborate on my 
philosophy but rather to explain my sociology. Consequently I propose 
to put my philosophy in a nutshell, precisely for the purpose of .making 
it easier for others to recognise how I handle sociological concepts. 
I submit that all philosophy can be summed up in three concepts: 
things, thought and choice. Around these fundamental concepts have 
grown systems of ontology, epistemology and morality. In a moderate 
realist philosophy all three branches of knowledge are well integrated 
with each other to form a single composite viewpoint. 
Putting my philosophy into its simplest terms, I can state that I 
am aware of things outside of me of which I have some knowledge and on 
the basis of that knowledge I have to make choices about how I will act. 
For a moderate realist, reality, knowledge, choice and action are 
intimately linked to each other. In other words, my moderate realism 
is an essentially practical philosophy. 
At their most basic, philosophical problems concern a complex 
reality which exists independently, regardless of whether individuals 
know it or not. From an awareness of this reality I der ive knowledge: 
some of which I can grasp intuitively; some of which I can gain from 
"'Insight', the largest ... Iork Lonergan has written, is at a conservative 
estimate one of the half a dozen or so most important philosophical 
books to have ao~eared in the course of the present century. II c .. Meyne 11, 
H.A., An Introduction to the Philosophy of Bernard Lonergan, Macmillan 
Press Ltd, London, 1976. 
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experience; and some of which I have to sort out by collecting data on 
it. Ultimately, though, on the basis of such knowledge, even when it 
is imperfect, I have to make choices. Some of these choices will relate 
to the reality that I originally apprehend; some such choices will 
relate to the thought I have gleaned from my experience, and some such 
cAoices will relate to other choices that I have previously made. 
Choice is a most significant element in my philosophy. Although 
am convinced, and am prepared to affirm, that it is possible to be 
certain about some simple, material and cognitive facts, I accept that 
much of my knowledge is imperfect, tentative, analogical. Consequently, 
I, like others, am constantly confronted with the necessity of making 
choices on the basis of imperfect knowledge. To guide one in acting 
on such knowledge there is a need for a keen appreciation of the 
principles of morality, ethics, and politics. I and many like me would 
consider that any philosophy which did not grapple with ethical problems 
was inadequately comprehensive. 
I will not source the above ideas by referring them to any particular 
writer, because to the best of my knowledge no one has previously 
expressed them in the way that I have here. Nonetheless, throughout the 
next half of this dissertation I do display that I have read widely in 
both philosophy and sociology and it is from this reading that the above 
ideas have crystallised. 
The question now emerges: How does all this relate to sociology? 
When I am confronted with the problems of what sociology is? what 
it does? what it can achieve? I fall back quite naturally on what I know 
of the essentials of philosophy. I want to understand sociology in 
terms of its ontology, epistemology and morality. In other words I want 
to know what is its subject matter, what are its methods of knowing its 
subject matter, and on the basis of such knowing, how can this science 
contribute to choices that have to be made. 
The main difference between a moderate realist philosophy and 
sociology is that the former has a primordial concentration on the 
individuality of things, whereas sociology prefers to deal with their 
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social aspect. On the one hand a philosopher will approach a problem 
by stating that there is a thing outside of him and on the basis of his 
knowledge of it, he will choose what he can say or do about it. On the 
other hand, a sociologist is more likely to frame the same problem thus: 
there are groups outside us and we can obtain certain data about them 
and on the basis of our understanding of these data we can understand how 
our society is organised. Usually a sociologist will stop there. He 
will not go a further step and state that we can understand how our 
society ouoht to be organised. Modern mainstream sociology does not 
generally shape its fundamental problems in terms of ethics. 
Often sociologists seem to consider choice as little more than 
opinions - which are sometimes called value judgments. Fact is 
separated from value. Fact is considered as objective, observable and 
measurable - though a moderate realist will counter this contention by 
pointing out that there are as many interpretations of fact as there are 
philosophies. In the main, value is considered as a matter of personal 
preference, where there are a number of such preferences and all of them 
are of more or less equal importance. On the other hand ethical choice 
is often virtually inescapable in so far as it must be consistent with 
one's ontology and epistemology. But some sociologists would find that 
last statement irritatingly incomprehensible - a matter for metaphysics, 
irrelevant to their science. 
Given this intellectual milieu a sociologist who is a moderate 
realist can sometimes be made to feel like a fish out of water. In as 
much as he understands the philosophy of logical positivism he will find 
easy acceptance in sociological circles. He who is an empiricist is 
welcome: but he who does not want "to limit his philosophy to empiricism 
is more likely to be made unwelcome. In effect he may be excluded from 
the discipline or simply tolerated within it. Else he may feel forced 
to succumb to the intellectual dominance of a major sociological school, 
unless he can articulate a credible counter position. Academic freedom, 
however, demands that the chance to do this be open to him. 
Social Science and Public Policy 
This latter "task has been made easier recently; because nowadays 
there is a great deal of disillusionment with a social science which is 
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uncomfortable with ethics. In few places is this more obvious than 
in the efforts of sociology to establish its bearings in regard to public 
policy . The difficulty in the relationship between the two can be made 
plainer by personal ising it and stating that when sociologists wish to 
act as advisers to governments, they are inevitably confronted not alone 
with choices, but also with systems of knowledge which provide 
principles for making choices: politics, ethics and morality. 
Martin Rein's book on 'Social Science and Public Policy' is a good 
example of an effort to reconcile the two. In it Rein stated that he 
was interested in the uses of social science for public policy. So in 
search of an answer to how one could be used for the other he began to 
explore how the subject was dealt with in philosophy. His book implies 
he did not find the answer. Instead what he discovered was that 
philosophical debate was, by and large, abstract and divorced from 
specific policy concerns while modern social science literature was, by 
contrast, more concrete, but without the benefit of a formal framework 
from which to address ethical and epistemological issues. 2 My immediate 
reaction to t~is remark is that a comprehensive framework for the 
reconciliation of social science and public policy would have to be one 
which gave due importance, balance and consideration to ontological, 
epistemological and ethical issues. 
Rein concludes that it would surely be intriguing to discover ways 
in which philosophical and sociological traditions could be integrated 
or, at least, in which differences between them could be identified and 
analysed. But Rein himself does not attempt to do so in this book of 
essays. He simply tries to deal with a philosophical problem: the 
dichotomy between fact and value. He does not try to relate his social 
science to a coherent and comprehensive philosophy. 
In essence Rein considers a clash between a science and a policy. 
submit that he would have had a better chance of being successful in 
solving even his immediate problem had he given equal balance in his 
investigations to a reulity, a science and a policy. 
2 Rein, M. Social Science and Public Policy. Penguin Books Ltd., 
New York, 1976. 
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In this treatise I accept the same kind of challenge that Rein 
faced. In accepting it, I maintain that whether the matter under 
discussion is one for sociology or philosophy attention must be paid to 
the thing, the knowledge and the choice. The thing, of course, is the 
subject matter. The knowledge is really the method of kno~ing, or the 
science. The choice embraces the ethical principles or the political 
processes by which public policy is made. Moreover, in any analysis 
such as Rein's its success depends upon the symmetry that is maintained 
between these three components of the problem. 
Philosophy is very broad in its scope. Indeed one of the 
definitions of a philosophy is that it unites other branches of 
knowledge in a coherent viewpoint. Nonetheless the extensiveness of the 
ground covered by philosophy is less of a problem whenever a scholar 
follows the excellent advice of one of the greatest of all the 
philosophers: Descartes. It is generally known that he insisted on 
getting back to the basics of grasping clear and distinct ideas about 
simple things before getting involved in complicated analysis. I 
suggest that those of us who work with sociological concepts can 
benefit by acquiring a similar facility. 
Consequently in the ensuing paragraphs (and subsequently in the 
chapters that follow) I will explain how I understand a reality: that 
of an organised community. I will then disentangle a definition of 
sociology, by whittling down some descriptions of it until I can state 
simply and clearly what it means to me. Then I will spell out what 
mean by choice and will indicate the comprehensiveness of the 
philosophical and sociological foundation which helps me to wrestle 
with social policy issues. 
Three Perspectives on Social Policy 
However, definitions are much influenced by one ' s current 
perspectives. Consequently, before I get down to definitions, I want 
first of all to draw attention to apparently conflicting, but potentially 
complementary perspectives. To begin with, in regard to issues of public 
policy I name three perspectives as follows: the administrative method 
or common sense perspective; the scientific method or research 
perspective; and the philosophic method or policy perspective. The 
three are distinguishable and may be separate but need not necessarily be so. 
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The Administrative Perspective 
Within the Public Service, for instance, those who concentrate on 
the administrative perspective are primarily interested in the task in 
hand. They wish to know precisely what program objective is to be 
achieved and what are the means to attain it. They are concerned about 
whether there is enough money in the budget to ensure a capable 
performance of a particular departmenta l function and sufficient and 
competent staff to carry out the variety of tasks involved. 
Those who pride themselves on their administrative ability are 
often ready to profess their belief in the importance of common sense. 
The intelligence that goes with common sense is apt to be a 
specialisation in matters which are particular and concrete. The 
function of the administrator is to master each situation as it arises. 
It follows that those who operate primarily from an administrative 
perspective often have an impatience with technical language, research 
methods, general conclusions and statements which claim to have a 
universal validity. The administrator, as a man of common sense, does 
not favour a concentration on theoretical issues . He or she is far 
more at' home in the familiar world of departmental procedures and 
the specific responsibilities of divisions, branches and sections. 
The administrator also places great store on the value of 
experience. Ad~inistrators look for staff who can fit into a given job, 
among a given group of people, someone who can be at intelligent ease 
in every situation in which he is called upon to speak and act. A 
ccmpetent administrator always knows what is going on in his department, 
just what to say in any work situation, just who to contact and where 
the relevant files are, just what neecs to be done and how to go about 
it. His experience has taken him through a cycle of eventualities that 
have occurred in his department. He knows the score. He may have made 
mistakes but he learns not to make them twice. He develops an acumen 
that notices changes in established routines. He can size up a political 
situation before embarking on a course of executive action. He has the 
resourcefulness that hits upon the response that fits in with 
departmental policy as he confronts each new situation. 
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Common sense, although it can be supremely intelligent, has its 
own limitations. It has a basically constant style of bureaucratic 
language , it prefers to stick to its own universe of discourse, and to 
follow its own methodological precept of keeping to the concrete, of 
avoiding analogies and generalisations, and to acknowledge tilat it does 
not feel at home in the realm of the abstract and the universal. 
The Research Perspective 
Those who operate from a research perspective are on a quite 
different wicket. The researcher pins his faith not on this or that 
specific conclusion but rather on the validity of scientific method 
itself. 
The scientific method can be conceived as a process of empirical 
inquiry which moves from the observation of specific data to an 
explanation of their meaning. A principal technique in effecting the 
transition from description to explanation is measurement . In 
constructing the numerical relations of things to one another there is 
introduced into the analysis of any particular problem an almost 
necessary simplification of arrangement. In s2lecting and determining 
standard units of measurement, the scientist introduces into his 
investigations an element that may be conventional or arbitrary, but 
which is always theoretical. 
Those who approach problems of public policy from a research 
perspective pursue their objectives on the basis of hypotheses, research 
designs, statistical techniques and computer analysis. Within such 
frameworks of meaning, the researcher moves from the particular to the 
general, from the concrete to the abstract, from the immediate problem 
to the long- term solution . Whereas those who work from an administrative 
perspective like to move from a familiar program objective to another 
program objective similarly familiar, the researcher seeks to advance 
from the familiar to the unfamiliar, and even from the obvious to the 
hidden. What the researcher offers is usually not an immediate 
solution to the workaday task of administering a program, but rather some 
further insight into the extent and quality of the consequences of the 
program he evaluates. 
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The fact that administrators and researchers have different 
outlooks accounts for the fact that there is often tension between them. 
The researcher is inclined to want to reach a general audience and to 
express his conclusions precisely and to imply that his solutions have 
a g~~eral validity. The administrator prefers to consult with his own 
peer group who have the arduous task of coping with similar administrative 
difficulties and to speak mainly about the practicality of a particular 
course of executive action. 
In the long term, of course, it is obvious that both the 
administrator and the researcher perform tasks which are complementary 
to each other . In the short term, however, there is often tension in 
their relationship. For as long as the tension is present the 
researcher may be temptec to conclude that the administrative 
perspective is somehow crude. In retaliation, the administrator may be 
tempted to make jokes about the ineptitude of those who concentrate on 
research and even to demand that if they are to justify their existence, 
they had better provide more palpable evidence of their usefulness. 
The Policy Perspective 
The development of a policy perspective often depends upon the 
insights of both the common sense of administration and the scientific 
method of research. It can also be sharpened by pursuing a philosophic 
method. The philosophic method, however, is not always understood by 
those who have not a philosophical training. Some social scientists, 
suggests Lonergan, find philosophy baffling, repellent or absurd and 
even dispute whether it has any method at all.
3
* 
3 Lonergan, ~.J.F., Ins i ght, A Study of Human Understanding. Darton 
Longman and Todd, London, 1957. 
* By the same token a philosopher can also be baffled when he finds 
that a sociologist will react to what he considers a fundamental 
fact by labelling it an assumption. To the philosopher it may 
appear that what he held to be knowledge is being taken by his 
sociologist critic to be merely opinion. For instance., for a 
philosopher the existence of the principle that a thing cannot 
be and not be at the same time is a cognitive fact, not an 
assumption, as it may be for a sociologist. In Michel Foucault's 
terminology the disjunctions between the universes of discourse 
of the two disciplines are immense. 
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The basic difference is that scientific method is prior to 
scientific work and independent of particular scientific results, but 
philosophic method is coincident with philosophic work and stands or 
falls with the success or failure of a particular philosophy. Sciences 
are concerned to assign various determinate conceptual concepts to fill 
empty heuristic itructures, so that virtually the same method leads 
necessarily to different determinations . Philosophic method obtains 
its inteqrated view of a single universe of discourse, not by determining 
the contents that fill heuristic structures, but by relating the 
heuristic structures to one another. Scientific method can produce a 
variety of particular conclusions, but philosophic method aims at the 
attainment of a single all-inclusive view. 
As Lonergan points out, just as there is nothing to prevent a 
scientist from being a man of common sense, so there is nothing to 
prevent him from being a philosopher. Indeed, the scientist's dedication 
to truth and his habituation to intellectual patterns of experience are 
conducive to philosophy: In as much as mind itself by its inner unity 
demands the integration of all it knows, the mind of the scientist will be 
all the more impelled to proceed to that integration along a course that 
is at once economical and effective. 
The contribution of science and scientific method to ohilosophy lies 
in its unique ability to supply philosophy with instances of heuristic 
structures - that is various methods of acquiring knowledge. Philosophy 
has been fertilised repeatedly by scientific achievement. But it would 
be a mistake to expect that a philosophy, as such, should conform to the 
method or the linguistic technique or the group mentality of the 
scientist. The distinctive contribution of philosophy to science -
precisely in as much as a philosophy is a metaphysic - is to integrate 
heuristic structures of learning into a single view of the universe. 
Such a view is not only single, it is also necessarily personal. 
In as much as a policy analyst uses a philosophic method he is very 
likely to be dissatisfied with endless analysis and more interested in 
synthesis; he will want to embrace a variety of issues in a single 
conceptual framework; and he will recognise that this tendency will have 
a strongly subjective element in it. Whereas the reasonableness of each 
scientist is a consequence of the reasonableness of all, the philosopher's 
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reasonableness is grounded on a personal commitment to knowledge that 
is essentially his own. For issues in philosophy cannot be settled by 
looking up a handbook, or by reference to a set of experiments 
performed by other scientists, or by appealing to the authoritative 
statements of experts who belong to the past or the present. A 
philosopher often bases an argument on what he proposes as a generally 
accepted axiom and then logically builds up the consequences of 
accepting the initial proposal until he has reached his conclusion. Other 
authors may be quoted, but they are quoted as references only. The 
validity of the argument does not depend upon the authority of others: 
it depends upon the acceptance of premises, the rationality of the 
argument and the reasonableness of the conclusion. 
A philosophical argument must stand on its own merits. Philosophical 
evidence is within the philosopher himself. It exists in his ability to 
use his own experience, to recognise the intelligence he has gained 
through the application of scientific method, to synthesise his knowledge 
by logical reflection, and to present his findings in a way that is 
significant and ideally is easily understood as such by others. 
There is an element of intuition in the use by a policy analyst of 
a philosophic method. But it is not the kind of intuition that comes 
from a stroke of luck. It is far more likely to come from a long and 
conscientious study of relevant issues. It is the result of inquiry and 
insight, reflection and judgment, deliberation and choice. 
When the chips are down a philosophic method involves the policy 
analyst in the risk of making a definite choice on the way to change a 
policy or to meet a future contingency. At the same time, in the course 
of providing arguments, he must exercise a subtlety of mind that displays 
an intelligent appreciation both of the common sense of the administrator 
and of the scientific method of the researcher - both in their differences 
nnd their complementarity. 
From this analysis of the three perspectives - which may be 
operative in any arena of decision making on public policy - it is obvious 
there will always be tension between them. But the degree of tension 
need not be exaggerated. A reconciliation between the three perspectives 
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is possible. In fact such reconciliation is constantly required for 
the formulation and re-formulation of government policies. 
In the preceding paragraphs, the analysis implies that the three 
different perspectives are held by three different classes of people. 
But there is no need to imagine that the three ways of looking at things 
are necessarily characteristic of separate classes - or even of separate 
individuals. There is nothing extraordinary about a single individual 
being able to look at problems of public policy from three different 
angles. Whenever an individual does so, he will be aware of tensions 
within himself. But there is no reason why he cannot reconcile such 
tensions within his own thinking by giving appropriate balance to each 
perspective in his judgments on specific issues. 
A sensitive awareness of various modes of an individual's thought 
is not an unusual characteristic of philosophers. One can learn to 
understand what Lonergan calls the polymorphism of individual 
consciousness. 4 Many sociologists, though, are likely to find such an 
idea peculiar. In their profession, sociologists seldom use an 
expression like the polymorphism of individual consciousness. They prefer 
to point out that different patterns of thinking are caused by different 
social environments. Resiliently, the philosopher will reply that that is 
just another part of a broader but still single truth. Nonetheless, in 
as much as truth is conformity of the mind with reality, sociologists can 
by their science bring a richness to the dimensions of this conformity 
that is often not matched by philosophers who are prepared to rest on 
principle! 
The Influence of Institutions on Perspectives 
In the preceding eight years or so, I have worked for a government 
department, a university and a federal parliament. As a 'participant 
observer' in each of these 'institutions' I have studied and written on 
an aspect of social policy. Each institution has a markedly different 
appreciation of reality, knowledge and choice and this is reflected in my 
writing at each successive stage. 
4 Op.cit. (Lonergan). 
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When I was with the Department of Social Security a dominant 
appreciation prevailed there about the importance of what was called 
common sense administration. Admittedly there were researchers and 
statisticians within the department, but their role was subsidiary to 
that of the administrators. A phil osopher was not in mu ch demand for 
dealing with departmental procedures; but he was useful when a new 
policy was being designed or evaluated. 
The departmental section in which I worked was dealing with a community 
development program called the Australian Assistance Plan (AAP). A 
sociologist in a university may often find it difficult to arrive at a 
theoretically satisfactory definition of 'community'; but for 
administrators this posed no problem. The program being promoted was 
one for the co-ordination of local social welfare services. hose who 
were involved (or could be involved) in the program were considered to 
form a community of interest. When the community of interest was 
operating at a local level, then they were considered as belonging to a 
local government community. So, geography and interest defined the 
community and that was that. The social reality with which we were 
concerned was thus easily - even simplistically - defined. 
When the program called the AAP was terminated by the government 
wrote a monograph on it called Planning-Becoming-Development. 5 The 
language in the monograph reflected the language that was used in the 
department: it was plain, ordinary and sensible. Few social scientists 
were mentioned in it and no references were made to philosophers. All in 
all the program description in the monograph was well structured and 
each chapter displays an ability in clear thinking, but the language was 
sober, the ideas commonplace and the presentation prosaic. In other 
words Planning-Becoming - Development displayed a common-sense approach 
to knowledge similar to that which prevailed within the department. 
In regard to 'choice' the monograph recorded the AAP policy 
decisions and elaborated on their consequences. It is true that I wrote 
not only about the choices that hdd been made but also about choices that 
5 OBrien, T. Planning-Becoming-Development. C.C.E., Australi an 
National University, Canberra. 1977. 
13 
were in the making or could have been made. But once again the salient 
intention of the document was to make a plain statement of what had 
happened, in case a program like it might happen again. 
By the same token the second chapter in this dissertation takes a 
reflective look at the 'community development' theory which underlay 
the Australian Assistance Plan. The intention of this chapter is to 
evolve a theory from a matter-of-fact experience of a program. Once 
again the emphasis is on a logical but common-sense approach to reality, 
knowledge and choice. 
When I left the department and took up a visiting fellowship at the 
university I found myself in a different world. Here the salient ethos 
was not one of a common-sense appreciation of a common-sense reality; but 
rather an ethos where there was a more sophisticated approach to 
knowledge about knowledge. In the university epistemology was the name 
of the game. 
A university discipline provides a framework within which knowledge 
is sought. Since I was now a resident in a sociology department I sought 
to get to grips with the question of what was the essential framework for 
acquiring knowledge which sociology provided. I had previously done 
courses in sociology and absorbed knowledge about its origins and its 
methods, now I wanted to know more about sociology as a science. 
wanted to know precisely, in a nutshell, what it is. 
In language that is appropriately epistemological I explain the 
process of finding my conclusion in Chapter 4. Suffice it to state 
here that I did not find in sociological writings or in textbooks a 
definition of sociology upon which everyone agreed and with which I could 
be happy. So, I had to forge a fresh one of my own . This definition is 
both suitable for my purpose (and for others) of relating sociology to 
public policy. I also found it was acceptable to sociologists with whom 
I have discussed it. It slmply says: 
Sociology is the science of institutions - their genesis, 
functioning and relationships. 
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On the basis of this definition I wrote a book called 
'Job-Generation, . 6 Unlike 'Planning-Becoming- Development ' which was 
factual in as much as it documented a past program, 'Job-Generation' is 
totally theoretical in so far as a program based upon it has yet to be 
implemented. Whereas the first book provided knowledge derived from the 
reality of a past program, the second book provides knowledge on the 
basis of which a choice can be made of making its proposals a reality. 
After all, I wrote the second book in a university and the business of 
a university is knowledge. 
Subsequently, when I joined the Secretariat of the Joint 
Parliamentary Committee of Public Accounts (PAC) I quickly discovered 
that not knowledge but choice was the critical issue there. True, 
choices have to be based on knowledge of certain realities; but the 
responsibility of the Parliament to make choices is the ever- present and 
dominant imperative in the PAC. The work of the Secretariat is to 
facilitiate choices in public policy and in tending towards that end 
neither common sense nor epistemology is enough: a consciousness of 
ethics is a prerequisite. 
The task I was given was to make sense of a wide variety of income 
maintenance programs administered by ten Federal Departments i n the 
social policy area. The reality I had to deal with was complex . One 
hundred and twenty- seven programs were identified as falling within the 
scope of the PAC inquiry. A way had to be found of relating these 
programs to each other and of arranging them in an order which would 
make it easy for others to understand each of them separately and all 
of them together. In the manner in which the information was initially 
presented by the departments in response to the PAC questionnaire the 
assortment of programs was a hodge- podge . 
Confronted with the task of establishing a conceptual framework 
into which a large variety of programs could be ordered, I found that 
the philosophic approach to knowledge that I have just previously 
described stood me in good stead. I hit upon the strategy of selecting 
6 OBrien, T. Job -Generation, Hill of Content, Melbourne, 1981. 
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an ethical concept - that of justice - as my co-ordinating principle. 
To be more precise the proposition that public administration is a 
mechanism of distributive justice enabled me to contain a plethora of 
information within a single, albeit flexible, concept. 
In the process it was nonetheless necessary to structure the 
information according to a scientific method. So, an hypothesis was 
formed, a questionnaire designed, and data collected, collated, analysed 
and synthesised . The criteria of evaluation were latent in the 
questionnaire, a~d consequently when the data were elicited from the 
departments it was possible to make comparative judgments on the basis 
of the evidence about the clarity and cohesiveness of program 
objectives. It was also possible to compare programs for the efficiency 
of their administration and the effectiveness of their results. 
It w~ true also that because the research would subsequently be 
published, it had to be written up in a common- sense style which would 
appeal to a general readership. Nevertheless, it is the philosophical 
concept of distributive justice which holds the whole report together. 
The briefing paper that I had written was subsequently 
submitted to the members of the Joint Parliamentary Committee of Public 
Accounts who used it as a basis for their judgments about what kind 
of hearings ought to be held and what kind of recommendations to 
l 
Parliament ought to be derived from the cumulative processes of the total 
inquiry. My work was simply a preparation for theirs. 
But even my own analysis of the information r had studied must 
culminate in choices. For it is the role of the staff of the 
Secretariat to select initial recommendations for policy on the basis 
of information received in inquiries . Choices are essentially a matter 
of exercising one's judgment on the basis of the available evidence. 
To sum up,in this Part I, I have discussed the content of the 
following three parts of this dissertation and related each of them to 
a major research study. Part II contains a common- sense description of 
a community development theory. Part III discusses an epistemological 
problem of how to construct an appropriate sociological paradigm within 
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which to analyse social policy. Part IV defines social policy and 
discusses the relevance of the idea of distributive justice to social 
administration. 
By late 1983, the Joint Parliamentary Committee of Public Accounts 
will have tabled in Parliament a report on the 'Administration of 
Income Maintenance Programs'. In as much as the Committee will have 
accepted the preparatory work that I have done on this report, it will 
provide a good example of how a combination of a common-sense method, 
and a scientific method and a philosophic method can be used, and also 
how such thinking can contribute to making choices in public policy. 
Be that as it may, my main purpose in the following dissertation 
is not simply to establish the relevance of three methods of knowing. 
The dissertation itself has a salient concentration on the contribution 
that a new way of understanding sociology can make to policy formulation. 
My main aim in discussing common sense and philosophic method is to 
define sociology by separating it from other forms of knowledge. For 
. this reason, the most important Part in this treatise is the third one, 
in which I define sociology and propose a sociological paradigm for 
action in the social policy area. 
'. 
PART II 
SEEING THINGS AS THEY ARE 
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CHAPTER 2 
A PARADIGM FOR COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT 
I derive my understanding of social policy from a prior understanding 
of the theory and practice of community development. I have been 
fortunate enough to have been involved in community development programs 
in Kenya, East Africa, and subsequently I was a director of a community 
development organisation which served the Province of Prince Edward 
Island in Canada. In Australia, I was involved in the Australian 
Assistance Plan, which I saw as a community development program that 
operated at a national, regional and local level. 
Ideally, it would be best to capture the idea of community 
development in a definition. But this assumes that the term is definable, 
and this simply cannot be taken for granted. It is a mistake to labour 
under the illusion that every term in common use can be defined in a way 
that is universally acceptable. 
Strictly speaking, to define a concept is to limit its meaning in 
terms of its genus and species. But the meaning of some terms cannot 
be thus limited. An idea like 'community' has almost an unlimited 
meaning in regard to human beings, in so far as it can be applied to all 
instances of people living together. Similarly, the term 'development' 
is open to many and unpredictable connotations. Any attempt to give the 
term itself a definite , meaning in its association with the term 
'community' poses insurmountable problems. It does seem to be virtually 
impossible to forge a definition of community development with which 
everyone interested in the subject will be prepared to agree. 
When confronted with the difficulty of indefinable terms, one has 
two options. The first is to resort to a general description of the 
topic which is broad enough to half-please everyone. The second option 
. 
n 
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is to choose a tighter statement which, in effect, can serve as a 
personal definition of what one means. 
Descriptions are looser than definitions. However, descriptions 
can serve a purpose of indicating the general parameters within which 
a topic is being studied. Such explanations help to identify the 
general nature of the phenomenon under obse rvation. 
Despite the fact that community development may be virtually 
impossible to define, it is, of course, acceptable to define one's own 
personal interpretation of it. Indeed anyone who wishes to discuss i t, 
must do so, in order to work with clear and distinct ideas that can be 
conveyed to others. Naturally, in proposing a definition of terms, one 
may at the same time be seeking the agreement of many others, but it 
would be foolhardy to imagine that a desire for acceptability is the 
same thing as actual acceptability on a broad scale. Nevertheless, the 
willingness of an individual to provide a definition represents an 
honest approach to research into any subject. 
This last statement puts me on the spot to state what I mean by 
community development. Let me say at the outset that I am primarily 
interested in co-operation between local organisations and government 
departments . Naturally I recognise that there can be community 
development without any government involvement in it, but my present 
particular interest is in government-sponsored community development 
programs. The development in question may be first of all sponsored by 
the community and subsequently attract the sponsorship of government, or 
vice versa . One way or another, interaction between local organisat ions 
and government is central to my understanding of community development. 
Having said this, I still do not want to proceed immediately to a 
succinct statement of what I mean by the essence of the concept. 
Instead I propose that my personal definition will be better understcod, 
if I first of all give an account of the steps I have taken to arrive 
at it . 
A logician may choose to take two approaches to a definition of 
terms. One approach is to define government-sponsored community 
development programs by extension. By this I mean that one can point to 
, 
----~--
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a number of such programs in various countries around the world and 
identify the concept by reference to them. But the fact that each 
different country has a different understanding of what programs can 
be categorised as ones of community development does mean that our 
resultant definiticn is going to be very broad and rather loose. 
Fortunately, such definitions by extension. can be complemented by a 
definition by intension. That is, each interested observer can 
abstract from a variety of community development experiences the 
essence of what he perceives the concept means. So, in this analysis, 
propose to begin with a quick survey of the extent of the use of the 
concept and then to follow this up by explaining what for me is its 
essential meaning. 
Community Development Programs Around the World 
In Britain, the Seebohm Report7 saw community development as a 
responsibility of new service departments of local government. It is 
described as a client-centred operation in which staff mobilise 
resources within the local area for the improvement of social welfare 
services. In subsequent years increased government support for such 
activity has been given to places designated as specially deprived 
areas. In these areas the Home Office established special inter-service 
teams to assist under-privileged communities. 
In the USA a series of programs aimed at combating the problem of 
poverty in the cities was developed through the 1960's and the 1970's. 
The stress was on public participation in the solution of local 
problems. Such programs generated a lot of literature on how the 
Americans interpret community development. Programs like the Model 
City Program, have since been amalgamated into the Federal Government 's 
Community Development Block Grant Program which in 1978 provided 
7 Britain. Report of the Committee on Local Authority and Allied 
Personal Social Services (Chairman, F. Seebolm), London, 1968. 
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$3.5 billion to local government for neighbourhood improvement, 
community services and facilities. 8 
In Canada, community development spans a number of agencies, 
including the Federal Neighbourhood Improvement Program, the federal and 
provincial rehabilitation programs, the social animation programs of the 
Ministry of Culture, the Canadian Ass istance Plan, the Company of Young 
Canadians, the Opportunities for Youth Program and so on. Some wil l 
even include within a very broad definition of community development, 
the provision of multi-serv i ce centres to integrate and decentral i se t he 
provision of services by government departments. 
Since I will subsequently be working towards a personal definition 
of community development I should also like to make a brief reference to 
community development in Kenya, East Africa; where I worked i n the 60 's. 
The then President and Prime Minister of the country, Jomo Kenyatta, 
regarded community development activity as a major responsibility of 
politicians. When politicians were in recess from Parliament, they were 
expected to foster self-help projects in their electorates. 
My purpose in making this passing reference t o Kenya is to provide 
just one instance of a variety of community development philosophies and 
practices wh ich exist in underdeveloped countries i n Afr i ca, As ia and 
South America. The community development ideas which are evolving in 
these countries are important for more advanced countries. In fact, 
some writers, such as Batten,9 have maintained that the current interest 
in community development techniques had its origins in the practices of 
British administration in underdeveloped countries. In the 50's, the 
western nations realised that the principles fundamental to the practice 
of community development overseas have an important relevance to their 
own more developed political, economic and social structures. The rich 
countries learned from their experiences in the poor countries and began 
to apply the theories and practices of community development back home. 
Here in Australia, there has been an accelerated interest in 
~ommunity development in recent years. In the early 70's references to 
u 
9 
Department of Environment, Housing and Community Development. 
Unpublished paper on Community Development. Canberra, 1977. 
Batten, T.R. The Non-Directive Approach in Group and Community Work. 
Oxford University Press, London, 1967. 
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community development were common in the literature and seminars of such 
organisations as the Councils of Social Service, the Australian Counc i l 
for the Rehabilitation of the Disabled, the Council for the Aged, service 
clubs , leagues clubs, citizen's advice bureaux, resident action groups, 
adult education groups and the like. Local government authorities employed 
community development officers mainly to help in the provision of welfare 
services . They still do . In each of the states community development is 
mostly regarded as the province of government departments of welfare. 
Within the federal departmental system the Department of Social Security has 
a close association with a variety of groups which consider themselves 
involved in the processes of community development. Under the Whitlam 
government, the Department of Urban and Regional Development undertook a 
community development responsibility; and this function survived for a time 
in the subsequent creation of the Department of the Environment, Housing 
and Community Development. In turn, this department was abolished and at 
present (1983) there is no department within the federal system which has a 
responsibility for community development in its title. Nonetheless such 
departments as the Departments of Employment and Industrial Relations and 
the Department of Education and Youth Affairs and others, are involved in 
what may be called community development activities. 
A Definition by Intension of Community Development 
Since community development in one form or another is a world-wide 
phenomenon and since thousands of people in Australia would consider that 
they are involved in it, it is sensible to ask, what is it? What is its 
essential nature? In the language of the logician after it has been defined 
by extension, how can it be defined by intension? How is it possible for 
any individual to capture his own idea of community development in a formula 
of words that will be precise enough to pin- point its key idea and yet be 
flexible enough to be applicable to a variety of programs here in Australia? 
At this stage it is apt to refer to a description of community 
development which has cropped up again and again in discussions on this 
matter, even though it was first written in 1956. It is a description 
that was still being used in interdepartmental discussions within the 
federal government in the late 1970's. It is sometimes referred to as 
the standard U. N. definition. It comes from the Twentieth Report of the 
Administrative Committee of Co-ordination to the United Nations Economic 
and Social Council. It is as follows: 
,..... 
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The term community development has come into international 
usage to connote the processes by which the efforts of the 
people themselves are united with those of government 
authorities to improve the economic, social and cultural 
conditions of communities, to integrate those communities 
into the life of the nation and to enable them to 
contribute to national development. This complex of 
processes is made up of two elements: the participation of 
the people themselves in efforts to improve their level of 
living with as much reliance as possible on their own 
initiative, and the provision of technical and other services 
in ways which encourage initiatives, s~lf-help and mutual 
self-help to make them more effective. 10 
This 'definition' has lasted in good currency for a long time, so 
it must have some validity. However, before looking at its good points 
propose to identify some of its more obvious weaknesses. 
Anybody acquainted with the rules of logic will be sceptical about 
it as a definition. A definition is supposed to state the essence of a 
thing and to separate one thing from others in a way that makes it 
easily identifiable. ll The U.N. definitio'n hardly does that. The terms 
embrace so much that there is little room to separate one thing from 
another. For example, the phrase 'economic, social and cultural 
conditions' embraces almost everything. Such an expression may describe 
the context within which community development activity occurs, but it 
does not describe the nature of community development activity itself . 
A definition is meant to be terse. It should measure up to the 
thing defined, being neither too wide nor too narrow. It should fit 
like a glove or a tight pair of jeans. This definition hangs like a 
kaftan. 
The definition also falls foul of one of the biggest blunders in 
defining things. To define community development it uses the term 
community a second time. This makes the reasoning circular and advances 
our understanding of the concept very little. A purist would say, this 
10 
11 
United Nations, Twentieth Report of the Administrative Committee of 
Co-ordination to the United Nations Economic and Social Council, 
New York, 1956. 
Luce, A. Teach Yourself Logic, English Universities Press, 
London 1958 . 
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is not a definition, but simply a description, and a very loose 
description at that . 
It might be objected that if this formula of words is all that 
bad, why put it up for analysis? It is worth doing so, because bad and 
all as it is, it is still possible to strip away the unnecessary verbiage, 
separate the wheat from the chaff, and arrive at an important kernel of 
truth. 
For me, the key phrase in the 'definition' is that which refers to 
the fact that: 
... the efforts of the people themselves are united with 
those of government authorities. 
make the point that government authorities are also people. So, 
what want to extricate from this definition is its emphasis on 
potentially productive relationships between organised groups in the 
private and the public sector. 
I accept that there are people who interpret community development 
quite differently. There are those who stress that community development 
happens at the neighbourhood level and has nothing to do with government 
departments at all. Indeed they hold that government departments are a 
hinderance to any such development. 
I agree that it is possible to interpret the beginnings of 
community development in this way. But it is most unlikely for any 
community in Australia to develop for long before it runs up against the 
fact of government intervention in its affairs in one form or another. 
On the other hand, the key issue for a person interested in 
government sponsorship of community development activity is how to 
encourage the interaction between people in government departments and 
people in local organisations for their mutual advantage. So, I propose 
to shape a definition of community development wnich simply says: 
Community development happens through organisational 
interaction. 
------~~ .... ------------------------------...................... ~~. 
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In other words, the essential characteristic of government-sponsored 
community development programs is organisational interaction. For me 
these two words capture the core meaning of community development. In a 
sense they define it. In another sense, though, the definition is too 
skimpy. We cannot say that the concept of organisational interaction on 
its own casts enough light to make any community development program easily 
understood. Nonetheless, I submit that the concept of institutional 
interaction provides us with a fundamental idea upon which the definition 
of all community development programs can be built. 
Community Development and Different Forms of Organisational Interaction 
Community development is not only a dynamic concept, it also 
manifests itself as a reality that takes different shapes and forms in 
different countries and in different contexts. Consequently, even 
though I find its central core of meaning in organisational interaction, 
this concept has to be extended further to fully capture the essence of 
community development programs in particular places. Accordingly I 
propose this form of words to explain it: 
Community development happens through the organisation of 
special interest groups and through the interaction of 
these new institutions with older and more established 
institutions for the benefit of increasing categories and 
numbers of people. 
It may be countered that this definition does not say much; but I 
propose it says enough to specify the nature of the kinds of community 
development that I have experienced. By not saying too much the 
definition is sufficiently flexible to be applicable to a variety of 
programs . The shape of any particular program can be further determined 
by the circumstances which decide the 'special interest groups', the 
'new institutions', the 'established institutions', the' interaction', 
the 'benefit' and so on. 
In order to provide an example of how apt this definition is, I 
will clarify how the meaning of its terms became apparent in the unfolding 
of the nature of the Australian Assistance Plan (AAP) . The special 
interest groups involved in the AAP were those associations in local 
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government areas, or in regions, that were especially concerned with 
the improvement of social welfare services. These groups formed the 
constituent elements of a new institution in Australian society which 
were called Regional Councils for Social Development - or Regional 
Councils for short. 
These were the new institutions that began to interact with 
established institutions for dealing with the welfare services aspect 
of social policy. In the first place, the interaction involved the 
gaining of acceptance by the Regional Councils from established 
government departments of their right to be involved in the prov i sion of 
services - local, small-scale, short-term, social welfare services. In 
the second place, the interaction involved planning - on the basis of 
local organisations' knowledge of their own needs - of new or expanded 
welfare services. In the third place, the interaction involved a 
pressuring of the established service departments to supply services 
which were better tailored to the social welfare needs of particular 
places. 
Within the parametres of the AAP social policy, the 'established 
institutions' were principally the service departments - Social Security, 
Health and Education - though other federal departments besides were 
involved in the action . The activity of the Regional Councils sponsored 
under the AAP policy also affected a variety of departments in the state 
government system. Local governmentsalso were put in the position where 
they had to decide on what kind of official interaction they were 
prepared to have with the Regional Councils for Social Development - as 
also were a variety of established voluntary agencies. 
In the first three years of the Australian Assistance Plan, the 
'benefit' which resulted from the work of the Regional Councils was 
about $12 million dollars spent on the resolution of local issues. 
About $5 million of this was spent on structural arrangements for 
neighbourhood action, such as the acquisition of staff and premises; and 
about S7 million was spent in local social welfare projects. The 
objective of the AAP - which was achieved in part - was to reach those 
categories of people who were most in need of social welfare services, 
and to reach increasing numbers of them . 
. 
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In brief, I argue that the above stated definition of community 
development is applicable to the Australian Assistance Plan. 
However, this forging of a definition of what I interpret as a 
nationally sponsored community development program is a definition based 
on hindsight. At the beginning of the development of the AAP, its 
initiators had no such clarity of vision. There is much value, however, 
in eliciting a definition from a past program. The intelligent 
i nterpretation of a previous program can provide the intellectual basis 
for the design of an alternative program. 
An Approach to Designing a New Program 
In setting out to design a new program one can try to learn from 
the mistakes in the Australian Assistance Plan and get rid of the many 
perceived weaknesses in its implementation. In the context of the 
political management of the economy, it can be claimed that one of the 
major weaknesses of the AAP was that through organisational interaction 
it stimulated a demand for services, even though there was no real 
knowing where the demand might end. Moreover the AAP policy concentrated 
on the provision of welfare services and did not include any 
responsibility to stimulate complementary organisational activity to 
generate enough wealth locally to pay for increases ' n services. 
Indeed, it could be argued that the AAP policy was pursued almost to the 
extent of disregarding the possibility that an escalation of welfare 
services might over-extend the ability of the economy to pay for them. 
This argument can lead to the conclusion that it would, perhaps, 
have been better if the initial focus of a government sponsored community 
development program had been on an economic objective rather than a soc i al 
one. With the advantage of hindsight, it is fair to consider whether a 
focus on job-generation might have been better than a concentration on 
welfare services. 
Be that as it may, it is still true that the Australian Assistance 
Plan was widely and officially recognised as a valuable social experiment.12 
Exactly how valuable it has been has yet to be proved. The extent of its 
12 Australia. Social ~elfare Commission, Report on the Australian 
Assistance Plan, A.S.P.S., Canberra, 1976 . 
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value depends in part on how well equipped we are now, to use its 
lessons for future programs. 
When we do undertake to design a community development program to 
alleviate unemployment, I suggest that one way in which we can approach 
this task will be to accept 'instituti on al interaction ' as our key to 
a solution. We can then use this idea as th e foundation for building a 
new definition of community development which is relevant to the 
improvement of, say, manpower policy. To be more precise, to achieve 
our new purpose we can define a community development strategy to 
generate jobs as follows: 
Community development concerns the integration of 
institutional interaction geared towards the specific 
objective of generating a greater availability of 
productive work. 
This could be the start of a new social policy. However, it will 
be wise to realise that the organisations which can contribute to 
job-generation are many and varied, and to anticipate that the modes of 
their interactions can be similarily multiple in their forms. The 
integration of such diversity will be no easy task. 
The wording of a definition of community development may be simple 
but the ramifications of its consequences can be extraordinarily complex. 
Accordingly before beginning to design a new program it is a great 
advantage to have a conceptual framework which is simple enough in its 
perception to be easily understood, but yet supple enough in its 
comprehensiveness to cater for managing the complexity of pursuing 
simple ideas to their logical conclusion. Such a conceptual framework 
can be derived from a reading of the literature on community development. 
But it is a very great advantage when one's understanding of this aspect 
of the literature has already been exemplified in a national community 
development program. 
A perusal of the literature on community develop,l,ent gives 
evidence of the variety of its forms. However it is most unlikely that 
anyone will find in any single book written outside Australia a discussion 
of community development which is at once sufficiently incisive and 
sufficiently comprehensive to provide a cogent theoretical basis for the 
.. ----~~.~ ...... --------------.............................................. ~~~  
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design of a government sponsored community development program such 
as we had in the Australian Assistance Plan. 
Rothman's Models of Community Development 
Fortunately, there is one treat ise on community development, which 
although not adequate in itself to provide a prec i se theoretical 
explanation of a complex national program, nevertheless, does provide 
valuable pointers. I refer to Jack Rothman's 'Three Models of 
Community Organisation Practice'. It was f i rst published i n New Yo rk 
by the Columbia University Press in 1968 . His theory was revised in 
1972 and published again in 1974, after which it became generally 
a va il a b 1 e i n Au s t r ali a. 13 
Rothman holds that there are different forms of community 
organisation practice. He considers them separately. There appears, 
he maintains, three important orientations to deliberate and purposive 
change. He suggests we can best refer to them as approaches and names 
them Models A, Band C. They can be called respectivel y , locality 
development, social planning and social action. 
Model A 
Rothman begins with locality development. Locality development 
presupposes that community change may be pursued best of all through 
the broad participation of a wide spectrum of people at the loca l 
community level in goal determination and action. 
Model B 
This is the social planning approach. It emphasises a technical 
process of problem solving with regard to substantive problems such as 
poverty, inadequate social services, unemployment, delinquency, community 
recreation centres, health centres, housing and so on. Deliberately 
planned and controlled social change has a central place in this model. 
The use of a statistical base for planning decisions is paramount. The 
approach presupposes that change in a complex industrial environment 
requires expert planners, who through the exercise of technical abilities 
13 Rothman, J. Three Models of Community Organisation Practice, 
Columbia University Press, New York, 1968. 
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including the ability to lobby large bureaucratic institutions, can 
skillfully guide complex change processes. 
By and large the concern here is with establishing, arranging and 
delivering goods and services to people who need them. In this Model B, 
building organisational and management ability in the community does not 
playa central role. Likewise model B does not have a focus on 
fostering radical social change. 
Model C 
Model C, however, is about fundamental social change. It 
presupposes a disadvantaged segment of the population that needs to be 
organised, perhaps in alliance with others, in order to make adequate 
demands on the larger community for increased resources, or treatment 
more in accord with justice. 
Rothman proposes three models. But his principles of classification 
for differentiatin~ the three models co see8 to be conceptually untidy. 
He begins in Model A by using a concept of space as his principle of 
classification by referring to locality development. He then switches 
to a mode of operation as his principle of classification for Model B 
and C, by referring to social planning and social action. Finally, he 
offers as a rationale for his three models a principle of classification 
built on the philosophical labels of idealist, rationalist and realist. 
Greater conceptual tidiness can be brought into Rothman's analysis 
by adopting three separate principles of classification and by correlating 
them with three principal areas of operation. It then is possible to 
integrate all these separate ideas into a single paradigm. ~oreover, it 
can be shown that this paradigm is relevant to the various kinds of 
community development activities that were encompassed within the AAP 
policy. 
A Community Development Paradigm 
A schematic presentation of this paradigm is as follows: 
.. ----~~. --...... ----------------................................................ ~~. 
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Although Rothman does not provide a paradigm, as integrated as the 
one above, for his three models, he does recognise the interdependence 
between them. He refers to his models as being the result of different 
value preferences of three different types of practitioner. 
The locality development practitioner will likely cherish that 
aspect of the social work value system that emphasises harmony 
and communication in human affairs; the social planner will 
build on social work values that encourage rationality, 
objectivity and professional purposiveness; the social activist 
will draw upon social work value commitments that stress social 
justice and equality. 
In the case of the AAP, a government sponsored community development 
program was mounted in which all three kinds of practitioners had a role 
to play. Moreover, I propose that an understanding of the re levance of 
the foregoing paradigm can help to elucidate the relationship between the 
different modes of operation. Accordingly I will discuss each of the 
three principles of classification and illustrate its relevance to the 
AAP. To begin with, consider the effect of the spatial unit on the mode 
of activity which was salient at different levels of operation. 
The Nat iona l Level 
First of all it needs to be said that at the national level the 
Commonwealth Government sponsored the AAP policy through the agency of 
the newly formed Social Welfare Commission. The Commission was embedded 
____ ..... II~ ~ 
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within the federal departmental system. As a unit within a bureaucratic 
structure, the Commission was dependent upon the administrative support 
of the Department of Social Security. Nevertheless, the Commission by 
the terms of its mandate was charged with the responsibility to promote 
an innovative style of social planning and community development. 
The small group of community development practitioners within the 
Commission were required by circumstances to put their primary emphasis 
on what Rothman calls a social action model. 
They were concerned with questions of improved democracy, a fairer 
go for the poorer sections of the community, a better deal for those who 
needed welfare services, and the acceptance of the idea that ordinary 
people have a right to be involved in social action to improve their own 
communities. In short, community development practitioners in the 
Commission had to be concerned with matters of social justice. 
They had also to be realists in regard to paying attention to 
conflicts of interests between various federal gove~nment departments. 
The Commission had to be prepared to ease the tensions that existed 
between Federal and State Government departments in the delivery of 
welfare services. Moreover, those in the Commission had also to be 
alert to the sensitivities that existed in the relationships between the 
new institutions called the Regional Councils for Social Development and 
the already well established private welfare agencies. 
The Regional Level 
At the regional level a different set of values prevailed. he 
mandate that was given to the Regional Councils had a quite distinctive 
emphasis. The emphasis at this level was on a social planning 
secretariat staffed with professionals, but under the management of 
voluntary committees. The secretaria ts were to be headed (at least in 
theory) by expert social planners who were skilled in the methodology of 
community surveys, statistical analysis and the rational al~ocation of 
resources according to facts and figures acquired by social research. 
. 
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It may be stated in passing that the expert planning approach is 
one that on the surface at least has the best chance of acceptance by 
public administrators. For almost all such administrators conform to 
the principle that social welfare services ought to be provided on a 
rational and equitable basis. Where the need is greatest, there 
serv.ices should be provided. However, a political realist may well 
maintain that in practice this does not happen; though, if he is also 
an idealist, he may admit that it ought to; and if he is also a 
rationalist, he will be able to give facts and figures to prove his 
point . 
The Local Level 
In the Australian Assistance Plan funds were allocated to the 
Regional Councils for the employment of community development officers. 
Their job was to go into the poorer areas of the region, to make 
contact with people, to seek the support of neighbourhood groups, women ' s 
groups, ethnic groups and so on. The COO was expected to motivate 
co-operation between these local groups and the Regional Councils. Where 
new groups were needed in order to respond to a specific social problem, 
as, for instance, the employment of school-leavers, the COO was expected 
to encourage new organisational initiatives. The mandate that was given 
by the Commission to the COO's was to advance the interests of 
disadvantaged groups. The role was one of locality development, the mode 
of operation was largely one of motivating group activity. 
For each scale of operation in the community development program 
known as the Australian Assistance Plan there was a most immediately 
relevant mode of operation. Although this was true, it by no means 
expressed the whole truth. As a matter of fact, at each separate scale 
of operation all these modes of community development were to some extent 
appropriate and to some degree were always present, simultaneously. 
In the community development operation at the local level the 
practitioner is very quickly going to get beyond the stage of initial 
motivation, and will find himself being required to make plans for the 
future, and his plans will have a better chance of being effective to 
the extent that he understands social planning techniques. Planning for 
other people's lives is a political activity, and so, once plans are set, 
I 
I 
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the planners are well advised to be prepared for conflict, negotiation, 
bargaining, compromise, judgment and resolution. In other words social 
motivation leads through social planning to a social action mode of 
operation. 
A similar eventuality can be in evidence in the other scales of 
operation. At the regional level all three modes of operation may occur -
social planning, social motivation and social action. At the regional 
level, in the AAP the most important style of operation was meant to be 
the social planning style. In practice, in different regions, at 
different times, the social motivation and social action modes of 
community development predominated. 
At the national level the Commission found it necessary to stress 
the values of social action, in order to gain acceptance for its mandate 
from government departments and agencies. In a sense, the Commission 
played an advocacy role, seeking recognition within the bureaucracy for 
the right of community organisations to affect departmental decisions. 
The arguments in favour of allowing citizens greater control over service 
delivery were based on terms like justice, equality, and democratic 
processes. The purpose of such arguments was to enable the Commission to 
gain acceptance for a community development program that had repercussions 
not alone on bureaucratic administration but also on regional planning and 
local organisation. 
As a matter of course, public administrators are wary of community 
development programs. Public servants have a most important role to 
play in rationing scarce resources among a variety of public programs in 
accordance with long established principles, traditions, and procedures. 
They know that the new pressures which can be generated by community 
development programs are often unpredictable. They realise that in a 
government sponsored community development program all sorts of cross-
currents of interactions are likely to occur which can challenge the 
effectiveness of established programs . From the point of view of 
encouraging initiative and fostering the development of new services, a 
loosening of bureaucratic controls may be necessary; but from the point 
of view of stable administration it has its risks. During the promotion 
of the Australian Assistance Plan, the Commission recognised these risks, 
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but maintained that the community development activity was necessary to 
facilitate the provision of improved services. Similarly, in any new 
community development program, the risks to be undertaken must be 
balanced against the advantages to be gained. Both the means and the 
ends must be justified. 
An Apt Definition for a National Program 
At this stage we have arrived at a critical turning point in this 
chapter. We have already looked at definitions I have derived from 
previous program experiences. It is now time to advance this 
conceptualisation further and to evolve new definitions better suited to 
a new program, in this instance, focussed, say, on job-generation. 
will do this briefly in two paragraphs. The first gives the broad 
outline of a particular type of a government sponsored program. The 
second gives a terse statement of its essence. 
An awareness of the many potential conflicts in community development 
enables one to forge a more apposite definition which is directly related 
to the government sponsorship of a national program. In this context 
'community development' consists in a choice by cabinet of a specific 
policy objective, for the attainment of which, a department of the 
public service is charged with the responsibility of launching a new 
institution, which has a calculated degree of freedom from traditional 
bureaucratic controls. This requires that the new institution be so 
designed to encourage interested people to accept a mandate to achieve 
a stated objective, through the performance of defined functions, within 
a determinate geographical area. It entails the activation and re-
activation of many local organisations; and extends to their co-ordination 
at a regional or local government level . It further entails the making 
available to such co-ordinating institutions, adequate financial and staff 
resources to achieve their purpose. It also involves the planned use of 
the activity of these institutions as a catalyst among established 
departments and voluntary agencies, in our federal system, for the 
deliberately and publicly acknowledged purpose of integrating the 
consequent organisational interaction, so that it, too, becomes geared 
towards the initially chosen objective. 
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In fine, a succinct definition of a government sponsored community 
development program can be stated as follows: 
Community development concerns the activity of giving 
purpose to a new institution, generating its functioning; 
and integrating its relationships. 
,-
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CHAPTER 3 
PARADIGMS IN SOCIAL SCIENCE 
he previous chapter ended in a terse definition of community 
development . A definition such as this is significant because it catches 
succinctly the nature of a social activity. But some definitions can do 
more than that. In the formulation of social policy a definition can 
sometimes act as a principle upon which a paradigm can be designed. Indeed, 
insofar as a definition of a social activity is both incisive and flexible 
it can give rise to a paradigm within which the development of subsequent 
programmatic action can be explained. 14 The knowledge can be directl y 
related to things that are actually happening. In other words the root 
of the knowledge can be ontological. 
A definition of sociology is bound to be different. Sociology is a 
science . A science is a way of knowing. Consequently knowledge about a 
science is knowledge about a way of knowing. In effect, a definition of 
sociology will help one to understand not a tangible fact, but rather a 
cognitive fact. Strictly speaking the problem of trying to find out what 
a science is, is essentially an epistemological one. 
Sociologists, though, are sometimes reluctant to be specific about the 
nature of their science. For instance, this reluctance is plainly in 
evidence in Raymond Aron's book on the 'Main Currents in Sociological 
Thought' . 
Aron begins his book by admitting that 'to write a history of sociology, 
one must first arrive at a definition of what is to be called a "sociology '" .15 
Then on top of that he concedes that this task is beyond him. 
14 
15 
The statement of a principle can achieve the same effect. For 
instance the 'Opportunities for Youth Program' in Canada could be 
said to have been established on the basis of a principle which 
stated: 'Give young people worthwhile things to do that they enjoy 
doing and for which they are properly remunerated'. c . A survey of 
Programs to Youth of the Federal Departments and Agencies, by 
T. 0 Brien, under contract with the Citizenship Branch of the Secretary 
of State, Ottowa, Canada, 1970. 
Aron, R., Main Currents in Sociological Thought. Anchor Books, 
Doubleday and Company Inc., Garden City, New York, 1968. 
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He acknowledges that we 'cannot offer any body of demonstrated truths 
which might be called the present state of sociology' . 16 He is prepared 
to risk what the prev i ous chapter of this dissertation termed a 
definition by extension. He proposes: 
To avoid this difficulty I prefer to regard as sociology that 
which societies designate as such; I rega rd sociologists as those 
who assume this title - of honor or disgrace as you will; and 
for an idea of sociology throughout the world, I refer to the 
quadrennial International Congress of Sociology attended by 
several hundred people who call themselves sociologists and who 
discuss a number of problems they call sociological - problems 
which imply a certain idea of what sociology is and should be 
today.1 7 
Such a definition is all very well for those who are already 
sociologists. Presumably they will know what Aron means. But for any 
newcomer who wishes to gain acceptance within the community of scholars 
who call themselves sociologists the definition is not much use. The 
circle is closed: he remains in the dark. If the newcomer happens to 
be well versed in history, it may remind him of ~nosticism - in the 
2nd Century A.D. 18 The gnostics were a Christian sect who claimed to 
have esoteric spiritual knowledge of a kind that was hard to refute 
because they would not reveal what it was! 
Anyway, anyone who is familiar with logic (or even with a chi ld's 
persistent questioning) will realise that the human mind is seldom fully 
satisfied by definitions by extension and seeks to complement them by 
definitions by intension. Indeed, this very tendency is evident in Aron's 
own case. Despite his protestations to the contrary, he inadvertent ly 
slips into an attempt at defining the nature of sociology. His definition 
by intension (albeit a very bad one) is as follows: 
16 
17 
18 
Op . cit . (Aron) . 
Gp. cit . (Aron) 
The New Ency10paedia Britannica. Ency1opa2dia Britannica nc., 
Vol.8, 15th Edition, Chicago, 1982. 
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Sociology may be said to be characterised by two specific 
aims which account for its nature. On the one hand 
sociology lays claim to objective and scientific knowledge. 
On the other hand what it claims to know objectively and 
scientifically is some vaguely defined thing we call society or 
societies or social phenomena. 19 
The realisation that the adjective 'social' and the abstract 
nouns 'society' and 'sociology' itself are all derived from the same 
etymological root makes the reasoning circular and the above statement 
practically meaningless. Moreover, when there is vagueness about the 
subject matter, such sociology's claim to scientific knowledge is at 
least suspect. 
Given that Aron's definition by intension is so inadequate he 
would have been saved from the above criticism if he had adhered to his 
original plan of only defining sociology by extension. Be that as it 
may, he goes on to state that in the course of recent international 
congr~sses, two typical schools of sociology have emerged each aware of 
itself and of its opposition to the other. These two concepts of 
sociology were that of the American school on the one hand and that of 
the Soviet, or Marxist, school on the other. These two schools, 
co ntinues Aron, do not involve the whole of what is practised allover 
the world under the name of sociology; but these two schools/which are 
the most typical ones, form the opposite poles between which fluctuates 
what is called sociology today. 
Now it is possible to consider any science - the concept of sociology 
included - as a way of knowing, a heuristic structure, a cognitive map, a 
framework of knowledge, a problematic or a paradigm. All these terms 
although not exactly synonomous are roughly similar. In effect, it is 
Aron's contention that in regard to sociology the Americans and the 
Marx i sts have two competing paradigms. Consequently in as much as one 
can find a way of identifying the nature of these paradigms one may be on 
the track of discovering an acceptable definition of sociology. 
Fortunately, it so happens that in recent years two eminent social 
theorists, the one an American and the other a Marxist, have each written 
19 Op. cit . (Aron). 
" 
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a book which deals with frameworks of knowledge . The American, Kuhn, 20 
wrote a book called 'Structures of Scientific Revolutions' and called 
his concept of a heuristic structure a paradigm. The Marxist, Althusser, 
wrote 'For Marx' 21 in which he describes an equivalent idea of a way of 
knowing as a problematic. Consequently it makes sense to sort out how 
Kuhn and Althusser consider science in general before zooming in on the 
nature of the science of sociology in particular. 
Paradigm and Problematic 
In accordance with the above train of thought the best way to proceed 
is first of all to present an explanation of Kuhn's paradigm. This will 
be followed by an account of the consternation that Kuhn's paradigm for 
social science caused among logical positivists. To add fuel to the 
flames of such consternation a brief reference will be made to Willer 
and Willer's criticism of empiricism in general. Thus the way is 
prepared for the introduction of an alternative viewpoint: that of 
Althusser. So, an explanation of Althusser's use of the problematic will 
be presented. 
However, one can go a step further. Both Kuhn and Althusser are 
open to criticism on the basis of the moderate realist philosophy which 
was referred to briefly in Chapter 1 to this dissertation. 
Consequently it is proposed to compare and contrast Kuhn's paradigm and 
Althusser's problematic from the viewpoint of moderate realism. After 
this has been accomplished the ground will have been prepared for the 
presentation of the definition of the science of sociology from a new 
philosophical perspective. 
Kuhn 's Paradigm 
Kuhn's book entitled 'The Structure of Scientific Revolutions' is a 
history of how scientists know their science. The history refers to 
particular scientists who were pre-eminent in certain selected fields , as 
for example: Aristotle,Copernicus, Gallileo Descartes, Newton, Lavoisier, 
Priestly, Leisnitz, Einstein and so on. They studied things like motion, 
physics, mechanics, thermodynamics, electricity and relativity. Such 
20 
21 
Kuhn, T. Structures of Scientific Revolutions. University of Chigago 
Press, 2nd Edition, Chigago, 1970. 
Althusser, L. For Marx, Librairie Francois Maspero S.A., 1966. 
'. 
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men are known as 'physical scientists'. Kuhn's work is an historical 
account of how they know what they know, and about the states of 
knowledge in which the various sciences were at different periods. 
Kuhn proposes that in what he calls pre-science there is no dominant 
theory which is generally accepted by those interested in the field. 
There is no unified understanding of the problem in question. There is 
no single salient conceptual framework within which the problem is 
considered. There is in fact no paradigm. 
However, when a particular problem in science becomes the centre of 
attention and a scientist succeeds in explaining it so well that his 
thinking becomes dominant in the field, then a paradigm emerges. Kuhn 
makes the point that it need not necessarily be an individual thinker who 
makes this breakthrough. A number of scientists working along the same 
lines could establish a new theory. Once such a theory becomes a 
paradigm, in effect, this means that everyone working in the field must 
take it into account. It may be difficult to pin-point in time the 
precise emergence of the paradigm. but one can identify the period in 
which it came to the fore. For instance Lavoisier helped to establish a 
paradigm for understanding electricity; Newton, mechanics; and Einstein, 
relativity. Their theories become the accepted paradigm during 
particular periods, even though there may have been some overlapping 
with theories · that preceded theirs. 
Each time an established paradigm is 'toppled' there is what Kuhn 
calls a scientific revolution. Paradigms are toppled by innovative 
thinkers who identify weaknesses in paradigms and by relating the old 
paradigms to a new framework of facts in the real world make it 
impossible to defend them any longer. 
Referring to scientific revolutions Kuhn states: 'Each of these 
necessitates the community's rejection of one time-honoured scientific 
theory in favour of another incompatible with it'. This results in: 
(i) a consequent scrutiny, and 
(ii) a transformation of the scientific imagination. 
This can be expressed succinctly and accurately by stating that 
there is a transformation of the world in which scientific work is done. 
.... 
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Kuhn claims that the makers of paradigmatic science - which he 
considers as 'normal science' - are successful in gaining dominance 
because their achievement is sufficiently unprecedented to attract 
enduring groups away from competing modes of scientific activity. 
Simultaneously it is sufficiently open-ended to leave all sorts of 
problems for re-defined groups of practitioners to resolve. Students 
who wish to enter the discipline now have to study their paradigms and, 
initially at least, are under pressure to accept what the paradigm 
proclaims. Around the paradigm grows a body of theorists and 
practitioners. There follows the formation of specialised journals and 
the foundation of specialised societies with a similar focus of interest. 
A claim is made for a special place for the paradigm in university 
curricula. The paradigm has arrived. The paradigm becomes the accepted 
model for studying that science. Kuhn sometimes refers to such a pattern 
of study as a disciplinary matrix. 
The paradigm sets the focus for the study of the science. It defines 
its general parametres. It still leaves room for a tremendous amount of 
work in explaining the original position. Kuhn says a paradigm is rarely 
an object of replication. Instead, like an accepted juridical decision 
in common law, it is an object for further articulation and specification 
under new and more stringent conditions. 
The paradigm may be compared to the outside straight-edged pieces in 
a jig- saw puzzle. Before tackling a specific problem within the discipline, 
it is a good idea to get the outside edges in shape first. The need for 
the paradigm arises out of the immense difficulty encountered in 
developing points of contact between a theory and reality. Once one has 
grasped the general framework of a science, then one can work on 'ts 
specific aspects. One is assured by onE's colleagues who subscribe to 
the same paradigm that one is on the right track. One is supported in 
one's research by a strong network of commitments - conceptual, theoretical, 
instrumental and methodological. 
In these circumstances, to propose a new paradigm not only requires 
intelligence, it also demands great courage. 
. 
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Nonetheless, every so often a new talent comes along that has such 
courage. Instead of an individual it may perhaps be a group of gifted 
scientists. Kuhn states that paradigm-makers are often new to the 
discipline. On account of their fresher outlook they are able to spot 
anomalies in the old paradigm and begin to unsettl~ the whole-hearted 
acceptance of the received widsom. Kuhn makes the point, though, that 
once any established paradigm is in place, the re is no way i n which i t 
can be ignored by anyone working in that field - newcomer or not. To 
reject one paradigm without at the same time substituting another would 
be seen as rejecting 'science' itself. And few grouos of scientists worth 
their salt will tolerate that. 
By ensuring that paradigms will not be too easily surrendered, 
resistance to new ideas guarantees that scientists will not be too eas ily 
distracted from their main interest, and makes it mandatory that 
anomalies that could possibly lead to paradigm changes will have to 
penetrate existing knowledge to the very core before they will be taken 
seriously. Skirmishes may take place on the peripheries of a science 
but, with some exceptions, before scientists will acknowledge a revolution 
in their thinking, the new paradigm maker - like an Einstein - must prove 
that he has something worthwhile to offer. His new paradigm must give a 
better understanding of the reality in question than was previously 
available. 
Although Kuhn does not say so explicitly he does bring out the 
political nature of the accepted truth. The paradigm belongs to the 
' scientific community'. It is hard to buck the system. In Kuhn 's own 
words: 'The group's members as individuals and by virtue of their shared 
training and experience are the possessers of the rules of the game or 
of some equivalent basi s for unequivocal judgment.' 
A moderate realist philosopher may wish to simplify Kuhn's message 
in this way. In all knowledge their are three essent ial elements to be 
taken into consideration. Firstly there is the thing itself - which can 
be known. Secondly, their is the knowledge of the thing in the minds of 
the knowing group. Thirdly there is the choice by the knowing group that 
what it knows it accepts as true. Once all three elements are present 
the paradigm i5 solidly established. 
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However, Kuhn goes on to stress the relativity of scientific 
knowledge . He states that a paradigm is only true until the next 
revolution comes along. His historical account of paradigm makers shows 
that this has often occurred in the past and can be expected to occur in 
the future. A moderate realist could interject here and say, yes, and 
when it does, a new choice will have to be made about what is to be 
accepted as true. 
The Reaction of the Scientific Community 
Kuhn's book caused quite a stir. His paradigm was the subject of 
an international colloquium in the philosophy of science. As a result 
of this colloquium a book was published by Lakatos and Musgrave called 
'Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge' .22 The list of names of expert 
social theorists who attended this conference is a testimony to the 
importance of the topic discussed. It included: T.S. Kuhn, 
J.W.N. Watkins, S.E . Toulmin, L. Pearce Williams, K.R. Popper, 
Margaret Masterman. I. Lakatos, and P.K. Feyerabend. 
a sampling ~f the discussion which ensued. 
The following is 
In the conference setting, Kuhn himself was given the opportunity 
to re-state his theory of how scientific revolutions occur. It soon 
became apparent that he was at loggerheads with mainstream logical 
positivism in general and with Sir Karl Popper in particular. The gist 
of Kuhn's argument with Popper and the popperians hinges upon the fact 
that logic and formal mathematics are not enough in themselves to 
explain the progress of science. Kuhn says that, 'Again and again Sir 
Karl has rejected the "psychology of knowledge" or the "subjective"', 
and insisted that his concern was with the 'logic of knowledge' and the 
objective. Nevertheless, Kuhn insinuates politely, Popper allows in by 
the back door, the relevance of the individual's source of inspiration. 
Kuh n then posits the question: How about the scientific group's source of 
22 Lakatos, I. and Musgrave, A.E. Criticism and the Growth of 
Knowledge, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1970. 
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inspiration which has been brought about by both nurture and training 
in the psychological make -up of licenced membership? In other words 
Kuhn makes the point that there are social-psychological imperatives 
that cause the acceptance of even Sir Karl's logical imperatives related 
to conjecture and refutation. 
Watkins, a contributor to the discussion, waxes rhetorically in 
reaction to his own construction of Kuhn's theory, i.e. as a 'view of 
the scientific community as essentially a closed system, intermittently 
shaken by collective nervous breakdowns followed by restored mental 
unison'. He is at pains to defend Popper, but he is unfair to Kuhn, 
because he over-emphasises what he calls the gestalt-switch. In other 
words he admits to interpreting Kuhn's paradigm maliciously (sic) as an 
instant-paradigm thesis. By over-stating his case, he lessened whatever 
chance he had of winning the argument. One could draw the conclusion 
from his contribution to the conference that he simply wanted Popper to 
be right. 
Popper's own contribution to the conference is written in a very_ 
urbane style admonishing everyone at the beginning that 'we approach 
everything in the light of preconceived theory ... as a consequence one 
is liable to pick out those things that one either likes or dislikes 
He is reluctant to be in outright disagreement with Kuhn. He states 
eventually that his difference with Kuhn goes back fundamentally to logic. 
It is difficult to see how Kuhn could possibly agree with this, 
particularly since Popper immediately afterwards refers fleetingly to a 
paper he wrote about scientific knowledge being subjectless. The subject, 
either as an individual or as a scientific group, plays far too important 
a part in the establishment of Kuhn's paradigms of science for him to 
agree to such a statement. It is nonsense to claim that the difference 
between the two men is simply logical when both are arguing from quite 
different premises . The difference between Kuhn and Popper is political. 
Toulmin, another contributor to the conference takes Kuhn much more 
seriously. He states that Kuhn has compelled many people to face for 
the first time the full profundity of the conceptual transformations 
which have marked the historical development of scientific ideas. He 
softens Kuhn's thesis by suggesting that Kuhn's revolutions be looked upon 
. . 
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as units of variation leading eventually to effective changes in 
scientific theory. Nonetheless, he accepts that such changes may depend 
on 'political revolutions' within a science. 
Masterman's article is a 'tour de orce'. She defends Kuhn. She 
says he is scientifically perspicuous even though he is philosophically 
obscure. She gives a first class analysis of twenty-one meanings for 
Kuhn's paradigm. She then synthesises these into three: metaparadigms, 
sociological paradigms and construct paradigms. She scoffs at Popper 
and Feyerbend. She claims that it is obvious that one of the roots of 
scientific achievement is metaphysical; praises the originality of Kuhn's 
sociological notion of a paradigm; but suggests that his paradigm is 
most of all an artifact which can be used as a puzzle-solving device. 
Her paper demonstrates that a computer scientist can be a formidable 
critic of any hazy thinking in the philosophy of science. 
So as not to make this section of the chapter too long it is proposed 
to pass on to Kuhn's reply to his critics. Kuhn makes the point that 
where he differs from Watkins, Popper, Toulmin, Lakatos and Feyerbend, it 
is in respect to substance rather than to method. The substance in 
question is normal science and the change from one normal scientific 
tradition is another. Courteously he reaffirms a basic point: 
Some of the principles deployed in my explanation of science 
are irreducibly sociological - the group of ablest and best 
people, appropriately trained and disciplined make the 
choices that lead to developments in science .... 
In effect they endorse the paradigm. 
The colloquium which has been discussed above provides evidence of 
conflict among logical positivists and empiricists particularly in 
regard to the validity of Kuhn's perception about who decides on 
paradigms for science. Within the confines of that argument about 
'scientific revolutions' Kuhn and particularly Masterman present a much 
better case than Pop~er and particularly Watkins. However, the further 
question can still be asked: Does either side offer an adequate philosophy 
of science? 
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To this question a book by Willer and Willer presents an answer. 23 
Their book is entitled 'Systematic Empiricism: Critique of a Pseudo-
science'. It provides an ironical sequel to the above argument. It 
criticises positivism and empiricism in general. Willer and Willer imply 
that the claim to objectivity is spurious as it leads to self-
objectivication of scientific inquiry making it philosophically invalid. 
Empiricism is also at times socially pernicious to the extent that it 
buttresses the status quo. The results of a ' scientific' research are often 
used as a means of social control, if not by intention, at least in effect. 
To the extent that American sociologists are empiricists and logical 
positivists, Willer and Willer raise doubts about the validity of the 
philosophy which underlies their science. 
Both Kuhn and Popper are also open to attack from another angle. 
Marxists find their philosophy too compartmentalised to offer a satisfactory 
expla nation of scientific know,ledge. Althusser has mounted such an attack 
in his writings. 
Althusser's Problematic 
Althusser's book entitled 'For Marx' is difficult to read. 24 He gives 
words meanings of his own. Admittedly a glossary is included in the book 
and in it an attempt is made to describe a problematic. It goes as follows: 
A word or concept cannot be considered in isolation; it exists only in 
the theoretical framework in which it is used: it's problematic 
There follows a definition of the negation of some of its elements - which is 
not very helpful, since what one wants to know is not what a problematic is 
not, but rather what it is. Finally in a typically paradoxical Althusserian 
statement the glossary states: 
It (presumably the problematic) is centred on the absence of problems 
and concepts within the problematic as much as by their presence ... 
(It must be acknowledged that Althusser did not write this description/ 
definition himself, but in a letter to his translater, recorded in the 
book, he endorses it.) 
23 
24 
Willer, D. and Willer, S. Systematic Empiricism: Critique of a 
Pseudoscience. Prentice Hall inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1973. 
Op.cit . (Althusser) . 
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Throughout this book the reader is not spared any of A1thusser's 
own struggle in expressing what he wants to say, nor any of his 
translator's difficulty in conveying it. Moreover, A1thusser repeatedly 
makes oblique reference to his own interpretations of how Marx 
interpreted other philosophers, which detracts from making his own meaning 
clear. Then there is also the difficulty for the reader that this book is 
a compilation of essays rather than a carefully structured unit. 
Nonetheless, just as Kuhn's writing about a paradigm reflects the 
American approach to the philosophy of science, A1thusser's writing about 
a problematic reflects Marxist thinking on the same subject. Consequently 
in order to gain an understanding of how a concept of sociology emerges 
from different philosophies of science, it is worth struggling to follow 
the intricacies of A1thusser ' s language and thought. 
In the chapter IOn the Young Marx ' A1thusser states (page 6) that 
every ideology has its own problematic, i.e . a framework from which it is 
impossible to extract one element without altering its meaning . When he 
refers to the philosophy of Ludwig Feuerbach (as he often does) Althusser 
proposes that his writings do not succeed in conceiving what it is that 
constitutes the internal essence of an ideological thought, that is, its 
problematic. In other words Feuerbach's writings have not got a 
determinate unitary structure. 
A1thusser states that it is necessary for a philosopher to think the 
unity of a determinate ideological unity by means of the concepts of its 
problematic. This enables a rigorous thinker to arrive at the typical 
systematic structure unifying all the elements of the thought to be 
brought to light and so to discover a determinate content. his in turn 
allows a rigorous thinker to understand the meaning of the elements of 
the ideology concerned. He can then go even further along the road to 
knowledge by relating this ideology to the problems posed to every 
thinker by the historical period in which he lives. 
The understanding uf an ideological argument implies simultaneous 
knowledge of the ideological field in which a thought emerges and grows 
and the awareness of the internal unity in this same thought. This is 
the thought's problema ti c. E1 sewhere A1 thusser equates a problerratic 
II 
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with an ideological schema. He subsequently makes a distinction 
between the ideological problematic and a scientific problematic. 
At this stage a moderate realist could interject and propose that 
what Althusser is talking about is a philosophical overview within the 
unity of which the role of a variety of sciences can be more clearly 
understood. 
At the beginning of his chapter 'On the Materialistic Dialectic' 
Althusser presents the reader with his own explanations of his terminology. 
Theory with a capital 'T' means Marxist philosophy. All other philosophies 
are arrogantly relegated to ideologies. In the text of 'For Marx' theory 
with a small "t" refers to scientific theories. Marx, claims Althusser, 
founded a scientific theory of history. By theory in this respect 
Althusser means a specific form of practice, which itself belongs to the 
complex unity of the social practice of a determinate human society. 
The theoretical practice of a science, that is, its problematic, is 
always completely distinct from the ideological practice of its pre -history. 
This distinction between a scientific theory and the ideology from which it 
emanates takes the form of a theoretical and historical discontinuity. It 
is what Gaston Bachelard (1884-1962 ) calls an 'epistemological break,.25 
The comment can be made on this concept of Bachelard, which Althusser 
adopted as his own, that such a breakthrough into a new way of knowing 
results from a combination of a clear philosophical perspective and 
rigorously logical thought. Analogically, it can be compared to a ' break ' 
in billards where a combination of luck and skill puts one well ahead in 
the game. 
Beyond the break which constitutes the science there develops a theory, 
which can now be understood as a theoretical practice of a scientific 
character. (I n this thinking Althusser is close to Kuhn's idea of a period 
of pre-science being replaced by paradigmatic science.) In other words a 
problematic emerges. However each such theory with a small "t" (i.e. the 
theoretical practice of a science) exists within the ambit of the Theory 
with the big 'T' (i .e. Marxist philosophy: dialectical materialism). 
This theory of dialectical materialism is essential for the 
transformation of domains of knowledge in which a Marxist theoretical 
practice may exist. The Marxist scientific theory of economics and 
25 Gp. cit . (A 1 thusser). 
.... 
49 
politics is established in 'Capital'. But the Marxist theoretical 
practice of epistemology, of the history of science, ideology, philosophy, 
(Althusser's own words) and art has yet to be constituted. These fields 
of knowledge must be purified in a continuous struggle against previous 
iueologies - and particularly in a struggle against idealism . The 
reasons and aims of this struggle are clarified by the Theory with the 
big 'T': the materialist dialectic. 
Meanwhile Althusser allows that existing science goes on. But he 
warns the rigorous thinker that what is truly science and what is truly 
ideology has to be discerned. The majority of sciences in the ordinary 
sense of the term do have a 'theory' which he describes as their corpus 
of concepts. But they do not have a Theory with a big 'T' to which to 
relate their theoretical practice. However, Althusser claims that in the 
long run all science will need to be related to the Theory: dialectical 
materialism. 
In reading Althusser it is not always easy to discern how much of 
what he is proposing is his own thinking and how much that of Marx. 
However, this distinction is not essential to the main purpose of this 
chapter. Here the primary concentration is simply upon grasping what a 
pre- eminent Marxist philosopher, Althusser, means by a problematic and 
within what philosophical context he evolves this concept. 
Marx himself never wrote a 'Dialectics' but Althusser sets out to 
explain how he has elicited one from his writings. This explanation 
brings one through a tendentious explication of the relationship of Hegel 
to Marx and ends up with what Althusser proposes as the two key ideas of 
dialectical materialism: 
(i) the ever pre-giveness of a structured complex unity; and 
(ii) over-determination, i.e. complexly-structurally- unevenly-
determined. 
Towards the end of t~e book Althusser gives a summary of the 
Marxist dialectic active in the theoretical and political practices of 
Marxism . In his own convoluted terminology it goes as follows: 
I' 
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The specific difference of Marxist contradiction is its 
'unevenness' or 'overdetermination', which reflects in its 
conditions of existence, that is, the specific structure of 
unevenness (in dominance) of the ever-pre-given complex whole 
which is its existence. Thus understood, contradiction is the 
motor of all development. Displacement and condensation, with 
their basis in its overdetermination, explain by their dominance 
the phases (non-antagonistic, antagonistic and explosive ) which 
constitutes the existence of the compl ex process, that is, 'of the 
development of things'. 
In brief, Althusser conceives dialectical materialism as a process 
in which there is a combination of the concrete (the ever-pre -given-
complex), the contradictory and the dynamic. It is from within the 
context of such a philosophy that the present day concept of dialectical 
sociology emerges. 
A Philosophical Recapitulation 
Kuhn is ostensibly a positivist. Althusser is a materialist. In 
order to summarise the comparison and contrast of Kuhn's paradigm and 
Althusser's problematic it is possible to assess them both from an 
unaligned philosophical position: that of a moderate realist . 
From this standpoint, Kuhn is weak on ontology, but he is strong on 
the history of the epistemology of science. The insights he has gleaned 
from his study of history lead him to the discovery of psychological and / or 
social imperatives in the matter of choice. His sense of logic is 
balanced by a sense of history which convinces him that he cannot ignore 
the presence of politics in the matter of the choices that the scientific 
community makes . Moreover even though he does not go so far as articulating 
a discovery of ethics or morality, it is implied in his thesis that the 
choices so made ought to be ethical and moral. His proposition that the 
best people make the choices that lead to developments in science has 
strong ethical overtones in it. Anyway, his emphasis on the choice of 
the paradigm by the scientific community embarrassed some of his fr i ends 
who wished to defend their paradigm of logical positivism from the 
uncomfortable incursion of a new paradigm . 
By contrast Althusser is definite in his ontology . He posits it 
quite forcibly in his description of the ever-pre-given-comp1ex-structure. 
He relates his epistemology - his generalities I, II and III - to his 
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ontology and insists that both this ontology and epistemology should direct 
the choice of the problematics for new sciences. From a philosophic angle 
this approach to making choices is more satisfyingly comprehensive than 
Kuhn's. However this does not imply that one finds Althusser's epistemology 
original nor does it imply that his materialistic ontology is valid. 
A moderate realist has a different approa ch to reality. He can 
begin, not necessarily with the ever-pre-given-complex-structure, but 
rather with any individual tangible thing. The thing can be considered 
both as an objective reality and as a concept. It is both an 'ens' and 
potentially an 'ens rationis'. It is both a being and a thing-to-be- known. 
It has both 'esse' and 'essentia', i.e. it has both existence and a form 
of existence, its essence. Related to this theory of essence a moderate 
realist identifies substance and accidents. Some accidents are specified 
as essential properties of substance, such as extension in space and time 
and the relations between the elements within a substance. The relationships 
of the accidents of one substance to the accidents of another can also be 
scrutinised. Indeed the precise specification of these relationships is the 
realm of the physical scientist. They are observable, quantifiable and 
measurable. Philosophically, this is where Kuhn paradigms are located. 
Incidentally, it is here that the logic and the mathematics of the 
empiricists can lead to much precision of thought. Their focus is good 
for science but inadequate for a comprehensive philosophy. The very 
limitations of empiricism can work to its advantage. In as much as 
empiricists deal with the compartmentalised problems of physical science 
it is an advantage for them to be pluralistic, open to new perspectives and 
new experiences. In so far as physical scientists, logical positivists or 
empiricists become doctrinaire about metaphysics they are in trouble. To 
the extent that they deny the relevance of metaphysics to science they are 
in danger of becoming obscurantists; for an obscurantist is one who is 
locked into his own tunnel-vision and shoves out into the dark difficult 
ideas which he cannot handle. 
On the other hand, Althusser has no doubt about the comprehensiveness 
of his philosophy. Having worked through his various scientific 
problematics he then professes the doctrine of an absolute Theory with 
a capital 'T'. He is at pains to claim that this Theory has worked 
, . 
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itself out in practice in economics and politics. He purports that 
acceptance of this theory of dialectical materialism will ensure improved 
problematics for sciences. But he cannot prove his point. Those who are 
not Marxists remain sceptical. To the extent that Marxist philosophy 
permeates a widespread political movement it undoubtedly influences the 
perceptions of many sCientists; but in so far as Marxism as a philosophy 
is rejected by other philsophies, it can be argued that ultimately it 
contributes not to an improvement of sCience, but to its detriment. 
However, the aim of this chapter is not to prove that either Kuhn's 
or Althusser's philosophy is either right or wrong. This chapter has a 
much more limited objective. For the purpose of this dissertation one 
does not have to prove conclusively that logical positivism is better than 
Marxism or that moderate realism is better than either of them. The 
purpose here is rather to show that there are many different philosophies 
(and not just the three kinds discussed here). Consequently, it is unfair 
for anyone to demand that any social scientist should blinker himself into 
one of them - or even to disown his critical ability in regard to any of 
them. 
When a social scientist has a philosophy of his own which differs from 
that of others, academic freedom demands that he gets a fair hearing and 
that he is judged on the intelligence and the reasonableness of the case he 
presents. One who happens to have a preference for moderate realism will 
never be content with either logical positivism or Marxism; but that does 
not mean that he should become suspect as a social scientist. 
A moderate realist is neither an empiricist nor an idealist but both 
empiricism and idealism have a place in his philosophy. In this regard 
Lonergan sums up a moderate realist viewpoint very neatly. He states that 
idealism is a half-way house between current empirical fact and future reality. 
Both the paradigm and the problematic, discussed above, belong to 
philosophical schools which are uncomfortable with idealism. After they 
have pushed idealism out the doors, though, it comes back in through the 
windows. It is far too simplistic to imagine that idealism involves a 
denial that matter has existence independently of consciousness. Idealism 
I in philosophy is better understood as a method for breaking down the hard 
. . 
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and fast dichotomies of subject and object. Idealism recognises that 
the mind is not merely a passive mirror duplicating external realities and 
acknowledges instead that the mind is active and indeed construct ive in 
the creation of knowledge. 
It is impossible to keep all idealism out of the activity of knowing. 
This can be aptly illustrated by the way in wh ich idealism seeps into the 
writing of Kuhn and Althusser. Kuhn in his paradigm allows idealism back 
into his positivism through the decisive choices of his scientific community. 
Even though Althusser insists upon rigorous ideas of necessity, 
inevitability and determinism, he also emphasises ideas of deliberate 
revolutionary activity and free activity. Choice is not based on 
positivisttc knowledge alone but also on the idealism which motivates it. 
To sum up, both the paradigm and the problematic are provisional 
conceptual frameworks within which problems of knowledge can be tackled. 
The difference between their use by Kuhn and Althusser can be traced back 
to the differences in these two men's philosophies. 
Althusser argues that rigorous thinking can lead to the acceptance of 
a comprehensive philosophy which can form the foundation for the proper 
pursuit of science. Kuhn argues in favour of believing what we dre told by 
others in the scientific community - upon whom, he contends, we can 
reasonably rely. Some consideration of the value of a comprehensive 
philosophy and some degree of belief in Kuhn's scientific community can be 
looked upon as an essential constituent of intellectual collaboration. 
Indeed a study of the thinking of social theorists like Althusser and Kuhn 
puts one on d plateau of knowledge from which one may pursue one ' s own 
investigation into similar topics. 
However, such consideration for the beliefs of others is subject to one's 
own checking and control. The acceptance of the insi ghts gleaned is variable 
i n its extent, and it is provisional. Even though it is reasonable to 
appreciate that there is much of value in what eminent social theorists 
propose, it would be unreasonable to swap a belief in the value of others' 
ideas for the knowledge one has gained through careful reflection on one 's 
own experience. 
Belief is not knowledge. One can acquire knowledge - as distinct 
from belief - by distilling the essence of what one learns from others 
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and making it one's own. The richer the practical experience that one 
can bring to the reception of ideas, the greater the chance one has of 
knowledge. In the last analysis knowledge is the affirmation of the 
things one correctly understands in one's own experience.26 It is from 
such knowledge that new paradigms for either social science or sociology 
are likely to emerge. 
When one is immersed in the evolution of social policy initiatives 
and research, then the knowledge of what is happening in these fields 
results from a consciousness of an actual inability to avoid the lessons 
of one's own experience, to renounce one's intelligence in inquiry, or to 
desert one's reasonableness in reflection. It is on the basis of this kind 
of knowledge that one's search for a new paradigm for sociology is likely 
to prove fruitful. The fact that such an investigation may end up by 
authenticating a perception of a sociological paradigm that one has held 
for years does not lessen the value of articulating an argument which 
justifies its validity now. 
26 0p. ci t . (Lonergan) 
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CHAPTER 4 
A PARADIGM FOR SOCIOLOGY 
The foregoing chapter displays the importance of the concept of a 
paradigm in social science in general. Thus the scene has been set for 
sharpening the focus of this investigation so as to specify a paradigm 
for a particular social science: sociology. One way to construct an 
epistemological paradigm is to whittle down some current descriptions of 
sociology until one can get at its core meaning. When one knows precisely 
what one means by sociology, one can seek agreement from others that one ' s 
perception of it is valid for others also. From such a defi nition of 
sociology a paradigm for action can be elicited. 
However, a newcomer to sociology could be excused for contending 
that it does not have what Althusser calls a scientific problematic - it 
does not have a specific form of practice. Some current definitions of 
sociology could easily lead one to claim that sociology i n Kuhn's terms 
is in a state of pre-science. Questions can be asked about: Where is 
the clear-cut dominant theory which is generally accepted by t hose in 
the field? Where is the common understanding of what soc iology i s about ? 
Has sociology got any sensible paradigm? 
As was indicated in the previous chapter, Aron proposes t hat the 
27 Soviet and the American schools of sociology dominate t he scene. But, 
as the foregoing analysis of the thought of Kuhn and Althusser so aptly 
illustrate, there is a dispute over method between the representati ves of 
Soviet dialectical sociology under the influence of Marxi sm and the 
representatives of American empiricism under the i nfluence of logical 
positivism. Empiricist sociology can be expected to accuse dialectical 
sociology of arbitrariness, since it does not, it is said, subject its 
27 
Gp . cit . (Aron). 
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assertions to the test of direct personal observation: while dialectical 
sociology can be expected to accuse its opponents of the uncritical use of 
empirical techniques, without attending to the relevant problems of a 
wider structural context, and so attaining neither to historical depth nor 
to a critical perspective. 
Faced with such conflict between the dominant sociological schools, 
the newcomer, who is a moderate realist, is well advised to pick his steps 
carefully if he is to find a pathway towards his own solution of what 
sociology is all about. 
Stepping Stones Towards a New Definition 
The 'Great Soviet Enclopedia' provides a definition of sociology 
as follows: 
Sociology, the study of society as an integrated system, and of 
individual social institutions, processes and groups viewed in 
their connection with society as a whole. An essential pre-condition 
of sociological knowledge is the view of society as an inter-
connected entity 'and not as something mechanically concatenated 
and therefore permitting all sorts of arbitrary comblnations of 
separate social elements (V.l Lenin, Poln sobr, Soch 5th ed. Vol.l, 
p.165)'.28 
One who approaches the definition of sociology from the standpoint 
of moderate realism is unlikely to accept dialectic materialism nor its 
consequential exemplification in sociology. Perhaps such a person may be 
sympathetic with some of the outlooks of Soviet sociology and might even 
find a study of it interesting from the point of view of revealing the 
polymorphism of philosophic consciousness, but in the long run it will be 
next to impossible for him to accept what he considers the unjustified 
constraints of dialectical materialism on the practice of sociology. 
On the other hand, if he turns to the Encyclopaedia Americana for its 
definition of sociology he will confront a different problem. In a search 
of an adequate definition of sociology the Soviets will appear to him to 
err on the side of too much regulation of the discipline. Moreover it is 
a kind of regulation which he can hardly accept if he is to retain his 
28 Great Soviet Encylopedia. A translation of the 3rd Edition. 
Macmillan Inc., NY, Collier Macmillan Publishers, London, 1980. 
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integrity and his freedom of thought. By contrast, in the case of the 
American definition there is such a lack of regulation (in the sense of 
putting order into ideas) that it is difficult for him to know what he 
is required to acknowledge if he wishes to subscribe to the American 
school of sociology. The following definition, taken from Encylopaedia 
Americana, illustrates the second half of this dilemma. 
Sociology has sometimes been described as the scientific 
study of social behaviour of human beings. Beyond this the 
definitions and theories of modern sociologists exhibit great 
diversity. Because there is no consensus among sociologists, 
definitions directed at the general public usually glide over 
the problem by speaking of sociology as the science of society, 
or as the study of human group life, or as the study of social 
relations or institutions. (Emphasis added.)29 
The suggestion that it is possible to glide over the problem is 
euphemistic. Moreover, definitions can be found aplenty which are not 
directed at the general public; but rather at the academic community, 
other sociologists and students of sociology. Many such definitions are 
deplorable in their lack of logi~. The two main logical flaws are: 
(i) the assertion that sociology cannot be defined (as above); 
and 
(ii) the use of the word ' social' to define sociology. 
In the light of this discussion of sociology as one of the social 
sciences, it is ironical that the abuse of the word 'social' in the 
definition of sociology is found so plentifully in that provided by the 
'International ~ncyclopoedia of the Social Sciences'. It is as follows: 
29 
30 
A commonly accepted definition of sociology as a special science 
is that it is the study of social aggregates and groups in their 
institutional organisation, of institutions and their organisations, 
and of the causes and consequences of changes in institutions and 
social organisation. The major units of sociological inquiry are 
social systems and their sub-systems; social institutions and social 
structure; and social aggregates, relationships, groups and 
organisations .30 
The Encyclopaedia Americana. Americana Corporation, Danbury, 
Connecticut, 1978. 
International Encyclopaedia of the Social SCiences, Ed. Sills D.L., 
Vol.15, The Macmillan Company and the Free Press, 1968. 
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Trying to define sociology by the use of the word 'social' is like 
defining geography by stating that geography is the study of geographical 
systems and sub - systems . Similar examples of the use of the word 'social' 
and 'society' in the pretence of defining sociology are not hard to find 
in text books. Here are two samples: 
The task of an introductory text in sociology is to present a clear 
understanding of social interaction, social structure, and social 
change. How do societies work? How do societies hang together? 31 
How do they change? How do they meet - or fail to meet - human needs? 
Sociology is a systematic and scientific discipline seeking knowledge 
of a man as a social animal: his societies and sub - societies and his 
adjustment to them, his customs and institutions and the patterns of 
stability and change that they develop.32 
Other modern sociological textbooks duck for cover and adopt Aron's 
tactic of saying that sociology is undefinable. Two samples are as follows: 
Throughout this book I will not define sociology, because I believe one 
cannot explain what the field is or how he feels (s ic ) about it, except 
by giving examples of what sociologists do and commenting on these 
examples. 33 
The question 'What is Sociology?' or its corollary, 'What is a 
sociologist? is a familiar one which has been on the scene for a long 
while... . However, what is the' sociology of sociology?' is a more 
unsettling question, and this volume is an endeavor to indicate that 
we are dealing with an important query. Too often we tend to take for 
granted what we are most familiar with, and for sociology this is 
sociology itself. I do not mean by this sociology as one among many 
academic subjects, an abstraction consisting of abstractions - I mean 
sociology as a multidimensional set of activities and conceptions 
which has been and is of great existential importance for people who 
think of themselves as sociologists . Sociologists too, are social 
beings, just like sociology itself is a social fact; in essen~~, this 
book utilizes a variety of materials to illustrate just that. 
Fortunately there are better definitions of sociology than those 
mentioned above but it is still very difficult to find a satisfactory one. 
31 
32 
33 
34 
Biesanz, M. H. and Biesanz, J. Introduction to Sociology, 3rd Edition, 
Prentice- Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1974. 
Stewart, E. W. and Glynn, J.A. Introduction to Sociology. McGraw 
Hill Inc., N.Y., 1971. 
McNall, S.G. The Sociological Experience, A Modern Introduction to 
Sociology, 2nd Edition, Little Brown and Co., Boston, Appleton, 1969. 
Tiryakian, E.A. The Phenomenon of Sociology. Appleton-Century-Crofts, 
Meredith Corporation, N.Y., 1971. 
........... 
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Moreover if a sociologist is not content to study sociology for the sake 
of sociology, but wishes to turn it to practical use, say, for the 
formulation of government policy. the task is made even more difficu lt . 
Be that as it may, this author maintains that the tas k must be tackled 
and brought to a satisfactory conclus ion. 
A Definition of Sociology 
To begin with it is proposed that the proper subject of sociology 
is aptly captured in the concept of the 'institution ' . Secondly the 
method of knowing in sociology is 'scientific method'. Thirdly, it is 
proposed that if the science of sociology is to be a responsible one it 
must relinquish its insistence on knowledge for knowledge 's sake and 
accept that the knowledge gained in sociology about institutions 
inevitably has consequences for organisational policy. These three points 
are developed in the rest of this chapter and the next. 
An understanding of the way in which the term institution is being 
interpreted is of rivotal importance for the subsequent understanding of 
the definition of sociology which will be proposed. Nonetheless, the 
use of this term will be better understood when sociology has first of 
all been defined by separating it from philosophy - i n this instance a 
moderate realist version of philosophy. 
Philosophy is concerned with the individuality of things and with 
the totality of all things. Sociology is much more limited in its scope. 
A philosopher can take any single thing and use it as the starting point 
for his philosophy. Even a speck of dust is sufficient sub j ect matter upon 
which to philosophise. For a moderate realist philosopher the most 
important concept which he relates to the reality of any thing is its 
existence. He finds conformity between the actual existence of the speck 
of dust outside himself and the concept of the speck of dust which exists i n 
his mind. Moreover the speck of dust has existence of a distinctive kind. 
Its distinctive mode of existence is called its essence. Its existence, 
essentially as a speck of dust, is extended in space and time. It is of 
a certain size, has a certain shape, is present now, and it is conceivable 
that it might not have existed at all and to that extent it is contingent. 
Nonetheless the fact of its existence necessarily puts it into a 
-! 
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relationship with other existing things and in examlnlng these relation-
ships a philosopher can philosophise long and large. In other words, because 
a philosopher uses the data of consciousness rather than just the data of 
the senses,he can raise and discuss many important issues on the basis of 
his perception of an individual thing which is ostensibly of minute 
importance. 
Philosophy is also concerned with the totality of all things - the 
earth, the sun, the moon and the stars, the whole universe, the whole of 
existence. The meaning of it all, the concepts related to it all, of 
space and time, of necessity and contingency, of potentiality and 
actuality, of cause and effect: they are all part and parcel of philosophy. 
By contrast, sociologists do not focus on what philosophers call the 
principle of individuation. The philosophical mysteries of individuality 
escape them. Neither is the subject of sociology, the universe nor the 
totality of all that exists. It is possible to· distinguish two concepts: 
that of 'the earth' and that of 'our world'. The earth can be considered 
as a subject of philosophy, but not sociology. Sociology concentrates 
on our world. Sociology does not deal with the earth as considered apart 
from us and existing independently of us: it does deal with the earth as 
we have changed it and made it into 'our world'. 
So a definition of sociology could well be, 'Sociolo9Y deals 
with what we make of our world'. 
Sociology analyses how we arrange things. In other words it deals 
with how we generate institutions. The institutions may be either small 
or large, formal or informal, covert or overt. Marriage is an institution, 
though it often concerns just two people. The family is an institution and 
it may be as small as three. On the other hand a village, a town, a city 
or a nation is also an institution. 
The original meaning of institution is derived from the Latin 
' i nstituere', meaning, to appoint, to establish, to set up, to arrange 
things. Sociology is essentially concerned with how we arrange things 
among ourselves to form our world. But in the struggle to put order or 
sense into the arrangement of things, mankind has often to contend with 
realities that seem simple and are yet extremely complicated, that 
seem intelligible though at times absurd, that seem reasonable though 
-'" 
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at times they are as obscene as a nuclear war; and so it is often beyond 
the wit of man to cope with them. 
An example of the awareness of the complexity of the world we live 
in can be seen in Michel Foucault's book entitled, ' The Archaeology of 
Knowledge, .35 He discusses not institutions themselves but their 
documentation and the discourses about them. 
Such discourses as economics, medicine, grammar, the 
science of living give rise to certain organisations of 
concepts, certain regrouping of objects, certain types 
of enunciation .... 
Throughout the book he is at pains to profess how intricate, complicated, 
convoluted, untidily interconnected and bountiful our world is. He 
remarks that: 
When one speaks of a system of formation one does not only 
mean the juxtaposition, coexistence, or interaction of 
heterogenous elements (institutions, techniques, social 
groups, perceptual organisations, relations between various 
discourses) but also the relation that is established between 
them and in a well determined form - by discoursive practice. 
Nonetheless 'genesis, continuity and totalisation' are the great themes 
of the history of ideas. 
The horizons of the archaeology (of knowledge) therefore is not ~ 
science, ~ rationality, ~ mentality, ~ culture; it is a tangle of 
interpositivities whose limits and points of intersection cannot be fixed 
in a single operation. He cOlTlTIents- that the analysis of discourse 
operates between the two poles of totality and plethora. On the one hand 
the human mind strives to put order into a seemingly disordered reality: 
35 
36 
One shows how different texts with which one is dealing 
refer to one another, organise themselves into a single figure, 
converge with institutions and practices and carry meanings 
that may be common to a period. 36 
Foucault, M. The Archaeology of Knowledge, Tavistock Publications 
Ltd., London, 1977. 
Op . cit. (Foucaul t). 
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On the other hand, we are confronted with a plethora of meanings, some of 
which overwhelm us, and some of which are beyond our comprehension: 
Meaning springs up through ... manifest formulations, it 
hides beneath what appears, and secretly duplicates it, because 
each discourse contains the power to say something other than 
what it actually says, and thus to embrace a plurality of 
meanings .... 37 
In reaction to the complexity of our world, Soviet sociology is 
determined to constrain it all within a theory of dialetical materialism. 
American sociology compartmentalises problems and deals with them 
separately. Meanwhile human creativity is constantly at work subjectively 
making choices which create order and disorder and new order and new 
disorder in our world. As a consequence it is difficult for sociology to 
predict with scientific accuracy the outcome of human activity, but it 
can identify 'institutions' through which men began to arrange their 
relationships in the past; keep these relationships working in the 
present; and through which they may conti Rue to adjust and adapt their 
relationships to each other in the future. 
For this reason this dissertation proposes that sociology 
can be defined as the science of institutions. 
Giddens, in his Introduction to a book on Durkheim has a similar 
appreciation of the importance of the concept of institution in regard 
to sociology. He states that: 
One can, indeed, without distorting the meaning of this 
expression, call institutions all the beliefs and modes of 
conduct instituted by the collectivity. Sociology can 
then be defined as the science of institutions, their 
genesis and functioning. 38 
This definition of Giddens is an attractive one. It is short and 
to the point. It refers to both the origins and dynamism of collective 
action. However it leaves out of account the concept of interaction which 
figures prominently in some of the more sensible descriptions of sociology. 
For example, Collier's Encyclopaedia offers the following: 
37 
38 
Gp. cit. (Foucau 1t) 
Giddens, A. In Introduction to Emile Durkheim - Selected Writings, 
Cambridge University Press, 1972. 
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Sociology is the study of interaction among peoples and of the 
effects of this interaction on human behavior. Such interaction can 
range from the first physical contacts of the newborn babe with its 
mother to a philosophical discussion at an international conference, 
from a casual passing on the street to the most intimate human 
relationships . What processes lead to these interactions, what 
exactly occurs when they take place, and what are their short-term 
and long- term consequences are subjects sociologists study.39 
Cuber in his book entitled 'Sociology: A Synopsis of Principles', 
states much the same thing far more briefly: 
Sociology may be defined as a body of scientific knowledge about 
human relations. 40 
By marrying Giddens' perception with Cuber's, it is possible to come 
up with a good terse definition: 
Sociology is the science of institutions, their genesis,functioning 
and relationships. 41 
A Way of Knowing 
The above analysis has arrived at a definition of sociology by 
specifying its proper object. Analogically just as a knife is an instrument 
for cutting, sociology is an instrument for knowing about institutions. But 
specifying the subject matter of sociology does not complete the process of 
its definition. Attention has also to be paid to sociology's method of 
knowing. 
In the first chapter of this dissertation, scientific method was 
described as an empirical inquiry that moves from the observation of 
specific data to an explanation of their meaning. In this process 
sociology uses a variety of techniques. For instance, for the purpose of 
collecting data on institutions or one sort of another, sociologists may 
use direct observation, process analysis, depth interviews, descriptive 
surveys, or participant observation, or combinations of any of these 
techniques. 
39 
40 
41 
Colliers Encyclopaedia. Ed. Halsey, W.O., Crowell-Collier 
Educational Corporation, Vol.21, USA, 1973. 
Cuber, J.F. Sociology: A Synopsis of ?rinciples, 5th Edition, 
Appleton-Century Crofts, Division of Meredith Publishing Company, 
N.Y., 1959. 
Cf. a Brien, T. Job-Generation, Hill of Content, Melbourne, 1981, p.65. 
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Alternatively they may use a content analysis technique on the 
documentation relevant to their topic. It is also possible that a 
sociologist may use projective techniques which analyse responses to 
unstructured material like single words or even ink blots; or 
responses to stories, myths, customs and so on. The choice of the 
techniques depends upon the institution which is being studied and the 
particular perspective from which the sociologist chooses to study it.42 
Many sociologists use advanced statistical techniques to collect 
and analyse data on issues of national significance such as questions 
of demography, ethnicity, stratification, standards of educationa l 
achievements, employment patterns and the like. Explanatory surveys are 
conducted which involve the researcher in the production and pre-testing 
of questionnaires and the coding of open- ended answers. Al so government 
statistics are used taken from official surveys, registration material 
and special studies published in the form of census data and other vital 
statistics. 
The analysis of such material may involve the sociologist in editing, 
coding and tabulating the data on the chosen subject of his enquiry. 
Knowledge of statistical techniques for establishing randomness, sampling 
procedures, and probability are all part of the sociologist's stock 
in trade; as also are a variety of techniques for interpreting the data 
which investigations yield from the setting of scales of measurement and 
the simple analysis of variance to techniques of multiple regression and 
factor analysis. 
No matter what technique a sociologist uses to collect his data 
for analysis, it is essential for him to keep in mind that the data only 
has meaning in relation to the subject matter upon which he has chosen to 
collect it. Data remains simply 'the given'; which means that it is the 
information given in response to the questions that the researcher has 
chosen to ask. Unless the researcher is ~uite sure in his own mind of 
the definition of the topic he has chosen to study, the data lapses 
into pre-scientific insignificance. 
By the same token, when it comes to analysing the data, the mind 
is active in the construction of the knowledge to be gained. Analysis by 
42 Wiseman, J.P. and M.S. Aron. Field Projects in Sociology, Transworld 
Publishers Ltd., Massachusetts, 1972. 
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its very nature is always a mental construction of reality . It is true 
that a sociologist analysing data may insist that scientific observation 
is a matter of just seeing what is to be seen and just accepting the data 
as it comes. But the specification of the topics to be studied has to be 
chosen in the first place and choice will also intrude into the methods 
selected to interpret them. 
The claim to total impartiality cannot be taken too literally. he 
sociologist no less than anyone else, is under the dominance of some 
guiding orientation. The context in which an investigation is undertaken 
determines this orientation, and the choice of the purpose of the 
investigation determines it further. Still the claim to impartiality 
does possess some validity in as much as the guiding orientation of the 
sociologist is the orientation that is a pure, detached, disinterested 
desire to know. 
Be that as it may the sociologist is at a particular disadvantage in 
collecting data on institutions; for data collected on how human beings 
arrange their affairs can give an appearance of scientific precisions, 
even when this precision has been purchased by the suppression of further 
facts of vital significance. So in operationalising his hypotheses a 
sociologist, more often than the physical scientist, will find that he will 
have to intervene with choices about how to interpret the data. When 
operational controls fail, on account of the inherent unpredictability of 
his subject matter, theoretical knowledge will have to step in to account 
for failures of control, to identify the uncontrollable factors, to 
determine and measure their activity and influence and so extrapolate to 
the probable finding that would have been identifiable if they did not 
interfere. 
In the foregoing paragraphs the word 'choice' crops up frequently. 
Choice enters in to the selection of topics for investigation. Choice 
is evident in the selection of methods to be used in an inquiry. Choice 
also intrudes into the interpretation of the data . Moreover, once knowledge 
has been gained by a piece of sociological research the challenge of choice 
is present once again in the question of how the knowledge will be used. 
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A sociologist does not cease to be a sociologist simply because 
he chooses to use the knowledge he has gained in sociological inquiry for 
purposes which go beyond the immediate responsibility of sociology 
itself. For instance, if the sociologist is also a policy analyst he may 
rightfully choose to use his knowledge of sociology for the purpose of 
advising government on social policy. Nonetheless, even though such a 
proposition may sound to most people like ordinary common sense, it is 
fair to put on record that within the discipline there is a traditional 
institutional bias against sociologists who do not (in a university 
fashion) study sociology for sociology's sake. 
The classic example of this bias is recorded in the Encyclopaedia 
Britannica. Here the writer of the article on sociology arbitrarily 
states: 
As a social science, sociology, contrary to popular misconception 
justified in part by its early history, does not have as its 
objectives the determination or modification of social values, the 
proposal of reforms, the design or administration of welfare 
programs, or the direct promotion of a better social order. These 
are important objectives to be sure, but they are the tasks of the 
statesman, the administrator, the legislator, the education, the 
social worker, the clergyman, the labor leader, the agitator and 
the propagandist, rather than of the sociologist as a social 
scientist. The discipline of sociology strictly speaking is 
concerned only with the pursuit and funding (sic) of knowledge 
about man and society. In such knowledge, which ideally comprises 
generalisations drawn from empirical and verified investigation, 
the sociologist strives to understand and to achieve prediction of 
human conduct and social phenomena. Values are among the data which 
he studies and not the end product of his labours. 43 
There is, of course, a logical weakness in this assertion. It is 
signalled when the writer switches the subject of his sentences in the 
paragraph from the abstract noun of 'sociology' in the first sentence, to 
the common nouns of the statesman, the administrator, the legislator, 
the educator etc. in the second sentence. Sociology as such may have to 
confine itself within its own parameters as a science, but this is not 
adequate justification for having the sociologist as a person so 'cribbed 
cabined and confined'. As well as performing his role as a research 
43 Encyclopaedia Britannica. Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc., William 
Benton, Publisher, Vol.20, USA, 1969. 
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sociologist, the same person may be called upon to make judgments about 
administration, legislation and education because of the very fact that 
he is a sociologist. When he does give others the benefit of his 
considered judgment on such matters it does not seem sensible to ask him 
to renege on his profession as a sociologist. 
Indeed in the final paragraph in thi s same article in the 
Encyclopaedia Britannica there is a virtual back-down from the position 
taken in the beginning of the article which was quoted above. It goes 
as follows: 
Sociology had increasing application to the solution or practical 
problems, especially after the 2nd decade of the 20th century. The 
findings of sociological research have been utilised, particularly 
in such fields as criminology, social work, education, race relations, 
planning, government, administration, marketing, communication, 
propaganda, public opinion polling, social psychiatry, industrial 
relations, and marriage and family counselling. Most sociologists 
continued in teaching and research activities at universities and 
colleges. 44 
The writer's final sentence is revealing in as much as it indicates the 
perspective from which the article was written . Obviously, though, some 
sociologists operate in other than a single role of 'pure ' research. 
The article in the Encyclopaedia Britannica , which not only pronounces 
on the parameters of the science of sociology but also virtually restricts 
the sociologist within the confines of his discipline, was written in 1969. 
One would expect that such a view of the role of sociologists would have 
been by-passed by events. To some extent it has been, in as much as the 
New Encyclopaedia Britannica, gives a better definition and discards 
altogether the kind of arbitrariness, which is being criticised here. 
Nonetheless the tradition of sociology as an exclusive or even as a 
closed science lingers on! 
The separation of sociology from public policy is all the more 
significant due to the difficulty of separating the concept of the 'social ' 
from the concept of the 'political'. The closeness of the two concepts i s 
discussed elsewhere in this dissertation. 45 
44 
45 
Op.cit . (Encyclopaedia Britannica). 
Cf. Chapter 5. pp 75, 76 
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The contention here is not that the scientific method used by 
sociologists should become politicised; for obviously that would be to 
prostitute the science . Instead attention is drawn to the fact that 
sociology studies 'institutions' and often (though not always) such 
institutions are very close to the politics of a nation. So, to imagine 
that the sociologist who has gained knowledge through his science should 
not become involved in the hurley-burley of its political consequences 
is to condemn the sociologist to being considered irrelevant or at least 
to his being treated as of far less importance than other social 
SCientists, such as economists. 
This last point could open up a whole new area for discussion which 
would lengthen this chapter unmanageably and destroy its unity of purpose. 
The purpose here has been simply to arrive at a definition of sociology 
and to indicate that such a definition can be used as a paradigm. When 
used as a paradigm it can serve to elucidate how the definition can 
'inform' governments' programmatic action. By inform is meant provide a 
foundation for understanding the origin, functioning and relationships of 
institutions brought into being by government policy. The fact that the 
definition proposed can in fact be used as a paradigm for explaining 
programs can be illustrated by picking any institution and examining how 
it began, how it now works, and what are its relationships with its 
environment. 
Sociology and Social Programs 
Before concluding this chapter I think it is permissable to switch 
to the first person and acknowledge that the definition I propose is 
original and that its use as a paradigm is based on personal experience. 
However, this personal experience is a matter of public record in two 
published books: one entitled, Planning - Becoming - Development and 
the other entitled, Job - Generation Both books are constructed on the 
basis of my definition of sociology as the science of institutions, their 
genesis, functioning and relationships. 
In accordance with the thinking which underlies both of these books 
it is possible to present the reader with a paradigm which is relevant to 
-
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the use of sociology for the formulation of public policy . Indeea the 
following paradigm makes an apt conclusion to this chapter, which set out 
to define sociology and then to prov ide evide nce on how such a definition 
can be useful when putting shape on social policy. The paradigm is as 
follows: 
Sociology is the science of institutions which examines their: 
Genesis Functioning Relationships 
Planning Becoming Development 
The influence of the above paradigm can be seen in the way it evolves into 
relevant concepts of social policy and public administrat ion. Key concepts 
in policy formulation and program design are as follows: 
Aim Resources Implementation 
Promot i on Organisation Definition 
Educa t ion Administration Relationships 
The working out i n practice of these concepts can be seen in the evolution 
of the Australian Assistance Plan (AAP ) . When the first steps were taken 
to promote the AAP, it was considered that the program to be derived from 
the initial policy could be embraced within three concepts which formed, 
in effect, its paradigm: 
46 
Aim : Resources Implementation 
Gradually, these concepts became more refined in their emphasis on 
the promotion of the aim, the organisation of the resources, and 
the definition of the composition of the RCS046 structures. So the 
key words for the AAP activities became: 
Promotion : Organisation Definition 
Regional Councils for Social Development under the Australian 
Assistance Plan. 
-
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Subsequently, these three concepts which related to the clarification 
of the policy led to the establishment of the RCS047 program which 
was concerned with education about program objectives or aims, 
organisation for the appropriate administration of resources, and 
a definite policy for the relationship of the new organisation to 
other bodies. So the key concepts underlying the development of the 
RCSO program became: 
Education Administration : Relationships 
In my book Job-Generation, I relate the triple concept of genesis, 
functioning and relationships (mentioned on p.65) to the triple concept 
of concern, power and justice (p.182) and, indeed, in the whole of 
Chapter 12 provide a detailed argument which shows the connection between 
these concepts and the fundamental philosophical principles of being, 
becoming and relations. In the subsequent chapters of this book, I will 
relate how a mandate can bring particular instances of social policy into 
being; how administrative arrangements are made for making a particular 
instance of social policy become a program reality; and how the justice of 
a program can be assessed by studying the relationships it causes. 
Moreover, the Report of the Joint Parliamentary Committee of Public Accounts 
on Income Maintenance Programs is itself affected by the above 
conceptualisations~ as it is by this fi~al definition of sociology: 
47 
48 
Sociology studies institutions to identify how they come into 
being; to determine the processes of their becoming functional; 
and to understand their relationships with each other. 
OBrien, T. Planning-Becoming-Oevelopment. Centre for Continuing 
Education, Australian National University, Canberra, 1977. 
Australia. Joint Parliamentary Committee of Public Accounts. 
Income Maintenance Programs. Canberra, 1983 
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CHAPTER 5 
CHOOSING HOW TO DEFINE SOCIAL POLICY 
The earlier parts of this study have shown how one can acquire 
experiential knowledge about community development and academic knowledge 
about sociology. This puts one on a plateau of knowledge from which to ask 
practical questions about a more complicated subject matter: social policy. 
Most people would not quarrel with the general statement that social policy 
deals with a wide range of issues. But it is important to go further than 
that a acknowledge that it concerns not alone actual issues but also issues 
that might have been or might arise in the future. The world of humankind 
and the affairs of a nation are so bountiful, complicated and incalculable 
(as perceived by Michele Foucault,* cf. Chapter 4) that the possibilities 
for decisions on social policy are manifold. Moreover they are to a large 
extent mutually exclusive. The fact that we now have one kind of social 
policy in Australia rather than another is a result of singling out some 
possibilities from the manifold and rejecting others. Our present social 
policy is a result of past political choice and the direction that it will 
take in the future will also be a matter of political choice. In seeking 
to understand social policy it is advantageous to be able to unravel what 
were the reasons for the choices that were made in the past; for then we 
may be in a better position to suggest how we might need to make different 
choices in the future. So the question of reasons for choices lies at the 
core of the next four chapters. 
Issues that cannot be settled by observation and experiment cannot be 
settles by empirical method. But it does not follow immediately that they 
cannot be settled at all. When one considers what should be the 
relationship between sociology and social policy from the perspective of 
scientific method it may be initially difficult to arrive at any conclusion. 
The scope of the question is too broad to be the ~ubject of observation, 
explanation and verification. However, scientific method is not the only 
way of knowing. There are other ways of tackling problems and finding 
solutions. Consider an analogical approach. 
For instance, there is an axiom in regard to knowledge that everyone 
can easily understand: it is that similar things are to be similarly 
understood. Concepts which express our understanding of things are said to 
* Opus ci t . 
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be univocal when they have the same meaning in all applications. Concepts 
are said to be analogous when their meaning varies systematically from one 
field of operations to another. An argument from analogy first of all 
assumes that some situation, A, is correctly understood. Once that is 
agreed upon, the people who accept the validity of the initial statement, 
can introduce a second proposition that argues that some other similar 
situation, B, is to be understood in the same fashion. 
Proverbs and adages often present an argument from analogy. They are 
a far older and more direct way of expressing knowledge than scientific 
method, and they do not lose their validity because of the advent of 
scientific knowledge. Admittedly, because science is analytic and 
abstractive its terms are exact and because its correlations purport to be 
generally valid they must be determined with the utmost precision; moreover 
because its terms are exact and its correlations general, it can arrive at 
logical ded.uctions in which each conclusion is equally exact and valid 
generally. On the other hand it may not always be wise to generalise too 
literally from a proverb to a conclusion valid on all occasions. But it 
is often possible to use a proverb to show how one situation compares with 
another. When the hat fits it must be worn~ 
Proverbs and adages crystallise the valid insights of plain, ordinary common 
sense. When one is using analogical statements, though, one needs a sense of 
humour; for while they usually provide an immediate insight into similar 
situations, they often include comparisons which are amusing in their difference. 
All this leads up to the use of an adage to get to grips with a problem. 
So it is proposed to state the adage first and then to use it as a stepping 
stone towards discussing the relationship between sociology and social policy. 
If we had bacon, we could have bacon and eggs, if we had eggs. 
The above adage is hypothetical; but no one who is sensible will want to 
quarrel with its logical validity. By analogy it is reasonable to state also 
that if one had a clear definition of sociology, one could understand the 
relationship between sociology and social policy, if one also had a clear 
definition of social policy. The previous chapter went to some pains to 
elucidate a good working definition of sociology. To the extent that a purpose 
of this dissertation is to show the relationship between a sociological 
paradigm and social policy, it is now necessary to define the latter. 
-
..... 
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Social Policy 
The term social policy is so often used that many might imagine that 
it has a meaning that is commonly understood. Not so. Earlier in this study 
when community development was being discussed the point was made that 
different people interpret it differently. Social policy is like that too. 
Politicians debate it, public administrators administer it, policy analysts 
analyse it, journalists write about it, the public talks about it and so on; 
yet there is no unanimity on what it means. It is a rich concept susceptible 
to many different interpretations. 
When scholars are confronted with a term that is hard to define, like 
sociology or social policy, they often resort to the tactic of first of all 
examining what others have written about it. They then draw their own 
conclusions about its essential meaning. For example, in the opening 
paragraph of the preface of Graycar's book, entitled Perspectives in Australian 
Social Policy, he draws attention to the difficulty of defining social policy 
in the following words: 
Social policy is a discipline that sits uneasily in contemporary 
intellectual life. It suffers from great ambiguities in definition. 
Is it an offshoot of, or perhaps a branch of sociology, of social 
work, of political science, of economics or of public administration? 
While it certainly contains elements of each of these (many of which 
themselves are hybrid disciplines) it is often disdained by 'purists' 
in these disciplines as a somewhat marginal activity.49 
There is no clearly recognizable theoretical base to the discipline, 
and much of the study that is undertaken is very practical and 
applied 50 
After having surveyed literature on social policy, Graycar proposes that: 
Social policy is about a theory of benefits and their distribution -
it is about alloca tions . In general, allocations in social policy 
can be about three things, allocation of income, allocation of 
services, and allocation of power. 51 
Graycar's emphasis raises problems. If he were writing about welfare 
policy his emphasis might not have been out of place; but to state that 
49 Cf. Graycar, A. Ed. Perspectives in Australian Social Policy. 
The Macmillan Company of Australia Pty Ltd, Melbourne, 1978. 
50 
opus ci t . (Graycar). 
51 
opus cit . (Graycar). 
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social policy is simply about the allocation of benefits implies an 
oversight. He misses the point that before goods can be allocated they have 
to be accumulated. Certainly social policy is about distribution, provided 
that distribution is not understood in its common sense or dictionary meaning; 
but rather is interpreted in the technical way that classical philosophers 
used it in relation to justice; since the traditional definition of 
distributive justice refers not just to the allocation of benefits, but 
rather to the allocation of both burdens and benefits. 
That last point is of critical significance to a proper understanding of 
social policy, but rather than develop it now I prefer to postpone its 
analysis until later. Instead it seems preferable to begin by discussing 
social policy in terms of the people who put it into practice. Then to 
clarify the meaning of 'social' and 'policy' in separation from each other 
before bringing them together again in what I hold is the term's essential 
meaning in the context in which I am using it. Subsequently I will identify 
how others have defined it and show that many confuse 'social policy' with 
'welfare policy'. Then in subsequent chapters I will make plain how a 
theoretical definition of what I call 'social welfare policy' is exemplified 
in 127 programs currently administered by a range of Commonwealth Government 
d epa rtmen ts . 
Social Policy in Practice 
In accordance with the definition of sociology in the previous chapters 
it is reasonable to propose that social policy is a matter of planning and/or 
managing relationships between institutions. In public administration it is 
easy to see how such a definition works out in practice. Parliament itself 
is an institution. The people who elect members of parliament delegate to _he 
political party which \vins an election, the power to rule. The politica l 
party is an institution. The victorious party delegates to cabinet the 
executive functions of government. The cabinet is an institution. The cabinet, 
which comprises many ministries, delegates to departments in the public service 
the right to provide a variety of services to a variety of different groups in 
the population which mades up the national community. The departments are 
institutions . Those who receive services from each separate Gepartment receive 
them according to certain rules and regulations and as such can be considered 
also as a recipient 'institution'. In other words, the recipients can be 
considered as belonging to a category identifiable by the 'arrangements' that 
government makes for them. 
........ 
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A Social Order 
Those of us who are citizens belong to a whole range of institutions. We 
act very often in accordance with the way things are arranged for us. Even in 
private life established institutionalised ways of doing things constitute our 
behaviour. In public life there is little we can do that does not have to 
conform to some regulation, procedure, arrangement, convention, way of doing 
things that either loosely or tightly, directly or indirectly, covertly or 
overtly, is influenced by government decisions. 
The outcome is called the social order. It is seldom perfectly 
satisfactory for everyone, but in Australia it is reasonably satisfactory 
for many. The order imposed by government, convention or tradition, is 
not something that necessarily breeds resentment or rejection. Instead, 
most people accept and even like a good degree of order in how they live. 
A new order or a new arrangement or life-style may be accepted or 
rejected by society at large. In other words new 'institutions' 
continuously emerge in the process of grou!J living. He live a·nd let live 
in tune with institutions of one sort or another. The fact that some 
innovations are rejected and die out does not mean that others will not 
take their place. Mankind has a talent for inventing new institutions 
to cope with matters cultural, social, political, economic and the like. 
In fact it would not be reasonable for a philosopher to propose that 
institutions are natural to man. 
But this treatise goes beyond that last statement and proposes that 
it is natural for man to establish a dominant institution (usually called 
a government) to manage institutional interaction. Moreover the idea is 
posited here that the management of institutional interaction is a valid 
interpretation of what is meant by the term social policy. 
Within this context the definition of social policy can be further 
explored . The exploration is necessary; for the term is often used so 
loosely as to carry little meaning. Since the term is a composite one 
it can be more fully defined by paying attention to both parts of it. 
The Meaning of Social 
It is especially necessary to define the word I social'. The 
essential meaning of the word can be derived from its origin. 'Social I 
and 'political' have similar origins. 'Social' comes from the Latin 
I societas I which the Romans used to describe their community. 'Political' 
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comes from the Greek ' polis' which the Athenians used to describe their 
commu nity. Allowances must be made for great differences in the 
connotations of both terms, since each is derived from a vastly different 
culture. Even so, the essential meaning of both terms is the same. Both 
'political' and 'soci al' refer to an organised community. 52 
In modern times the word 'political ' has acquired another and more 
distinctive meaning. It is often limited to refer to the organisation of 
parties which seek to control government. 
On the other hand the way in which 'social' i s generally used i s 
much less limited. For example, 'social' can refer to a variety of 
segments of the Australian community. Some segments are organ i sed for 
specific purposes; others are only loosely organised; while still others 
are hardly organised at all, except in the way in which we think about 
them. In other words, the term 'social' can be used variously to refer 
to the interests of people in a specific organisation like the Australian 
Council of Social Services, the Red Cross, the Confederation of Australian 
Industry or a trade union. It can also be used in relation to a less well 
organised group like the pensioners. It can even be used to reflect the 
organisation in our thinking about, say, the recipients of children ' s 
allowances - although in fact they are not organised. The adjective 
'social' can be used when references are made to the interests of all 
these groups, and to the interests of many other groups besides. 'Social ' 
refers to the organisation of people, either factuall y or conceptually. 
The Meaning of Policv 
A policy is a plan-of-action. When the word 'policy' is used in 
this chapter it will generally be in reference to government plans. 
There are many government plans which directly affect people insofar as 
they can be considered an institution, in other words a particular 
category, class, unit or group. When government considers plans, or i s 
actually operating plans, to give a benefit or a service to such groups, 
these plans form part of its social policy. 
52 Acquinas, referring to Aristotle's writing, says: Man is by nature 
a political animal, that is to say social. The comment was written 
as an aside, but it sums up the closeness of the relationship 
between the two in the mind of that philosopher. CJ • Arendt, H., 
The Human Condition, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1958. 
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Policy is always closely associated with an ideal. A realistic 
ideal can be understood as a half-way house between present fact and 
future reality. Somewhat similarly a policy represents a half-way house 
between a current situation and an improvement in that situation which 
the government wants to achieve. A policy results in action when a program 
is implemented; o~ to put the matter the other way round, a proqram is a 
policy-in-action. 
Very often the philosophical ideals, which appeal to a particular 
political party, subsequently become incorporated into its policy platform. 
On attaining power the party will ensure that i ts policies are translated 
into programs, which will usually be administered by departments. Major 
policy initiatives become enshrined in parliamentary legislation. In 
this way they become established as abiding elements in the Australian 
administrative system. 
On coming to power, new governments inherit the plans and programs 
of previous governments; and so to a large extent social policy is a 
captive of the past. On account of its previous commitments to 
established social policies, it is extremely difficult to achieve changes 
of direction. New plans have to compete for recognition against old 
plans, which now have greater substance because of the extent of time, 
money and personnel that have been invested in them as departmental 
programs . 
A government department is an institution; and within it there are 
subordinate institutions called divisions, branches, sections and 
subsections. Each of these subordinate institutions has a program or 
programs to administer. Normally the administration of such programs 
involves a range of relationships with other institutions including other 
departments and client populations. 
The Consequent Definition of Social Policy 
The foregoing paragraphs provide us with the basis for a matter-of-
fact definition: 
Social policy means the plans and programs which a government 
inherits or initiates to deal with its relationships with 
diverse institutions within the national community. 
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Such a definition by intension provides a starting point from which 
to explore the broader interpretations of social policy. In other words 
this core definition can be complemented by a discussion of the 
parametres of social policy. Having established one apt interpretation 
of its central meaning we are better able to travel around the boundaries 
of how others use the term without losing a sense of direction. 
A Range of Definitions 
To begin with we can refer to an English definition of social 
policy which seeks to capture the kernel of its meaning. In 1957, 
Professor Macbeath expressed it this way: 
Social policies are concerned with the right ordering of the 
network of relationships between men and women who live 
together in societies, or with the principles which should 
govern the activities of individuals and groups so f~ as they 
affect the lives and the interests of other people. 5 
Macbeath's purpose was to state the central issue in social policy. 
As he saw it, the central issue was between the self- regarding or 
egotistical activities of man or the other-regarding or altruistic 
activities. Arguing that some forms of social policy are based on the 
notion of moral progress, he then used criteria of moral progress which 
are to be found 'in the growing power of altruism over egoism' brought 
about by a fusion of intelligence and concern for social justice. The 
language is modern but the observation is not new. The dual claim of 
altruism and egoism is put more simply and directly in the Christian 
prescription that we should love our neighbour as ourselves. 
Two definitions from America serve to illustrate the difference 
between a definition which seeks to capture the essence of a concept 
and a definition which directs attention to its boundaries. A Freeman 
and Sherwood definition is short and to the point. It simply states 
the principle that social policy is: 
53 
Macbeath, G. Can Social Policies Be Rationally Tested? Hobbhouse 
Memorial Trust Lecture, Oxford University Press, 1957. 
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... the fundamental process by which enduring organisations 
maintain an element of stability and ~ the same time seek to 
improve conditions for their members. 4 
By contrast, Nathan Glazer has a much wider definition which seems to 
illustrate what happens in practice where the above principle is embodied 
in policies over a long period. His definition refers to the outcome 
rather than the principle; and since the outcome is elastic, his operational 
definition is necessarily broad-ranging. Social policy is: 
... all those public policies which have been developed in the 
past hundred years to protect families and individuals from the 
accidents of industrial and urban life, and which try tQ 
maintain a decent minimum of living conditions for all. ~5 
Similarly, other American social scientists like Martin Rein steer 
away from any core definition of social policy and prefer the political 
tactic of keeping all the options open. Rein chooses to explore the 
boundaries of the subject - the relationships of social policies to public 
policy, to academic disciplines, and to social work. He asserts that such 
an exploration will demonstrate that the boundaries do not have clear 
perimeters and that we cannot altogether eliminate the fuzziness of the 
b o 56 su Ject. 
For Rein, social policy can be regarded as the philosphy, politics, 
history and economics of the social services. In an Australian context 
such a definition must be broad enough to encompass services such as 
education, health care, welfare payments, housing, immigration, Aboriginal 
affairs, veterans ' affairs and so on. Rein himself is generally concerned 
with matters like: how social services have developed over time, the 
54 
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Freeman, H.E. and C.C. Sherwood. Social Research and Social Policy 
Prentice-Hall Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1970. 
Glazer, N. The Limits of Social Policy, Commentary 52, No.3, 
September 1971. 
Rein, M. Social Policy: Issues of Choice and Change, Random House, 
New York, 1970. 
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assumed problems with which they cope, the ideas and principles upon which 
trey are organised, the purposes and functions they are designed to fulf il , 
and the extent and quality of the re- distribution of public resources. 
Moreover, whenever the outcome is seen as inadequate, consideration has 
to be given to what changes are required, and how these can be brought 
about under particular historical, polit i cal, economic or other 
circumstances . 
There is a similarity between this broad approach to soc i al pol i cy and 
that which is represented by a book on 'Canadian Social Policy' edited by 
Shankar Yelaja. The editor refers to the fact that numerous views preva i l 
on the meaning of social policy and then embarks on a literature survey to 
extract 'threads of commonality' to advance an understanding on the term. 57 
Like many others, Yelaja himself seems to equate social policy with 
welfare policy. He posits as his first assumption that 'the government has 
a responsibility to meet the needs of the less fortunate members of society ' . 
He sees social policies as those which deal with certain exigencies of 
personal misfortune and societal conditions which are summarised in Si r 
William Beveridge's 1942 analysis of the 'five evil giants' of modern 
society: 
l. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
idleness or unemployment or underemployment; 
ignorance or inadequate education; 
disease including ill-health and physical or mental di sability; 
squalor or poor living conditions; and 
lack of sufficient income to maintain an acceptable standard of 
living .58 
This focus of attention on a range of recipients of government services 
implies a narrow definition of 'social policy'. In this case the heart of 
social policy becomes the relief of the condition of the poor. The concept 
of welfare is so impo~tant in this outlook, that the term 'social pol icy ' i s 
better replaced by the term 'social welfare pol icy ' . 
57 
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Advocates of an improved social welfare policy raise questions about 
the rights or 'entitlements' of citizens vis-a-vis government services. 
When this occurs, the policy at issue changes its aspect once more. The 
title which best describes this focus of attention is a 'just social 
welfare policy'. This raises the question of whether government is handling 
its relationships with the poorer groups in society in a way that is 
considered decent by the general community. 
The answer to this question will vary from country to country. Policy 
analysts make cross-country comparisons based on the proportion of the 
national budget allocated to welfare. By this standard, in the 1960's, 
Sweden was a pace-setter in social welfare policies and some Australian 
theorists looked upon it as a model worth copying. 
F. Gustav Moller, Minister of Welfare in the Social Democratic Party, 
was one of the architects of Sweden's welfare state. He argued that the 
government of a modern civilized state has a moral obligation to fulfil 
three goals of social welfare policy: 
1. It should guarantee a basic minimum standard of living for 
every citizen. 
2. It should provide services as an inherent right of everyone 
regardless of income. 
3. It should meet ~ese goals through equality of income and 
social justice . 
As spokesman for the Swedes, Moller goes beyond asking for a 'just' 
society and seeks instead a 'moral' system. Justice can be considered as 
a legal concept. Morality, however, transcends legal justice and rests 
upon one's ultimate interpretation of the nature of man: which in turn 
causes consequential judgments on what is considered proper conduct for 
man considered either as an individual or a social being. Although Moller 
stakes a claim for the implementation of a 'moral social welfare policy' it 
is not at all clear that all the ramifications of putting into practice 
this idea of public administration have ever been thoroughly articulated, 
either in Sweden or anywhere else. 
59 Op .cit . (Yelaja, 1978). 
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Social welfare policy, as described above has mainly to do with the 
distribution of goods and services to the weaker and poorer sections of the 
commu nity. Obviously, such things must be paid for by the more productive 
or wealthier sections of the community. The morality of the distribution 
can hardly be decided upon without reference to policies related to both 
the production and retention of wealth. 
In 1978, Scotton and Ferber published a book entitled 'Public 
Expenditures and Social Policy in Australia' 60 They state that the 
initial response to a question about the content of social policy would 
include references to specific areas of service such as health, welfare, 
education and housing. They point out that the key characteristic of 
these services is that the federal government is involved in them 'as 
subsidisers, regulators, and producers'. 
Since Scotton and Ferber were primarily engaged in examining public 
expenditure they put their emphasis less on what social policy is and 
instead concentrated on what governments do . When one is chiefly looking 
at the activity of government departments, then the essence of soc ial policy 
is its concern with distributive issues. In this event, social policy is 
viewed primarily as an activity of public administration - an exercise in 
the allocation of available resources. 
Because Scotton and Ferber have this emphasis in their interpretation 
of social policy, it is not surprising that they refer to David Donnison's 
assessment of what it does. As a distinguished British expert on 
administration, Donnison considers social policy as the distribution of 
resources and opportunities among different groups and categories of people. 
For him it is all about methods of achieving a more equal distribution of 
resources. He acknowledges that the extent to which current disparaties 
are tolerable, or even encouraged, is a matter which different societies 
have to sort cut for themselves. However, he claims that social policy 
should at least be concerned with gross inequalities and deprivations, 
especially those suffered by people whose capacity to earn income i n the 
60 Scotton, R.B. and H. Ferber (ed.) . Public Expenditures and 
Social Policy in Australia, Vol.1, The Whitlam Years 1972-75, Longman 
Cheshire, Melbourne, 1978. 
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market is weakest . Even though Scotton and Ferber comment on the 
difficulty of operationalising Donnison's guiding principle, it is clear 
that they agree with his orientation towards interpreting social policy 
as a matter of the distribution of welfare . 
Incidentally, Mendelsohn follows Donnison's line in the definition 
of social policy and quotes also from hi m as follows: 
What distinguishes a policy as social is .. . the fact that it 
deals with the distribution of resources, opportunities and l i fe 
chances between different groups and categories of people. 
Donnison is concerned with equality and fairness: 
We should not assume that in times of inflation, scarcity and 
crisis the nation cannot 'afford' equalising social pol icies ... 
We should not assume that equalising policies must necessarily 
be expensive . . . . Egalitarians must therefore be concerned 
about economic growth .... For the social policies of 
Governments are those of their actions which deliberately or 
accidently affect the distribution of resources, status, 
opportunities and life chances among social groups and 
categories within the country, and thus help to shape the 
general character and equity of its social relat6jons. Social policies are therefore concerned with fa i rness. 1 
As well as choosing to give a primary emphas i s to distribution, 
these analysts also imply that their main concern is with the effectiveness 
of services intended to help low income groups . Consequently, they state 
that one of their first problems is with the specification of the social 
unit in terms of which incomes are measured. Neither individuals nor 
household incomes provide an entirely satisfactory base for measurement. 
Individuals with small personal incomes may be well-off by virtue of 
belonging to wealthy families. Many people living together in families 
in the same households do not always pool their i ncomes and outlays. 
In the 1975 Poverty Report .62 Professor Henderson and his col l eagues 
adopted the concept of the 'income unit'. He divided this concept i nto a 
number of categories: single persons, single parents, and married couples 
61 
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with families of various sizes . The actual situation of these income 
units cannot be assessed by considering their cash income alone without 
taking i nto account subsidies available to them for aged relatives, 
veterans and their dependents, separated wives, children, young adults 
and so on . 
According to Scotton and Ferber another complication of the income 
distribution approach to welfare policy is the sheer number of cross-
characteristics of the social units. They are not only sick or poor; they 
have more or fewer children; they have or have not members who are aged, 
invalid, Aboriginal or foreign-born; they have a great variety of 
preferred consumption patterns; they live in locations variously affected 
by changing transport patterns, and are subject to the vagaries of 
unpredictable industrial situations and the uncertainty of adequate 
employment conditions. These characteristics are not independent of each 
other. Consequently in trying to understand social welfare policy, one 
has to be conscious of all sorts of possible correlations. 
Subsidies to ~ducation, health and housing can have widely varying 
impacts on the effectiveness of income maintenance programs which are 
cash payments. Educational advantage is a powerful determinant of life 
chances, the relationship between poor health and earning capacity is 
well-known , while specialised welfare services are of particular 
importance to people in specific disadvantaged categories such as, 
Aborigines, recent migrants, and the handicapped. 
In Australia, it is generally considered that the kind of social 
policy which provides both cash payments and welfare services should be 
provided to the extent that it is possible for the recipients to have a 
decent conventional minimum standard of living. To achieve this end the 
Federal Government administers a broad range of programs which ensure a 
widespread distribution of comparatively small cash payments to millions 
of its citizens. It also administers a series of programs which enable 
individuals to gain access to basic levels of education, health, housing~ 
and welfare services. 
-
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A Definition by Intension of Social Welfare Policy 
The administration of the Federal Government's programs which causes 
a distribution of cash and services throughout the Australian community 
can be considered as the implementation of a 'social welfare policy'. 
In accordance with a distinction of terms discussed earlier, ' social 
policy' itself has a broader connotat ion. It includes the management 
of the relationships between those sections of the community which are the 
beneficiaries of welfare programs and those other sections which produce 
the wealth to pay for them. The fact that i n reality there is some 
overlap between the two sections does not abrogate the importance of the 
distinction between the two concepts. Social policy is not just about 
distribution. It is also concerned with the balance in the relationship 
between those involved in the production of wealth and those i nvol ved in 
its distribution and consumption . This distinction can be made more plain 
when it is noted that a social policy perspective can be taken i n regard 
to almost all areas of public policy-making, whereas social welfare policy 
is but one important facet of it. The latter can be defined as follows: 
Social welfare policy refers to plans and programs which a 
government inherits or initiates to deal with i ts relationships 
with the indigent or less well-off sections of the national 
community. 
Sociological Inquiry into Programs of Social Policy 
Whereas social policy is about the allocation of burdens and benefits, 
social welfare policy can be described as being mainly about the distribut ion 
of benefits. In the following chapters there are references to a whole range 
of programs through which social welfare policy is implemented. In the 
implementation process there is ~ great deal of institutional interaction. 
In accordance with the earlier definition of sociology, programs of public 
administration can be evaluated in terms of their genesis, funct ioning and 
relationships. 
Thus the nature of each program can be determined initially by its 
purpose, mandate and origin. Most programs bear the mark of their origins. 
Ideas which are current when a new policy was being designed, persist when 
it is implemented as a program, and can influence the shape of its development 
for many years afterwards. 
Similarly sociologists can also be interested in the functioning of 
programs. A major function of government is to ration out available 
-
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public resources through a variety of departments to a variety of programs 
for onward transmission to a variety of client groups . One of the most 
significant aspects of the functioning of a program is the size of its 
budget. In the realm of the delivery of a public policy in the form of 
a program to a recipient group, t he size of the budget is a demonstration 
of the importance which is actually being given to particular forms of 
administrative action. The number of public servants engaged in the 
provision of a service, and the extent of manhours invested in it, can 
also serve as criteria of its importance - at least from the angle of 
senior administrators. 
The management of programs - and especially of larger programs -
often demands a complicated set of administrative arrangements to ensure 
that the service becomes available to eligible citizens. Moreover in a 
federal system, such as pertains in Australia, some programs will demand 
co-operative arrangements both within and between federal and state 
bureaucracies. Herein lies a fruitful field of investigation for a 
sociologist who is interested in institutional interaction. 
In the provision of a service a relationship is established between 
a government department and a client population. The nature of this 
relationship is variously determined by: how the departments make 
contributions towards their client's welfare; what conditions are laid 
down to enable potential beneficiaries to become recipients of benefits; 
and the manner in which clients actually receive the service . In other 
words, within the context of program administration, a great deal of 
sociological insight into human relationships can be gained. 
Obviously though, the concept of an institution is not confined to 
public administration. There are institutional relationships in the 
private business sector. There are institutional ways of worshipping in 
a variety of religions. Ethnic groups have their own independent 
institutions and a whole network of voluntary organisations pursue their 
institutionalised objectives regardless of government. There are also 
international institutions and so on. Nonetheless since this particular 
chapter has a focus on the relationship between sociology and social 
policy it is proposed to continue to direct attention to institutional 
interaction within the public sector here in Australia . 
-
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There are plenty of examples of the use of scientific methods to 
collect sociological information for government reports. One can refer 
to the research done for: The Royal Commission on Australian Government 
Administration, The Commission of Inquiry into Poverty, The Commission of 
Inquiry into Education, The Royal Commission on Human Relationships and 
the l{ke. However, after researchers have collected factual evidence for 
a government report, those who wish to adhere rigidly to an empiricist 
philosophy may find themselves in a quandary. This is so, because 
government reports are often expected to come to conclusions and make 
recommendations, which while indicated by the evidence go beyond that which 
is strictly justified by it. Choice in such instances leads policy 
analysts into the realm of ethics. As empiricists they may simply want to 
present the facts and not risk the choices. However, those who are 
moderate realists would not have the same difficulty. They would find it 
natural for a thorough understanding of the facts to lead to options for 
choices. Since for them there is a consistency between their ontology, 
epistemology and ethics, they will see in recommendations for policy the 
logical completion of sociological inquiry. 
In preparing the grounds for such recommendations this kind of policy 
analyst will be aware that he/she will almost inevitably be drawn into a 
dialectical debate about fairness. He will know that the general public 
and, more importantly, significant sections of the electorate expect senior 
administrators to adhere to some standards of justice. Unfortunately, for 
most people these are often ill-defined. But ideally a professional policy 
analyst should be able to articulate how he understands different forms of 
justice - contractual, distributive and social. He should be able to 
clarify how various conceptions of justice have affected policies in the 
past; and so are likely to be operative in the future. Thus, the 
following chapters are really an exposition on what can be termed 
administrative justice . 
-
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CHAPTER 6 
CHOOSIriG TO PREVENT HlJUSTICE OR PRONaTE JUSTICE 
A Theoretical Definition Exemplified 
The previous chapter aimed at providing an abstract definition of 
social policy. Such a theoretical statement can be made much more 
meaningful by specifying the details of its exemplification. It is all 
very well to propose the theoretical definition of social policy as the 
management of institutional interaction, but it demands further 
sociological investigation to clarify what this means in practice. 
~ikewi~e the previous chapter proposed that social policy means the 
plans and programs which government inherits or initiates etc. But 
which plans? and more particularly which programs are in operation as 
a consequence? How many such programs are there and how are they 
administered by departments? 
It is now a matter of fact that such questions have been asked and 
answers have been given to them which formed the basis of a report to 
Parliament by the Joint Parliamentary Committee of Public Accounts. 63 
The actual topic of the report was the administration of income maintenance 
programs. However the definition of income maintenance was so broad as 
to include very many Commonwealth programs which provided cash transfers 
either to individuals or to organisations for the purpose of providing 
services to individuals. As a cansequence when the data was collected on 
such programs it emerged that there were 127 different programs providing 
services that could be construed as income maintenance programs. These 
were administered by ten departments: the Department of Education, 
Department of Social Security, Department of Territories and Local 
Government , Department of Administrative Services, Department of 
63 Australia. Joint Parliamentary Committee of Public 
Accounts (PAC). Report 213: Income Maintenance 
Programs. AGPS , Canberra , 1983 . 
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Employment and Industrial Relations, Department of Defence, Department of 
Immigration and Ethnic Affairs , Department of Health, and Department of 
Aboriginal Affairs. In effect the collated information on the income 
maintenance programs of all these departments provides a snapshot of 
much of the Commonwealth Government's current social welfare policy. 
The title of this report is 'Income Maintenance Programs'. Since 
it will be published this year (1983) and tabled in Parliament 
it would be inappropriate to anticipate any of its contents 
here. However, in the context of the argument in this dissertation, it is 
relevant to note that the questionnaire which collected the information 
was based on the sociological principle that programs of public 
administration can be evaluated in terms of their genesis, functioning 
and relationships. 
When the answers to the questionnaire first came in, it was part of 
the research task to put order into what first of all appeared as an 
untidy assortment of separate schemes . Consequently, it was necessary 
to find an explanation for the conceptual untidiness which underlies the 
administration of current social policy and then to devise a strategy for 
putting order into it. Accordingly, the final chapters of this 
dissertation on 'Sociology and Social Policy' will outline some of the 
theoretical thinking that does not form part of the report, but that had 
to be done beforehand, in order to decide how to present the data 
researched on the current administration of social welfare policy. 
Social Policy Grows like Topsy 
After examining the immense amount of information that was 
submitted by the different departments on the variety of their programs, 
the initial perception that emerged was that social policy is often 
unpredictable. By and large social policy grows not on the basis of 
a comprehensive plan but rather on the basis of a series of political 
reactions to a variety of critical situations. Many programs are 
implemented to prevent what is seen as a specific injustice to a 
particular group . The 'National Trachoma and Eye Health Program', the 
'Tertiary Education Assistance Scheme, the 'Sheltered Employment 
Allowance' and the 'Migrant Emergency Fund' are all cases in point. 
Around such issues pressure groups are formed, whose representatives 
present an argument that unless a program is tailored to their liking 
they will be treated unfairly. Whether they are or not, becomes a 
-
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matter of debate. In the ensuing political proces s the arguments about 
the implementation of programs to remedy unacceptable situations are 
essentially dialectical. 
The broad outlines of dialectical debate in policy formulation can 
be sketched in as follows. When pressure groups - or indeed 
departments acting on their behalf - arg ue that a part i cular pol i cy 
benefit should be given, they will maintain that justice is on the i r 
side. However it is usually possible for an opposition (another pressure 
group, another department or most often Finance, or Treasury ) , to show 
there are adequate reasons against implementing the program which 
outweigh those that are for it. If a social welfare group gains an 
increase in its benefits it may be at the expense of an industry lobby 
gaining an increase in theirs. When one department gains an inordinate 
share of the budget, the effective functioning of other departments can 
suffer as a consequence. Obviously not every ill consequence can be 
taken as a compelling reason for not pursuing a certain policy, 
otherwise no action could be achieved; and so the pros and cons of each 
program have to be thrashed out in a dialectical process. 
In general, philosophers, politicians and lawyers are much more 
comfortable with this style of reasoning and consequent program 
development than are sociologists, administrators and accountants. 
Because the argument in support of the development of social programs is 
characteristically dialectical in its form, the style of reasoning 
differs from the reasoning in the mathematical disciplines which 
administrators and accountants and empirical sociologists favour. Its 
logic, insteaa of being a deductive logic, is the logic of one side of 
an argument against the other, of proposals and objections, of 'pr "ma 
facie' cases which may be countered, and of presumptions which may be 
rebutted. ~4 
To the mathematically minded an argument must always be rational 
and cogent . The premises must provide sufficient condition for the 
result: the result must follow inevitably once the premises are accepted. 
To the politically minded the premises need only be adequate enough to 
point to a conclusion . It is sufficient in a dialectical argument to 
produce an adequate reason, and then to consider whether there are any 
counter arguments, and if there appear to be none, draw the conclus i on. 
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Arguments in favour of a particular direction for social policy or tor 
the implementation of a particular program characteristically contain a 
suppressed clause saying 'other things being equal' and hence are 
perpetually open to further debate. In the language of the statistician 
it can almost always be said about social policy that there are too many 
variables to allow definitive conclusions. Accordingly a social program may 
be proposed, and time given to those opposed to it, either to agree that 
they are convinced, or else pOint out the weaknesses in the arguments in its 
favour. The ar~ument is not conclusive politically unless, although 
there are opportunities for countering it, no reasonable person, pressure 
group nor depart~ent feels able to do so convincingly. 
When politicians, pressure groups and administrators reason about 
the formulation of social policy, the conclusion depends not only on 
the initia l arguments, but on the moves made in response to them, and in 
turn the counters to these, and so on. Experienced ~dministrators know 
that at each stage in policy formulation there are many possible moves, 
and the cogency of each move in favour of any particular program to some 
extent depends on the success or otherwise of previous programs. That is 
one reason why tradition and incrementalism are considered of such 
importance in administrative systems. The dialectical structure of the 
political process (together with the tenacity with which administrators 
fight for the retention of programs they have gained from it) has great 
consequences for social policy. It pitches the interests of one 
individual against another and matches one interest group against 
another. 
The distinctness of the individual - together with the distinctness 
of like individuals who form pressure groups - becomes important when it 
is recognised that one group can only get a benefit at scme other group ' s 
expense . It is when one group's rights and interests are in jeopardy 
that the unity and coherence of society is under strain, and it is then 
that issues of injustice arise. That is to say that when injustice is in 
danger of being done people get stirred up, indignant and resentful. When 
people are talking about justice, they are in danger of lapsing into 
platitudes . But whenever some specific instance of injustice becomes 
obvious in society then the cat is put among the pidgeons. The recent 
exposure of the tax avoidance schemes and the medifraud scandal illustrates 
the pOint. The reaction last year of the steelworkers and miners of 
Wollongong who demonstrated in Parliament House against what they saw as 
the injustice of unemployment gives the point dramatic impact . There is 
-
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a contrast between the mild way that people react to the idea of just ice 
and the more bitterly angry way they react to specific cases of gross 
injustice. 
Responses to Injustice 
An examination of the programs submitted by the ten departments 
clearly shows that each separate agency is not primarily concerned to 
promote justice in society at large; but rather administers its programs 
to prevent a specific piece of injustice happening to the group that 
forms its clientele. This fact is of critical significance in 
understanding the unarticulated motivation which underlies 
the Federal Government's administration of its income 
maintenance programs. 
Many of the programs seem to have begun as 'ad hoc' solutions to 
given situations. For instance, the Department of Immigration and 
Ethnic Affairs now implements a program for the 'Maintenance of 
Unattended Refugee Children' which was inaugurated recently, mainly to 
cope with the increase in the numbers of children who were separated from 
their parents in Asia and have arrived in Australia on their own. 
Similarly the Department of Employment and Industrial Relations operates 
a 'Special Youth Employment Training Program' (SYETP) as a response to 
the rise in the number of young unemployed. The Department of Defence 
operates a program of longer standing. It is the 'Medical and Dental 
officers - Refresher Training Bounty' which facilitates the transition 
of medical personnel from the Defence Forces to civilian practice. It 
bases its origin on Section 58B of the Defence Act, 1903. 65 
The clear realisation that social policy grows mainly as a series of 
' ad hoc' responses to the need to counter injustices to particular 
groups can be a revelation for a policy analyst. As a consequence he 
begins to accept that it will always be a matter of great difficulty to 
thoroughly understand present social policy or to predict with accuracy 
its future development. Present social policy is often expressed in 
very general or abstract terms which indicate the allegiance of a 
political party to a mixed set of ideals. The question of which items 
of social policy will become translated into actual programs with 
clearly defined implementation processes is often initially unanswerable. 
It may well depend on how strong a case of injustice can be made by a 
particular group for a program relevant to their interests. 
65 Opus cit . (PAC). 
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Analogically this pattern of policy formulation is called a stop-gap 
approach. As a result of it there is a great lack of co-ordination in the 
programs currently in operation. Consequently there are times when public 
administration appears like a maze of conflicting initiatives. Given 
these circumstances, it is fruitful to hit upon a principle which will 
provide a starting point for finding one's way through the labyrinth of 
Commonwealth Government policies and programs. Accordingly, I will propose 
such a principle and then give the reasons why I chose it. It is this: 
Whereas the political system operates as a mechanism for countering 
injustice, the administrative system operates as a mechanism for 
distributive justice - which when functioning properly can lead to 
the attainment of greater social justice )n the national community. 
This principle can only be fully understood when its terms are fully defined 
in the context in which they are being used. 
The quality of justice in social policy (good, bad or in-between) can 
be better appreciated when it is assessed in themultiplicity of encounter 
situations in which it is found. Social policy is essentially a matter of 
justice- in -encounter. 66 Those who are proposing a new policy find 
themselves in an encounter situation where they have to muster as much 
political support as possible to have their ideas accepted and turned in to 
programs. Sometimes such efforts are successful and sometimes they are not. 
But insofar as social policy grows as a result of spasmodic political 
reactions to disparate instances of injustice, it subsequently becomes 
necessary to bring a sense of order into the administrative arrangements to 
implement the assortment of programs that result. Such coordination of 
program development is no easy task. Some departments sucGeed in coping with 
it by incorporating all new program development within an existing legislative 
framework. One way or another, all senior administrators have to try to cope 
with the problem of coordinating departmental activities to the extent that 
they want to succeed in promoting a continuous improvement in the quality of 
justice in public administration as a whole. 
Definitions of Justice Relevant to Public Policy 
To fully appreciate the above line of thinking it is necessary to 
know what is meant by justice. Justice can be defined in a number of ways. 
66 Tillich, P. Love, Power and Justice. Ontological Analysis and 
Ethical Application, Oxford University Press, London, 1954. 
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One way to start is to separate the concept of justice from other concepts 
that are closely related to it, but still distinguishable from it. In 
public policy, exemplified in the administration of government programs, 
justice is not equality, it is not freedom, and it is not mateship.67 
Justice and Equality 
Justice is not equality because equality is concerned only with 
results and not how they are arrived at, and equality is concenned only 
that people should be treated the same, whereas justice is concerned to 
consider each individual case on its merits treating, if necessary, 
different people differently. When in the name of positive discrimination, 
the government administration treats Aboriginals differently from the rest 
of Australians the outcome is considered equitable. Equity in the 
original Aristotelian meaning of the term is justice mixed with generosity. 
But when justice strives for equity it loses the equality of treating 
everyone the same. When it concentrates on equality it misses out on equity. 
Parliamentarians are more concerned about treating some people fairly 
than with treating all people the same. Parliamentarians and executive 
government delegate to the public service the function of giving to many 
different groups that which is their due in accordance with legislation 
or regulation or cabinet decision of ministerial decree. This function 
is exercised by the public service, to some extent regardless of whether 
the administrative action generates an outcome in society of increased 
equality or greater equity. Incidentally, the evidence supplied by the 
departments has clearly demonstrated that over the years the Federal 
Government's social welfare programs have, in fact, resulted in an outcome 
of greater equity for the poorer sections of society; but they do not 
produce equality. 
The 'Program Descriptions' in Volume 2 of the Report of the Parliamentary 
Committee,68 show that departmental programs are aimed at different groups 
in the community and that these people are serviced differently and almost 
to the disregard of the effects this may have on the rest of society. It 
is true that within the group serviced the department's eligibility criteria 
67 Opus cit . (Lucas). 
68 Op .cit . (PAC). 
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will be framed so as to treat all clients equally; but no department 
claims in its statement of objectives, that it is seeking to produce a 
more equal society. Admittedly the Department of Education states that its 
objective is to 'promote equality of educational opportunity', but that 
is a far cry from the concept of equality of outcome in society at large. 
Departments are not in the business of changing society in the name of 
equa 1 i ty. 
Justice and Freedom 
Justice is not freedom~ because freedom is concerned with who 
shall have the right to take independent decisions, whereas justice 
is concerned with the manner in which decisions are carried out, for 
what purposes and with what results. The freedom of politicians is 
limited by their responsibilities to their parties and their electorates. 
Departments do not enjoy freedom. Departments do not have the right 
of independent decision. They have to act at the behest of the political 
arm of government. Their job is to translate how decisions taken by 
others can be put into practice, and in doing so, the evidence has shown, 
they will always seek to clarify objectives and only sometimes to 
predict consequences or evaluate outcomes. 
Moreover, administrators of Government benefits on a large scale 
should take into account the fact that the outcomes of their policies 
do lessen freedom in society in two ways. Firstly it can create passivity, 
a lack of self-reliance and initiative in the recipients of benefits. 
Some beneficiaries are irked by the fact that they are not allowed the 
freedom to earn much on the side. Secondly, the large-scale 
distribution of benefits lessens the freedom of the individuals who 
produce the wealth to pay for the benefits. They have to pay tax from 
which they would prefer to be free. 
In any national community the ideal of perfect justice and perfect 
freedom together is unobtainable. If individuals have complete freedom 
they will not pay any taxes and if any benefits are available they will 
freely clailll what they can, regardless of the rights of others. On the 
other hand, in Australia there are strict regulations both for the 
collection of taxes and the administration of benefits. Thus freedom 
is limited; for regulation limits freedom . 
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However, in a democratic system wh i ch upholds the value of individua 
liberty and the right to the retention of private wealth, freedom 
cannot be limited to the extent that it lessens incentives for 
individuals to gain rewards through their own efforts. Otherwise a gross 
injustice may still be done to the total society, as too much restra i nt 
on independent action can stultify the creation of wealth. So just ice i n 
the Federal Government's total administ ra tion of soc ial policy is a 
matter of striking the right balance. Taxation is imposed calculatedl y: 
not enough to limit freedom unduly but still enough to produce communal 
benefits, as for example, the $15,000 million for the programs wh ich 
extend services mainly to those in need. 
In Australia, the outcome is not a perfectly free and a perfectl y 
just society - which is impossible anyway - but a society which i s 
reasonably free and just. Thus the common good is maintained by some 
compromise of both freedom and just i ce for the sake of the sharing of 
duties and benefits. 
Justice and Mateship 
Justice is not mateship either, because matesh i p i s a warm vi rtue 
concerned with fellow-feeling, whereas justice is a cold, intellectual 
virtue which can be manifested without feel i ng and is concerned to 
emphasise that each person is not merely a human being like all others, 
but also a separate individual, with his own distinctive point of vi ew, 
his own particular rights and his own special interests. 
Departmental administrations are sometimes accused of be i ng cold 
and bureaucratic - both terms often referring to the same rea li ty. hi s 
is understandable since, for instance, the main purpose of the 
administration of income maintenance programs i s to dispense j ustice not 
to engender friendliness. Moreover, even though departments will 
endeavour to treat all their clientele alike, the better administrations 
have appeal mechanisms to take into account the spec i al circumstances 
which pertain to individuals. Thus i n regard to individuals the better 
departments will try to treat all their clients equally, and maybe, 
where necessary, Even equitably. 
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A Positive Definition 
The above definitions of justice by exclusion are not satisfactory 
in themselves. They have yet to be complemented by a positive 
definition. It is not enough to state what justice is not: it is 
necessary to state what it is. 
There is a traditional definition of justice that states it means 
giving everyone his or her due. To give everyone his due means to give 
everyone his rights. Rights are not based on justice. The opposite is 
true. Justice is based on rights. It is because individuals have 
rights that questions of justice and fair dealing arise. 
All people have natural rights, such as the right to life, to 
marry, to have children, to work, to own property and so on. Such rights 
are taken for granted in Australia. But in social policy, the concern i s 
not so much about natural rights but rather with legal and conventional 
rights in accordance with parliamentary legislation or departmental 
decisions. These rights guarantee to the citizens of this political 
community such things as the provision of a pension, a benefit, an 
allowance, an education, an opportunity for training and the like. 
In the public administration of this social policy, the relationship 
between a department and the recipients of its services is one of 
justice in which the department must give to the citizens that which is 
rightfully theirs. 
A Balance in Relationships 
Justice has a variety of forms. In its essence, however, it can 
be described as a proper balance in relationships. Commutative justice 
refers to a proper balance in relationships between individuals, 
whether as separate persons or corporate entities. It generally 
pertains to person-to-person or one-to-one relationships. In its 
elemental form justice between individuals can be perceived intuitively. 
However, the ramifications and consequences of basic agreements can 
often be so complicated that superstructures of legal provisions 
relevant to a multiplicity of situations are required to ensure fairness 
to contracting parties. When disputes arise they can be settled in 
the courts. But normally the courts only intervene when injustice has 
been done or is in danger of being done. Every day millions of citizens 
______ ~-- I--...... --------------------------------------------------------.... ~~ .. 
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engage in a myriad of transactions in which commutative justice is 
operative. This kind of justice lies at the heart of the functioning 
of the economy and the polity. 
An understanding of commutative justice provides a foundation for 
an appreciation of other forms of justice, such as social justice. But 
social justice has a nature and a dynamism of its own. Unfortunately, 
though, it is nowhere nearly as well defined as contractual justice. 
Like sociology and social policy, it is considered by some to be 
indefinable - a veritable Iwill 0 1 the wispl. A quotation from a recent 
article by Julian Le Grand from the London School of Economics sums up 
the state of the art: 
Recently there has been a growing interest among political 
philosophers and welfare economists in the objectives of 
social and economic organisation. lIT particular, inspired 
by Rawl IS major contribution (1971), the problem of defining 
the aim of social justice has attracted a great deal of 
attention and effort. Despite this, however, it seems fair 
to say tha t a consensus has yet to emerge. No conception of 
social justice has appeared that 1S both sufficiently 
general to command widespread acceptability, and at the 
same time sufficiently specific to be useful for policy and 
other practical purposes.* (emphasis added) 
. , 
In reaction to this situation Le Grand refuses to accept that the 
uses of the term social justice are so diverse that any attempt to define 
a common element would be futile. Instead he accepts the challenge of 
defining it. He uses as his criterion for assessing other experts I 
definitions whether their conceptions of justice conform with intuitive 
and widespread acceptability. He wants his ideal definition to be 
practical, i.e., able to contribute to a reasonable and efficient 
allocation of resources. He states that he will not be satisfied with a 
definition that only commands a measure of agreement because it is so 
general. 
On the above criteria he assesses how others have defined justice. 
By a process of logical analysis he identifies the weaknesses in their 
arguments. The findings of Rawls, Nozik, Hayek and the utilitarians in 
* Le Grand, J., On Conceptions of social Justice, London 
School of Economics, september 1983. ( Paper presented 
at Congress of Australian Council of Social Service, 
Melbourne, September 1984.) 
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general are found wanting, as they fail to meet Le Grand's criteria. 
He concludes that the reason for the inadequacies in others ' conceptions 
of justice arise from their failure to take into account the crucial 
element of choice. He claims that the essential element in the 
consideration of whether a particular situation is just is the question 
of whether "a 11 i ndi vi dua 1 shave equal cho ices II • 
Any analyst who has an appreciation of how social policy is formed 
will find it hard to understand how justice could be properly discussed 
without relating it to choice. Politicians and public servants are 
considered to deserve credit to the extent that they are responsible for 
choosing the right policies and programs. Senior administrators who 
have acted unjustly are held accountable for their actions precisely 
because they are expected to be able to choose to do otherwise. 
Le Grand's style of reasoning is academic, logical, ethical and 
abstract. He concentrates on epistemological issues, even though his 
discovery of the importance of choice might lead him subsequently to a 
deeper exploration of moral ones. In this article, despite the fact that 
he starts out to define social justice he ends up by implying that its 
definition depends upon individual choices. He does not frame his definition 
in any sociological or political context. By contrast, the preceding 
chapters of this dissertation lead naturally to a quite different conclusion. 
As already stated commutative justice is about a proper balance in 
relationships between individuals. Distributive justice deals with 
relationships between individuals and organisations and vice versa. Social 
justice is about a proper balance in relationships between organisations 
or institutions. A more complete definition is as follows: 
Social justice, in a western democracy, is a concern of the 
Parliament insofar as it is called upon to make decisions 
on what is a proper balance in the relationships of the 
often conflictina interests of groups, organisations, 
institutions and classes. 
In general usage the term social justice refers to class structures or 
the broader categories into which the national community can be divided. 
For instance, my book on Job Generation discusses the diffic~lty of 
balancing relationships between governments, employers, unions and the 
unemployed. It identifies a range of institutions whose function it is 
... ~ .. 
~~ ~ 
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to promote and preserve social justice. Consider the following 
quotation: 
The federal Arbitration and Conciliation Commission and its 
associated state bodies are helped in their work by other 
institutional arrangements. Thus, the Prices and 
Justification Tribunal oversees the advancement of prices; 
the Restrictive Trade Practices Tri bunal concentrates on 
enterprise competitiveness; the Industries Assistance 
Commission influences industrial structures and tariffs; 
influential cabinet ministers, the Reserve Bank and to a 
lesser extent Treasury make decisions about exchange rate 
adjustments, and governments pursue redistribution policies 
through taxation measures. Even further out on this 
endlessly interactive cycle of interventions, industrial 
decisions in Australia are indirectly influenced by the 
International Monetary Fund, the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade, the International Labour Organisation 
and so on. Each of these many interventions influences 
who gets what slice of the national cake.* 
There is another recent example of this kind of justice-in-encounter. 
One could interpret the function of the Hawke Government's National 
Economic Summit Conference in 1983 as a mechanism for improving the 
quality of social justice throughout the Commonwealth of Australia. 
Ostensibly the purpose of the conference was to discuss the economy; but 
in practice the whole point of the exercise was to bring representatives 
of different sections of the national community together and to get them 
to realise that to the extent that a proper balance could be maintained 
in the relationships between the different power groups, then everyone 
would be better off. This ideal was set against the background of the 
threat that if good relationships were not maintained then the law of the 
jungle in industrial relations would prevail, with the consequent 
implication that social injustice would not only be done, but would be 
seen to be done. 
An economist could have taken an interest in the Summit Conference 
and have been primarily concerned about its epistemological context. 
That is the focus of his attention would have been on the different 
economic scenarios within which the discussions were held. A sociologist 
could have viewed the same conference and have been primarily interested 
in who were the people, representing what groups, who made the choices 
about what was a fair arrangement between conflicting interests. Social 
* Opus it ., p. 30. 
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justice is achieved not alone through economic science, but also through 
the politics of organisational interaction. 
The point could be made that social justice is a relevant concept 
when one is discussing how different segments of the Australian community 
fare when the gove~nment brings down its budget for health, welfare, 
education and the like. However, when the focus of attention is not so 
much on the broad relationships between large sections of the community 
but rather on the details of Commonwealth policies and programs that 
transfer cash payments to discrete organisations and more particularly to 
individuals, then distributive justice is by far the more relevant concept. 
Indeed one could sum up the situation in a nutshell by stating that the 
government tries to achieve the general aim of social justice by the specific 
allocations of burdens and benefits in the budget process. Thus the budget 
is essentially an exercise in distributive justice. 
Justice as a Co-ordinating Principle 
The choice of justice as a co-ordinating principle does not imply 
that justice by itself can act as a complete guide to decision- making in 
social policy. Other ideals also influence policy, like philanthropy, 
generosity and national prestige. For instance, concern about national 
prestige may well have influenced decisions to channel more money into 
rehabilitation programs for the handicapped during the International Year 
of Disabled Persons. 
Justice is not always the dominant consideration. Policy decisions 
are often influenced by more immediately relevant factors - such as the 
control of inflation, the alleviation of unemployment, productivity, 
efficiency and so on. Moreove~ it is a fact of life that some programs 
are motivated primarily by political expediency. Programs are proposed 
because they have an appeal to electorates in particular places at 
particular times - and all political parties have to take such 
considerations into account. As a consequence a niche has to be found 
for such programs. 
Once a program has been established within the system, regardless of 
how its origins were motivated, it still becomes part of the government's 
exercise of distributive justice insofar as it represents an allocation 
of benefits to particular groups or individuals. This idea can be 
--------.~.~ ....... ------------------------.............................................. ~. 
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expressed the other way around by stating that the administrative 
system is the mechanism whereby government concepts of distributive 
justice are operationalised. Since considerations of justice are 
relevant to all administrative actions, it is as well to clarify its 
meaning further by showing in the next chapter hew the work of various 
government departments can be considered in the light of concepts of 
distributive justice. 
... . . . 
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CHAPTER 7 
CHOOSING ON WHAT BASIS TO DISTRIBUTE BENEFITS 
The precise responsibility of distributive justice in the 
administration of government benefits is to give to each client 
and group exactly what is due to them in strict accordance with 
legislation or regulation or cabinet decision or Mi nisterial 
decree. 
In the context of the Commonwealth Government's administration of 
social policy distributive justice can be defined as the allotment of 
burdens and the allocation of benefits to the members of the national 
community . In the main, the burdens can be considered as taxation 
measures and t he benefits as 'social' measures. Burdens are imposed on 
the basis of ability to pay, demerit , expected subsequent benef i t etc. 
Benefits are apportioned on the basis of need, status, merit, entitlement, 
desert or reward. Principles of justice can be derived from each of the 
concepts which forms the basis for the distribution of either burdens or 
benefits. 
Burdens that are imposed on the basis of ability to pay means that 
the rich should be taxed more heavily than the not so well off. Demerit 
is used as a criterion of taxation inasmuch as the activities of smoking 
cigarettes, drinking alcohol and gambling are heavily taxed, whereas 
eating bread and going fishing are not, and drinking milk i s more likely 
to be subsidised than taxed. A man may have to pay tax when he imports 
a semi - trailer, but he expects a subsequent benef i t from using i t. And 
so on ... 
Burdens and Benefits 
In its inquiry into the ' l ncome f·1aintenance Pro grams', 
the Joint Parliamentary Committee of Public Accounts did not 
have a focus on taxation issues, and so a policy analyst could not 
f . f ' d ' 69 h attempt to derive taxation principles rom ltS ln lngs . However, t e 
Committee did report on detailed evidence about the nature, extent and 
69 Opus cit . (PAC). 
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quality of social benefits which the Federal Government distributes, and 
consequently a policy analyst could relate this information to the 
concepts of distributive justice already mentioned. However, beforehand, 
it is advisable to deliberate further about taxation; for it is impossible 
to discuss distributive justice in social policy without paying some 
attention to the broad principles underlying the relationship between the 
burden of taxation and the extensive allocation of 'social I benefits. 
The annual cost of the income maintenance programs surveyed by the 
Committee amounts to fifteen thousand million dollars. To pay for the 
services rendered taxes have to be imposed. There is a direct relation 
between the extent of revenue raised and the extent of social services 
provided. Moreover the bulk of federal revenue to finance the budget is 
raised through income tax, which in the final analysis is an impost on 
individuals. In much of social welfare policy the transfer of wealth is 
not so much from the rich to the poor as from the workers to the non-
workers. Taxable wealth does not just happen. Currently, just over 
seven million Australians in the workforce have to toil to produce it. 
Initially, the wealth belongs to individuals. Consequently as the social 
services system increases in size and complexity the burden of taxation 
on individuals increases also. This may lead in the future to an increased 
public demand that social policy in general should make sense and that 
there should be adequate justification for each individual program. 
To the extent that the individual considers only immediate interests 
not many would want to pay any tax at all. On the other hand Australians 
have achieved, and can maintain, a reasonably just social welfare system 
only by subordinating individual interests for the sake of the common 
good. To be fair, however, the common good of an adequate social welfare 
system does not in itself constitute a reason why any individual should 
be called upon to make sacrifices except in the context that everyone 
else in the community who can make similar sacrifices is being called 
upon to do so. 
Nobody likes paying taxes and most people are reluctant to have their 
hard earned money used to support others. The recent spate of tax 
evasion and avoidance may well be an indication that the impression is 
getting abroad that the taxation system is less than just and that income 
I 
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maintenance programs are extravagant. On the other hand if the tax 
system generally is just and if income maintenance programs are generally 
considered necessary in a civilised and humane society, people will not 
evade tax or if they do they will keep quiet about it. Laws can be 
enacted to lessen tax avoidance but ultimately the only protection is 
public opinion and private conscience, and therefore even if the ultimate 
concern is the expedient one of having a social system that works to the 
general benefit of all, it must be possible to discern that there is 
j ustice in the way both taxation measures and social services are 
administered. Tax law, like other forms of law, depends upon its being 
generally accepted for its being generally observed. Moreover, to be 
acceptable to all sections of the community, the social welfare system too 
must be seen to be making its contribution to the well-being of the nation 
considered as a socio-economic unit. From the point of view of the 
federal administrative system the national community is essentially a co-
operative rather than a competitive enterprise and taxes and benefits are 
meant to generate a society which is good for everyone. 
Not everything, though, is possible to the Federal Government. It 
cannot produce a perfectly just taxation system nor an absolutely cogent 
rationale for all its social welfare programs. If we insist on government 
being answerable for a perfect society, we implicitly concede absolute 
power to government. That is something government does not have in 
Australia and even if it had the attainment of the ideal would be beyond 
it. The Federal Government, like all other governments, has to do the 
best it can with immense, but yet limited resources, to cope with a 
multiplicity of ever-increasing human needs, wants, demands, desires, 
ambitions and aspirations. 70 
Moreover, strictly speaking, the concept of distributive justice is 
applicable only within the context of limited associations with definit ive 
aims held in common - such as in a credit union or a joint stock company. 
Such aims give guidance about how the fruits of common activitie~ should 
be distributed. The aims of Australian society as a whole are manifold 
to the extent of being indefinite and unlimited, and therefore invariably 
vague and sometimes conflicting. Consequently it is impossible in practice 
to arrive at a method which takes in taxes from each and everyone exactly 
what he ought to give and in turn gives to each and everyone exactly what 
70 
Opus cit . (Lucas). 
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he ought to have. But to admit that we cannot have a perfect scheme of 
distributive justice does not mean that we cannot aim at having a better one 
than we have at present in the current administration of departmental programs. .. _ . 
Criteria of Distributive Justice Affecting Departments 
Although the following analysis is based on concepts of distributive 
justice this does not imply that other forms of justice, such as 
commutative and social justice, are not also relevant to the topics under 
discussion. By the same token, even when one criterion of distributive 
justice is highlighted as being particularly relevant to a certain 
department it should not be inferred that other criteria are irrelevant. 
The criteria are derived from concepts of need, status, merit, 
entitlement, desert, reward etc. Although such criteria are 
distinguishable conceptually, in reality they may not be completely 
separate. In other words in considering the programs of the Department of 
Veterans' Affairs we can highlight the concept of 'desert' and by so doing 
appear to overlook the relevance of status, contractual agreement, 
entitlement, and so on. But they are still relevant. The highlighting of 
one criterion serves a purpose. It helps to identify what can be 
considered the dominant motivation for departmental programs. 
The fact of a dominant motivation necessarily implies subordinate 
motivations and it would be a mistake to forget about these altogether. 
For the purpose of analysis it is necessary to unravel one strand of 
motivation and show the contribution it can make to an understanding of 
departmental objectives. But in reality many different strands of 
motivation are woven together in any procedure of administrative justice. 
The complexity of the consequent reasoning may prove disconcerting 
to those who prefer to interpret justice according to a single dominant 
scheme, like 'to each according to his needs'. Such a tactic has a 
simplicity which can make rhetorical arguments ~uund impressive, but it 
would be far too simplistic an approach to proposing a framework for 
understanding the current administration of a broad range of social welfare 
programs. It is true that the concept of need underlies the administration 
of all programs, but in itself it is not sufficient to allow for a 
differentiation of departmental programs on the basis of their dominant 
purposes. 
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When the information for the report on Income Maintenance Programs was 
being gathered, particular attention was paid to each program objective. 
An effort was made to ascertain whether various program objectives were 
consonant with a dominant departmental objective. Then a further question 
was asked: Does each department's major objective reflect a principle of 
operation? a guiding orientation? an i deal? From the evidence supplied 
it was apparent that three ideals were operative. In brief, they were 
merit, reward and need. 
Merit 
Merit is the dominant basis upon which the Department of Education 
distributes the benefits under its control. It is true that this 
department also has programs which are based on need and accordingly 
makes positive discrimination in favour of disadvantaged groups such as 
Aboriginals and children living in isolated areas. But the main tenor of 
its statement of objectives reflects the concern that all Australians 
merit equality of educational opportunity. 71 
For example, the purpose of the 'Tertiary Education Assistance Scheme ' 
is to widen educational opportunity by making post-secondary education 
more accessible to students. As part of its function, the department aims 
'to provide talented students with an opportunity for full intellectual 
development' and 'seeks to ensure a flow of highly trained personnel into 
the workforce'. Merit as well as being closely linked with the concept 
of opportunity is akin to the concept of 'promise'. The allocation of 
cash benefits to students is based upon the implicit promise that both the 
individual and the general community will subsequently profit as a result 
of the outlay. For this reason there is a certain affinity between the 
administration of the functions of the Department of Education and Youth 
Affairs, and the Department of Employment and Industrial Relations, insofar 
as both are based on the principle that every Australian merits an 
opportunity to make a successful and remunerated contribution to society. 
The Department of Employment and Industrial Relations directs many 
of its programs to those who have the status of being unemployed. It is 
also noteworthy that many of its programs have a distinct welfare aspect 
to them as the department has a number of programs which are clearly 
based predominantly on need, particularly those which are implemented 
for Aboriginals, disabled people and disadvantaged youth. In effect, 
71 Opus cit . (PAC) 
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DEIR responds to these groups' essential need for training and money to 
sustain them while they seek permanent paid jobs. However, the main 
purpose of this department is not alone to sustain those in need but to 
provide training to potential employees on the basis of merit. 
Merit is often understood in the same sense as desert, but for the 
sake of categorising the dominant emphasis in the administration of 
departmental programs, it is useful to distinguish the two. Merit refers 
to the quality inherent in a person and to his or her potential to make a 
useful contribution to society. Desert refers to deeds already done or 
contributions already made. 
The distinction can be made clearer by contrasting the primary 
motivation in the administration of two departments. The training and 
apprenticeship programs administered by DEIR are directed towards the 
unemployed on the basis of their merit as potential employees. Most of 
the programs administered by the Department of Veterans' Affairs are 
based on the principle that ex-soldiers deserve special benefits because 
they have already made a special contribution to society by serving in 
the Defence Forces. They contend that ex-soldiers should get their just 
deserts. 
Reward 
At this stage of the analysis it is appropriate to introduce another 
criterion of administrative justice: that of agreement. Normally this 
criterion is associated with commutative justice; but it can be used as 
a criterion of distributive justice in a discussion of the administration 
of government programs. Part of justice consists in keeping agreements. 
Men are free to enter into any agreement they choose and good things are 
then distributed in accordance with their entitlements under agreements, 
preferrably recorded in contracts. Such contracts determine the extent of 
rewards that will be given in exchange for work done. 
The Department of Defence submitted five programs in response to the 
inquiry?2 The dominant motivation in the administration of income 
72 Opus it . (PAC). 
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maintenance programs by this department is based on the criterion of 
agreement. In other words it is part of the work contract. What the 
department said of the purpose of one of its programs could be judged as 
being applicable to them all, when it states: 
The scheme is a component of the overall conditions of service 
package of members of the Defence Force. The total package is 
tailored to attract and retain the high quality manpower which 
a contemporary defence force requires to operate effectively. 
The Department of Veterans ' Affairs is a clear case of a claim for 
distributive justice based on desert. Desert is akin to compensation. 
This department states the principle which motivates its objective quite 
exp 1 i citly: 
The major objective of the department in relation to the 
administration of the Australian Repatriation system is 
based primarily on the principle of compensation to 
veterans and dependents, for injury or death related to 
service, a principle which has been extended to i nclude 
the tangible effects of this service upon general health 
and life expectancy. Compensation is provided in the form 
of monetary payments, a comprehensive treatment service 
and certain re-establishment measures. 73 
Furthermore, in response to the Committee's request for information 
on income maintenance programs, the Department of Administrative 
Services submitted data on two programs. One is a straight-forward 
subsidy to migrants in Commonwealth hostels which is given on a needs 
basis. The other is a redundancy payment program for departmental 
employees and can be considered as part of their work contract. 
Need 
Need is a basis of apportionment. The outcome of a department's 
administration of distributive justice based primarily on need can help 
some disadvantaged groups become 'more equal' to better-off groups in 
society. When departments give to different groups according to their 
need, then, although they will treat different groups differently, the 
result will be to equalise their positions in some important respects. 
If each person in the Australian community is given the medical treatment 
he needs, we will all end up, if not equally well, at least more so than 
if some were not given needed health care. 
73 Opus cit . (PAC) . 
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In the administration of income maintenance programs there is one 
way in which need is clearly defined. Many of the income maintenance 
programs examined by the Committee are subject to an income test. The 
fact of not having a certain level of income defines the need. The need 
makes the person eligible for certain programs. 
However, the doctrine that need alone is a proper basis for a fair 
distribution is a modern one. In days gone by it was not regarded as 
constituting any claim in justice at all, but only one for pity or 
generosity. However, in Australia today, need is considered a proper 
basis for implementing many departmental programs. In fact the actual 
payment of benefits on the basis of need is so widespread and so 
entrenched within the total system that any large-scale reduction of 
benefits could cripple the consumer economy. It is an ironical turn of 
events that nowadays not alone do individuals need benefits for their 
sustenance, but the economy also needs the disbursement of such payments 
for its sustenance. In other words government social welfare payments 
help to sustain consumer spending. However, an over-reliance on payments 
to the needy to fuel the economy can easily become counter productive. 
Need can be considered a dominant motivation of many departmental 
programs; but distribution according to need contains its own pitfalls. 
Unless the administrators carefully calculate and monitor the need, 
the resultant programs can create a dependency syndrome within a 
client population. Distribution according to need keys in with the 
-
passive stance that justice so easily engenders, as the following reasoning 
shows. 74 There is a fallacious argument in popular currency which goes 
like this. Groups do not create their own needs: they happen to them. 
If the distribution of social benefits is to be according to need alone, 
recipient groups do not have to exert themselves. They need not 
fear that they are being selfish nor pushing their own barrow 
at the expense of others in the community if they just take what 
is coming to them. Recipient groups are less likely to be accused of 
grabbing too much - as unionists and employer groups often are - because 
recipients of welfare are not doing anything, but merely letting justice 
take its course. Their case, it is maintained, rests on facts 
objectively known and impersonally assessed. 
74 Op .aU . (Lucas). 
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The appeal of such an argument is powerful, but misdirected. 
Distributive justice demands that the needy who cannot help themselves 
should be assisted by the rest of society. But justice is not 
obtained simply by an administrative system that makes more and more 
people, who would otherwise help themselves, dependent. Justice is not 
achieved by dependency and passivity, but by self-reliance and the kind 
of self-assertiveness that is expressed in a willingness to work for 
others as well as oneself. There is no special excellence in the 
impersonal character of need as a basis of assessment, as compared with 
the more personal bases of desert, agreement or a possibly subjective 
assessment of merit. 
The largest cheque-paying department of all, the Department of Social 
Security, expressed in its submission an awareness of an administrative 
dilemma. It stated that one of its objectives was 'to ensure that those in 
need received priority in assistance'. It then referred to a second 
objective: 'to ensure that self-help and incentives to work are not 
discouraged'. However, the actual provision of positive incentives to 
work (apart from rehabilitation programs) is not part of its mandate. 
The department can only withdraw benefits - which is more of a corrective 
action than a positive incentive to work. 75 
The most comprehensive review of income maintenance policy was the 
Henderson Poverty Report. It looked at income maintenance programs from 
the perspective of the clients, whereas the Parliamentary Committee's 
Report looked at them from the perspective of their administration. The 
major recommendation of the Poverty Report was that government should 
work towards implementing a guaranteed minimum income scheme. That 
recommendation has been by-passed by events. In the current recession, 
Australians are not enthusiastic about the idea of getting a guaranteed 
minimum income for all, but are much more concerned about a social policy 
which will provide guaranteed minimum work. It is through work that most 
people satisfy their needs independently of government. The criterion of 
need remains a pre-eminent consideration, but the method of satisfying 
need is not necessarily by an extension of the kind of welfare payments 
that are costly, unproductive and restrictive of personal freedom. The 
overall evidence contained in the submissions shows a lack of adequate 
consideration of the necessity for social policy to provide incentives 
75 Opus cit. (PAC). 
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to encourage work, and so provide a policy framework within which 
people can satisfy their own needs. 
Of the ten departments surveyed, the programs in which need is the 
dominant factor more clearly than others are those of the Welfare Branch 
of the Department of the Capital Territory . The services are directed 
towards those who are in genuine poverty . Although the programs are few 
in number and comparatively small in cost, they are significant in a 
Federal system because they show in miniature the kind of services based 
on need that are supplied by the departments of welfare in all the 
States. They also indicate the kind of poverty with which welfare 
departments and voluntary agencies cope throughout Australia. 
The Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs can make a special 
case based on need for their clients. Many of them are at a disadvantage 
when they arrive in a new country and need financial and other assistance 
to settle into the Australian community. So, it is not surprising that 
meeting cases of such special need is a priority consideration for this 
department. 
Aboriginals are eligible for a variety of services from the 
Department of Aboriginal Affairs (DAA), because of their special needs. 
The DAA submission indicated that their programs are intended 'to enable 
Aboriginals to have access to social and welfare services available to 
the rest of the community and to promote the participation of Aboriginals 
in the planning, management and delivery of welfare services to meet 
their special needs,.76 The submission also stated that 'The policy of the 
Department is to ensure that the training and education programs conducted 
by other departments accommodate Aboriginal needs to the greatest degree 
possible' (emphasis added).77 
Although need once established constitutes a good reason for 
allocating benefits, it is not always easy to determine exactly what 
claims are and what claims are not to be allowed as claims of need. 
Standards in society vary over time . Standards in departmental 
76 
77 
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assessment of need vary also. The Department of Veteran's Affairs uses 
different criteria to the Department of Social Security. 
As long as need is not the only basis of apportionment, ambiguity 
in its application can be overcome as administrative decisions can be based 
on some other criteria when need is uncertain; but were need to be made the 
only prime ground for offering government benefits, ambiguity in their 
application will give rise to dissension and in some cases to injustice. 
It would not be too difficult for many people to claim that they are in need, 
whether they are non-workers or workers. A working man on a minimum wage, 
which is still subject to taxation, may consider that some welfare recipients 
have luxuries he cannot afford. 
Status is less popular as a basis for the distribution of benefits, but 
in its broader meaning it is most relevant to the administration of income 
maintenance programs. Status and not need could be considered as the 
criterion of eligibility for the Family Allowance benefit administered by the 
Department of Social Security; for recipients of the allowance simply have to 
have the status of being Australian citizens or residents here. In the case 
of other programs eligibility criteria are specially designed for those who 
have the status of student, senior citizen, veteran, as well as for the 
migrant and the Aboriginal. 
The Department of Health's programs are also based on need. Most of 
its programs have a strong legislative base which means that citizens have 
a legal entitlement to many of its services. Health needs are basic, 
universal and costly. People do not claim to merit good health care: they 
claim to be entitled to it. In terms of administration, however, the 
concept of entitlement has a specific meaning. Entitlement differs from 
other criteria of justice in that it depends not just upon conventions 
or traditions, but most particularly on legislation. 
In the early 1970's the debate about universal health care was based upon 
the idea that it was an entitlement that the Federal Government should guarantee: 
hence the introduction of Medibank, Mark 1. However, the perusal of t he programs 
submitted to the inquiry by thp. Department of Health, shows that the department 
has traditionally emphasised guaranteeing this entitlement only for the aged 
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and the sick who are poor. Nevertheless, the entitlement to health 
care for some categories, notably the handicapped and the disabled, is 
universal and is not subject to a means test. In other words the extent 
to which the Federal Government is prepared to guarantee the entitlement 
varies. Recent practices show that the Federal Government's 
responsibility in the provision of health care is dealt with in three 
ways. The department administers programs (mainly through the States) 
for those in most immediate and greatest need; it subsidises private 
medical insurance companies; and continues to support the implementation 
of the public insurance scheme called Medibank. Thus the entitlement of 
Australians to health services is met in a variety of ways. 
In its submission the Department of Social Security also specifies 
a single dominant objective. It states that in relation to pensions and 
benefits, the prlme policy objective is to provide a basic level of 
income support below which no one can involuntarily fall. It also aims 
to ensure thattnose most in need receive priority in assistance. The 
observation that there are exceptions to this principle, such as the 
Family Allowance, does not detract from the pre-eminent fact that the 
~aison de ' etre of the department is to distribute benefits on the 
basis of need. 
Certainly other criteria of distributive justice influence this 
department's administration of its twenty- nine programs to millions of 
people, and to a variety of organisations. The carefully worded 
eligibility criteria for its services reflect the influence of 
considerations of status, merit, entitlement, agreement and desert. 
But helping those most in need is its dominant and wide - ranging purpose. 
A Paradigm for Presenting Information on Departmental Programs 
The foregoing reasoning provided a rationale which was used for 
the collation of the information received during the Parliamentary 
investigation into !Income Maintenance Progr~ms'. 
This rationale determined the inital order in which the programs of 
individual departments were reviewed . The consequent presentation of 
programs served to show up the disparity between the objectives of the ten 
depa rtmen ts . 
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In effect, the outcome of arranging the departments into this 
particular order provided the researchers with a framework which 
contributed to an understanding of how different departments stand in 
relation to each other. The cumulative purposes of all departments could, 
in a broad way, be embraced within the following single paradigm based 
on the flexible concept of distributive justice. 
Merit 
1. Department of Education 
2. Department of Employment and Industrial Relations 
Reward 
3. Department of Defence 
4. Department of Veterans' Affairs 
5. Department of Administrative Services 
Need 
6. Department of Capital Territory 
7. Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affai rs 
8. Department of Aboriginal Affairs 
9. Depa rtrnen t of Health 
10. Department of Social Securi ty 
After having arrived at the above outside framework to the jig-saw 
puzzle of information on programs, it then became easier to arrange 
the presentation of the data given in response to the questionnaire in 
an orderly fashion. All in all, the number of programs in the social 
policy area which were surveyed by this inquiry was 127. These were 
spread across departments as follows: 
Department of Education 10 
Department of Employment and Industrial Relations 21 
Department of Defence 5 
Department of Veterans' Affairs 11 
Department of Administrative Services 2 
Department of Capital Territory 10 
Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs 10 
Department of Health 19 
Department of Social Security 29 
Department of Aboriginal Affairs : 10 
TOTAL 127 
1 -
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It would be well beyond the scope of this dissertation to provide a 
description of the nature and function of the above mentioned programs . 
Those who wish to learn more about the quality of the administration of 
all programs or the empirical data gathered on each of them could read 
Report 213 of the Joint Parliamentary Committee of Public Accounts. 78 
The purpose of this dissertation, though, is rather to concentrate on the 
sociological-cum-philosophical reasoning for understanding the underlying 
motivation for program development. In the next and final chapter the 
continued exploration of the same theme opens up some new horizons for 
social pol icy. 
78 Opus cit . (PAC) . 
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CHAPTER 8 
CHOOSI NG HOW TO WORK TOl4ARDS SOC IAL JUSTICE 
Community Development Again 
At the beginning of this dissertation, in the second chapter on 
'A Paradigm for Community Development', consideration was given to how 
new development can occur in local communities. Such development can be 
fostered by innovative government action. The development can be 
nurtured by government departments which are sufficiently receptive to 
local initiatives to use them to affect their own departmental policies. 
Thus the organisational interaction that can occur between local 
communities and government agencies can bring a profit to both 
participants. That chapter ended with a definition of community 
development which stated that it entailed: 
... the activity of giving purpose to a new institution, 
generating its functioning and integrating its relationships. 
That second chapter argued that socio-economic development can occur 
from the bottom up. Socio-economic development also occurs from the 
top down. When the Commonwealth of Australia was established, its 
founding fathers were also engaged in an exercise that could be 
described as 'the activity of giving purpose to a new institution, 
generating its functioning, and integrating its relationships'. 
Each department of the Commonwealth Government is an institution which 
has a mandate to perform a certain function which brings a benefit to those 
who are in the relationship to it of being the recipients of its services. 
Some departments cater for those citizens who are in greatest need of 
assistance from the Commonwealth. Other departments administer programs 
which reward those who have contributed to the common good. Still other 
departments provide services which provide opportunities to those who 
merit them; precisely because they have the capacity to contribute more 
to the common good eventually as a result of the assistance they receive 
initially . 
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The Dominance of the Need Principle in Social Policy 
However, it is apt to point out here that there is a strong bias 
in the Commonwealth Constitution in favour of the distribution of benefits 
which are based on need. Section 51 of the Commonwealth of Australia 
Constitution Act states that: The Parliament shall, subject to this 
Constitution, have powers to make laws for the peace, order and good 
government of the Commonwealth with respect to a range of functions. This 
range of functions makes specific reference to invalid and old age, widows 
pensions, child endowment, unemployment, pharmaceutical, sickness and 
hospital benefits, medical and dental services ... benefits to students 
and family allowances. 
In other words authority for the allocation of a variety of benefits 
is enshrined in the Constitution. Furthermore, specific legislation 
derived from the authority of the Constitution gives a solid administrative 
base to a range of programs which distribute over 10 billion dollars. 
Almost all these programs are based primarily on need. By contrast, the 
Constitution has no complementary list of powers to prompt the Parliament 
to pay benefits to individuals on the basis of merit. So, it is more 
than accidental that the amount of money which the Parliament expends on 
the administration of social benefits on the basis of need dwarfs the 
amount it expends on the basis of merit. 
This does not imply that the Commonwealth Government does not have 
the executive power to spend money on the basis of merit. It has such 
power. But the vast weight of tradition in legislative and administrative 
practice clearly favours expenditure based on need. Nevertheless, inasmuch 
as it is accepted that the total administrative system is a mechanism of 
distributive justice, then it must be acknowledged that there are other 
criteria for distribution . 
The Importance of the Merit Principle in Social Policy 
For instance, it has ' been argued in the previous chapter that both 
the Department of Education and Youth Affairs, and the Department of 
Employment and Industrial Relations can be considered as having good 
reason to base the administration of their programs on the merit 
principle . Unfortunately education and employment are often considered 
as simply welfare departments. 
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This is understandable inasmuch as these two departments are caught 
in the 'needs ' based trap . To the extent that their programs are designed 
to sustain those in need, then the two departments belong in the welfare 
policy area. On the other hand if the basic philosophy of these 
departments put more emphasis on 'merit' or even on 'reward' then they 
could belong more to that area of social policy which is concerned not so 
much with sustenance as with development. Then both the educat i on and the 
employment department would have greater affinity with departments like 
the Department of Science and Technology, the Department of Industry and 
Commerce, and even the Department of Housing and Construction, and the 
Department of Resources and Energy. These latter departments, however, 
are usually considered to belong to the 'economic' area, while education 
and employment are compartmentalised in what is described as the 'social' 
area - or even in the 'social welfare' area. Such compartmentalisation 
does not fit in well with the Federal Government 's goal of economic 
recovery. 
Rewards in Social Policy 
Other departments base some of their services on a reward principle 
the Department of Veteran's Affairs being the classic example of this 
motivation for the provision of services. When a service is done, a 
reward is appropriate. This is an idea that gains general acceptance. 
Arguments occur about who should get what reward and how great or how 
little the reward should be. The following quotation illustrates this 
point. 
79 
One could say it was wrong to pay one man more than another 
because there should be distribution according to needs. One 
could say it was wrong to pay the lazy scientist more than the 
dilligent dustman because there should be distr i bution according 
to effort. One could say it was wrong to pay the intelligent 
more than the stupid because society should compensate for 
genetic injustice. One could say it was wrong to pay the stupid 
more than the intelligent because society should compensate for 
the unhappiness which is the usual lot of the intelligent. (No 
one can do much about the brilliant, they will be miserable anyway) 
One could say it was wrong to pay people who li ked their 
work as much as those who didn't. 
One could - and did - say anything, and whatever one said it was 
always with the support of the particular kind of justice 
invoked by principles implicit in the statement. 79 
Young, W. The Rise of Meritocracy . Penguin, New York, 1961. 
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But this does not really prove that distributive justice is a 
confused concept or that no further elucidation is possible. What it 
does show is that, like in wage cases before the Arbitration Commission, 
there are arguments on all sides which have to be considered and assessed 
before it is possible to decide which of them are relevant to the 
particular distribution in question, and how much weight should be given 
to them . 80 
Even so, it is seldom possible to ascertain, with preC1Slon and on 
a perfectly rational basis, why anyone group should be rewarded so much 
more than another. Questions of benefits, like questions of wages, are 
influenced by considerations of common-sense, tradition, law, arbitration, 
~olitics and philosophy. The outcome is an expression of the operation 
of past and present social policies, wherein some groups are well 
rewarded and others are r.ot. In a sense the whole of our socio-economic 
system can be considered as a complicated web of contracts which give 
wages to some and benefits to others. These contracts may be either overt 
or covert, formal or infonnal, traditional or newly establ ished, and may 
be rooted in convention or in legislation. 
The inquiry which was conducted by the Joint Parliamentary Committee into 
that aspect of social policy which was reflected in the current administration 
of income maintenance programs was broad in its scope. Nonetheless since it 
concentrated on income maintenance programs mainly in the welfare are, it 
too had its limitations. It did not cover all social policy. The fact that 
others also get rewards may be hidden or overlooked. Manufacturers and 
importers benefit from tariffs and quotas; those in rural industry are 
assisted with subsidies and bounties; and many groups have, over the years, 
acquired tax concessions for themselves. Consequently, when considering 
rewards that are distributed as benefits, these can be related to the wider 
web of benefits that governments confer on different groups through what can 
be called either its implicit or explicit social policy. 
A Re-Evaluation of Social Policy 
The evolution of social policy to its present state is plainly 
reflected in current administrative practices. The latter are the result 
of a continuous political process during which numerous issues are dealt 
with and, repeatedly, settled and changed and settled again. Be that as 
80 
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it may, every once in a while, it is valuable for policy analysts to 
evaluate the system as a whole to ascertain whether or not a proper balance 
is being maintained between its various components and asking such 
questions as: 
(i) whether there is a key indicator which shows how well 
social policy is working? 
(ii) whether there is a salient goal implicit in its current 
administration? 
(iii) whether social justice can be facilitated by such a goal? 
The Key Social Indicator 
To begin this process it was necessary to further refine the context 
within which the data in the income maintenance study was being examined. 
When the focus of public policy is on economic measures, then inflation 
is generally considered to be the best indicator of their success or 
failure. On the other hand when one is considering social issues, it is 
unemployment which becomes the critical barometer that indicates how well 
the social services will be able to cope. 
The slowdown in economic activity and the consequent high rise of 
unemployment constitutes a major challenge to the administration of 
income maintenance programs. Until the present crisis unemployment 
levels have been low enough to be tolerated and the national socio-
economic system has been able to bear the cost of the volume of 
unemployment without difficulty. Not so today. With unemployment 
running at many times its pre-recession level, the long-term ability of 
the economy to cope with social commitments becomes a matter of doubt. 
Not only is the volume of the unemployed to whom benefits must be 
paid now larger: there is also a substantial loss of revenue in terms 
of contributions and taxes which amounts to much more than the cost of 
paying unemployment benefits. This is a point of quite critical 
significance. 
The Institute of Fiscal Studies in London has done a study to show 
statistically that the cost to the English national exchequer8 of using 
benefits as a response to unemployment should be reckoned as three times 
81 -t)·lnot-, A.'vf. and Monis, G.N. The Exchequer Costs of Unemployment, 
Fiscal StL!dies, Vol.2, No.3, London, ,!ovember 1981. 
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greater than the actual money paid out in unemployment benefits. This 
implies that when government is calculating the cost of unemployment, 
it should not alone reckon on the cost of actual payments but should also 
include the amount of personal and indirect taxes foregone by the 
failure to have everyone who wants to work productively employed. On 
this calculation, instead of Australia 's bill for unemployment being the 
official figure of SM1,SOO~ it would be closer to the mark to have the 
real cost ~eckoned as $M4,SOO. Such a calculation puts a different 
complexion on the significance of this particular social service. Add to 
that the realisation that the level of unemployment acts as a barometer 
indicating the increased need and rising costs of other social services. 
Some social groups are harder hit by unemployment than others and 
increasingly, as high levels of joblessness persist, new groups are being 
forced across the boundaries of poverty to join those who traditionally 
form the poorest sections of society. The social problem is further 
accentuated by the continued rapid growth of expenditure on health care, 
the probably irreversible increase in the indexation of pensions and 
benefits and the demographic trend towards an aging population. At the 
very time when revenue is growing more slowly, social welfare services 
in general are being called upon to meet heavy increases in expenditure. 
Indeed, the longer the present recession lasts, the greater the danger 
that revenue in relative terms will decline. But the demand for a 
multiplicity of social services continues to grow. This puts the whole 
basis of current social policy administration on trial. The consequent 
gradually growing concern about the ability of the system to cope is 
serious enough to cause a re-assessment of current perspectives on 
traditional administrative practices. 
The issue for the social welfare system is not simply one of 
increasing expenditure; it is even more so an issue of effectiveness. 
In spite of its relatively high cost to society, the extension of 
coverage to ever broader sections of the population, progressive 
increases in benefits and the introduction of arrangements for their 
indexation, the social welfare system remains a relatively ineffective 
system for the re-distribution of resources. Most people on benefits 
remain poor. A large section of those who depend on social services 
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live a precarious existence. Social services alleviate poverty: they 
do not solve it. 
In 1981, the OECD published a set of conference papers under the 
title of 'The Welfare State in Crisis' .82 The preface describes the 
core of the problem which the delegates confronted. Basically the 
crisis consists in a clash between social and economic policies. It 
became clear at the conference that the financial crisis of social 
services is closely related to high levels of unemployment not only 
because of the growing burden of unemployment compensation, and not only 
because of a loss of revenue on account of uncollected taxes; but 
because unemployment has an impact on a wide range of social 
expenditures. One way out of the crisis is to recognise the necessity 
of a progressive re-modelling of current social programs. 
This re-modelling of programs can be initiated by first of all 
making some conceptual distinctions. One can consider the actual 
administrators of each program as forming in themselves a service 
institution. In other words, a group of people within a department 
are so 'arranged' in order that they may provide a particular service. 
For the sake of analysis the receivers of a service can be considered 
as a separate institution. As receivers of a particular service they 
are 'arranged' into a particular category in accordance with the way 
in which both the administrators of programs and the general community 
think about them. For example, the providers of the war widows' 
pension can be considered as an institution in their own right; and 
the actual war widows themselves can be recognised as a separate unit 
within society at large. Moreover, the effort to improve programs 
can be considered in the light of improving the relationship between 
these separate, though complementary, institutions. 
Firstly the relationship between the givers and the receivers of 
services can be made better by re-evaluating the adequacy of the 
mandate for each program, whether this is provided by ministerial 
decree, .cabinet decision or legislation. Secondly, the relationship 
82 OECD. The Welfare State in Crisis. 
in the 1980 IS. Pa ri s, 1981. 
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can be made more satisfactory for both sides of the 'arrangement' by 
continuously striving to streamline the efficiency of the management 
practices whereby the service is delivered. In essence this entails the 
best possible use of money and personnel for the attainment of program 
objectives. Thirdly the relationship can also be made more fruitful by 
constantly seeking to obtain more accu rate data on the effectiveness of 
a program to the extent that its services succeed in satisfying its actual 
receivers. 
Another way to achieve a more fundamental re-modelling of the 
social system would be to begin to make explicit the goals, ideals and 
~ilosophies which are currently implicit in the operation of the public 
service. 
A Sa 1 i en t Goa 1 
Each program of each department can be considered in the context 
of each department's salient objective. In the submissions to the 
Parliamentary inquiry into the administration of income maintenance 
programs, it was possible to identify accurately the salient goal of a 
number of departments. Among the ten departments surveyed, some were able 
to provide a better statement of their dominant purpose than others. Those 
who specified their department's salient goal in a single succinct 
statement were best able to follow this up with a clear description of the 
efficiency and effectiveness of their services. 
For example, one can pick three out of the ten departments and 
identify their programs as being based upon principles of justice: 
(i) The salient goal of the Department of Social Security is: 
To provide, for those in need, a basic level of income 
below which no one may involuntarily fall. 
(ii) The salient goal of the Department of Veterans' Affairs is: 
To compensate veterans and their dependants. 
(iii) The salient goal of the Department of Employment and Industrial 
Relations is: To provide employment opportunities. 
......... 
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However a policy analyst may not be satisfied by capturing a 
salient goal for each department and then examining the functioning 
of each department in the light of the achievement of that goal. 
In as much as he is a moderate realist, with a calculated appreciation 
of the value of achieving a synthesis, he will want to identify a 
salient goal for the functioning of all the ten departments, 
considering them as a single, composite social welfare system. 
When he has achieved an appreciation of such a goal then an 
assessment of the contribution that can be made to it by each 
department becomes much easier. In present circumstances, in order 
that this single goal may be adequately comprehensive it has to be 
composite in its form. Given this pre-condition, it can be expressed 
as follows: 
The goal of social policy is to manage the government's 
relationships to a variety of institutions in the national 
community in a way which gives balanced attention to: 
(i ) the need to sustain those in need; 
(i i ) to compensate those who make valuable contributions 
to the common good; and 
(i i i ) to provide opportunities to those who show promi se 
of being able to make such contributions. 
This goal is comprehensive enough to cater for the dominant purposes 
of all the ten departments surveyed in the inquiry into the 
administration of income maintenance programs. This goal also 
constitutes one of the most important conclusions to be drawn both 
from the data derived from empirical methods of sociological research 
and also from the processes of philosophical reasoning which have been 
outlined in the preceding chapters. 
The Practical Advantages of an Ideal 
Although the above goal was used as a conceptual framework for 
a co-ordinated presentation of information on income maintenance 
programs, this does not imply that the same kind of co-ordination 
..... 
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exists in fact. Nonetheless, if senior managers choose to use the 
goal as a means of achieving the greater integration of social policy, 
or the greater co-ordination of programs within departments, then 
improved administration could be the result. 
The above goal was arrived at as a consequence of reasoning about 
distributive justice. But when the same goal is reflected upon in 
the light of the previously defined concept of social justice, then 
it takes on a new dimension. In this more general context a goal can 
do more than provide a way of understanding the present purpose of the 
social welfare system. A goal can be used to anticipate how the system 
might be developed in the future. This is so because a goal is like 
an ideal. To us an analogy, it is like a beacon which can provide a 
bearing for senior managers. It can give a sense of direction either 
for the management of current public policy or give rise to a new 
direction for it. Insofar as one considers that senior managers should 
be held responsible for the continuous promotion of social justice, 
a series of questions could be asked. Herewith are some examples: 
Firstly, there is the logical problem of whether the ideal of 
servicing need and the ideal of opening up opportunities are contradictory 
or contrary to each other. If the ideals are contradictory, then if 
an administrator chooses one he must reject the other. By contrast, 
if the ideals are contrary to each other, then even though it will 
be impossible to avoid tension, should it not be possible to formulate 
social policy in a way which will maintain a proper balance between 
them? 
Secondly, when the Department of Social Security made its submission 
to the Public Accounts Committee for Report 213, it gave expression 
to a dilemma it faced: assistance to those in need entails the risk 
that self-help and incentives to work are discouraged. In other words, 
the regulations for servicing need may have the effect of preventing 
people from making the best use of whatever opportunities to work are 
open to them. Those who are prepared to risk taking on a job run the 
risk of at least a temporary loss of benefit. 
One way out of this dilemma might have been for the Government to have 
chosen to adopt the recommendation of the Henderson Poverty Report for 
...... 
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a guaranteed minimum income for everyone. However, this recommendation 
was rejected when it was first made in 1975 and it is unlikely to 
become acceptable in the foreseeable future. Even so, the fact that 
a universal guaranteed minimum income was rejected does not mean that 
the Commonwealth Govern~ent might not consider opting for its 
implementation for selected categories of beneficiaries who are 
particularly disadvantaged. For instance, a guaranteed minimum income 
could be given to disabled people on the basis of their obvious need. 
In this case they would not lose the benefit when they had enough 'get 
up and go' to make the best use of their opportunities to earn money 
through productive work. Such a policy could be implemented to explore 
the choice of whether to stabilise the basic level of payments on 
benefits and to increase the level of discretionary earnings. In brief, 
the question becomes, could such a shift in policy be conducive to a 
less dependent and more productive society? 
Thirdly, the question could be asked whether a sharper specification 
of ideals by the Department of Employment and Industrial Relations (DEIR ) 
could help to make it more effective in generating more permanent 
employment? Certainly, the evidence in Report 213 shows that DEIR 
favours a concentration on the ideal of helping those in greatest need, 
i.e., those who are long-term unemployed and most disadvantaged. It 
would seem that Rawl 's principle of 'maximin' (most should be given to 
those with least) is in the ascendancy in DEIR's administration.* It 
could be argued, though, that in order to get a better return on public 
funds and to lessen long-term high rates of unemployment, assistance 
should be targetted towards those most likely to benefit rather than 
those most in need. No doubt DEIR would contend that a balance should 
be maintained between the two ideals. But based on the realisation that 
other departments channel a large proportion of the national budget 
towards the ideal of servicing those in need, it is fair to ask the 
question whether DEIR would make a better contribution to social policy 
as a whole if it gave priority in its administration to the ideal of 
providing opportunities to those who could make the most use of them? 
Fourthly, the question could be asked whether the Commonwealth 
Government is channelling too much money into servicing need and not 
* Rawls, J., A Theory of Justice, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 
1971. 
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enough into providing opportunities for those who could use them both 
to their personal advantage and the advantage of the general community. 
Report 213 showed that in 1981-82 $10 billion was expended by the 
Department of Social Security mainly on need, while only $167 million 
was spent by the Department of Employment and Industrial Relations, 
ostensibly on opportunity. Since then, in the 1984-85 budget, over one 
billion dollars has been allocated to the Employment Department. This 
would seem to indicate that the political arm of government recognises 
the importance of greater funding of departments which generate 
opportunities. However, to the extent that administrators in departments 
continue to concentrate on the ideal of servicing need, is there not a 
danger that chances to encourage those who could make the most of their 
opportunities to gain permanent employment could be lost? 
Fifthly, the ideal of rewarding those who provide important services to 
the national community is most in evidence in the rewards that are 
given to ex-servicemen by the Department of Veterans' Affairs. However, 
if as has already been discussed, unemployment is the key indicator of 
how social policy is working, should not greater rewards be given to 
those who generate employment? Insofar as research shows that the small 
business sector has the greatest potential to generate jobs in 
particular places, should not that sector be organised locally so as to 
be able to claim greater rewards for actual ising its employing potential? 
Sixthly, since the identification of a goal for social policy provides 
an overview of how the current system of social welfare services is 
administered, and how it might be improved, could a research project 
be implemented to show how well integrated are those departments which 
service economic development and how well co-ordinated are the programs 
within the various departments concerned? 
This dissertation does not give answers to these questions; but 
it does give a demonstration of how such questions can be derived 
from a rational analysis of current social policy. The analysis begins 
with direct and immediate knowledge of facts and situations. This 
provides the foundation for the clarification of sensible definitions 
for sociology, social policy, social justice and the like. From these 
definitions it is possible to derive hypotheses and principles for 
. .... 
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empirical research. This in turn can lead to a fuller understanding 
of social policy and to the possibility of identifying accurately an 
implicit goal that is operative in its adninistration. In turn, such 
a goal can be elevated to the status of an ideal and used to pose 
questions for subsequent translation into hypotheses, empirical research 
and increasing knowledge. So, the process of using soc~ological 
methods for understanding social policy can become dynamic, iterative 
and practical. Thus a policy analyst with a moderate realist 
philosophy can join with others in working towards the attainment of 
the ideal of social justice. 
Complementarity Between Empiricism and Idealism 
This dissertation provides sufficient reasons for a policy analyst 
to choose to make a succinct statement about the ideal of social justice 
which could be considered as a conceptual framework within which 
much empirical research could be done: 
A greater degree of social justice is achievable through 
the planning by the Parliament for administration by the 
public service of proqrams for distributina burdens and 
benefits to various institutions within the national 
community. 
The research into all the ramifications and consequences of the situation 
to which this statement refers would be all the better to the extent 
that it was informed by both empiricism and idealism. 
In an imperfect world, there will always be room for improvement 
in social policy. It is clear from Report 213 that its present 
administration could be better integrated and more purposeful in the 
pursuit of social justice. It could be argued that many of the weaknesses 
of the present system could be attributed to an over-reliance on an 
empiricist philosophy - seldom articulated, but often apparent. As a 
general rule empiricists are uncomfortable with idealism. They prefer 
to operate with things as they are. They are seldom protagonists of 
long-term goal setting. ~onetheless, the failure to set long-term 
objectives can often result in the lack of a guiding orientation for 
current administrative practices and lead to inefficient and even 
ineffectual programming. 
, 
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Empiricism is an adequate philosophy when the eco nomy is buoyant. 
But when the economy falters and the social situation aeteriorates, 
then, although empiricism does not cease to be relevant, it often 
does not supply the dynamism to lead to remedial action. Empiricists 
may be satisfied to observe things, quantify them and explain what is 
happening, and even to continue to do so when the economy is so bad 
that most people are frustrated by continuous explanations of what is 
happening. Those who are most immediately affected by a recession 
are not helped by being given a theoretical analysis of how bad things 
are. 
It is at this stage that people who are idealists have a better 
chance of being given a hearing. They are prepared to reason about 
the choices that have to be made to reach long-term objectives - and to 
reason with the people who have the power to make such choices. 0 
the extent that idealists can give well argued reasons for making such 
choices they can contribute more to the attainment of social jwstice. 
The success of the Hawke Government's National Economic Summit Conference 
in 1983 is a good example of how those who were motivated by the ideal 
of co-operation between conflicting interest groups did more to 
improve the economy that empiricists who maintained that the economic 
situation had to be accepted as it was. 
By a process of reasoning about choices, idealists can set goals 
for public administration. But this reasoning itself is dependent upon 
the knowledge-base provided by prior empirical research and subsequently 
more empirical research has to be done to discover the best method of 
reaching the goals desired. In philosophy, sociology and public 
administration, empiricists need interaction with idealists just as 
much as idealists need interaction with empiricists. Indeed, it is 
on the basis of this common-sense principle that the whole of this 
dissertation on the relationship between 'Sociology and Social Policy' has 
been written, and it is from this basic principle that its conclus 'ons 
have been derived. A policy analyst who is a moderate realist can 
reconcile empiric i sm with idealism in a realistic appraisal of what can 
be done to use the science of sociology to attain the ideals of soc ' al 
policy and thus contribute to the aim of improving social justice in 
public affairs. 
1 
1 
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May those in public administration who grasp the importa nce of 
ideals have the pragmatism to get them wor king in practice . In effect 
may their idealism form a bridge between the policies that are currently 
in operation and those that are, even now, obviously required in the 
immediate future. For the 1988 celebrations the Australian Bicentennial 
Authority has chosen as its central theme the concept of 'Living 
Together'. Both sociology and social pol i cy are all about living 
together . The purpose of this study has been to argue the case that the 
clear perception of a sensible relationship between the two could lead to 
the provision of reasons for more finely balanced policy decisions. This 
in turn could make the living together better for the millions of 
Australians - both taxpayers and beneficiar ' es - who form the clientele 
of the Commonwealth's public administration. 
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